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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE

-

OMNIBUS

GRAND JURY WITNESS WHO HAS
CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1968 BEEN GRANTED TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY MAY REFUSE TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS WHICH ARE BASED UPON INFORMATION DERIVED FROM
UNAUTHORIZED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.

In re Egan (3d Cir. 1971)
Sister Joques Egan was called to testify as a witness before a federal
grand jury.' Upon the Sister's refusal to testify on fifth amendment
grounds, the Government served her with a grant of "transactional
immunity. ' 2 When she appeared before the grand jury again, Sister Egan
refused to testify on several grounds, one being that the information which
prompted the Government to subpoena her, and which was used to
formulate questions presented to her, had been obtained through illegal
wiretapping and electronic surveillance. She was then brought before the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and
instructed to answer the questions. Upon her refusal, Sister Egan was
held in contempt. Initially, a three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed,8 but upon rehearing
en banc, the Third Circuit vacated the contempt citation and remanded the
case,4 holding that section 2515 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
1. The grand jury was investigating an alleged plot to kidnap a high public
official, to destroy government property, and to commit several other federal offenses.
An indictment had been returned against six defendants, naming Sister Egan as a
co-conspirator but not as a co-defendant.
2. Sister Egan was granted immunity in accordance with the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. III, § 2514, 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970).
The Act provides that a grand jury witness who is compelled to testify cannot be
prosecuted on account of any matter to which his testimony related, and that such
testimony cannot be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding against the witness.
As a result of this immunity, Sister Egan could not be prosecuted in relation to any
offense which the grand jury was then considering.
3. The panel held that: (1) the alleged procedural and constitutional defects
attending the application for immunity and the contempt hearing did not deprive
Sister Egan of due process; (2) the scope of the immunity granted to her extended
to all crimes then under investigation; and (3) a witness before a grand jury lacks
standing under the fourth amendment to complain of any illegal electronic surveillance, since the scope of the grand jury as an investigative tool should not be restricted and because sufficient protections would be available should the witness
become a defendant in a criminal trial. In re Egan, No. 71-1088 (3d Cir., Mar. 2,
1971), rev'd, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3279
(U.S. Dec. 14, 1971) (No. 71-263).
4. The case was remanded to the district court for a hearing to determine
whether the questions propounded to Sister Egan resulted from, or were based upon,
illegal electronic surveillance directed at her. 450 F.2d at 217. Throughout its opinion,
the Third Circuit assumed that the surveillance was conducted illegally.

(524)
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Streets Act of 19685 is an express prohibition against the use, before a
grand jury, of evidence derived from oral communications improperly
obtained and, therefore, Sister Egan could properly refuse to answer any
questions based upon illegally intercepted oral communications. In re Egan,
450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Dec. 14,
1971) (No. 71-263).
Historically, the grand jury has served two functions: (1) as a body
of accusers; and (2) as a protector of citizens from unfounded complaints.
While the English judicial system made use of the grand jury originally
as an accusatory body and later as a protective body,7 it was the latter
function which the framers of the United States Constitution chose to
emphasize, as evidenced by the fifth amendment. 8 Although in America
the grand jury has historically been regarded as a protective body, 9 it has
also served a valuable inquisitorial role' 0
While a witness before a federal grand jury is not afforded all the
rights of a defendant at trial,' the Supreme Court has held that the
witness is entitled to the benefits of the fifth amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination.' 2 However, in recognition of the grand jury's in5. 18 U.S.C. §2515 (1970).

This section provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of
the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a state, or a political subdivision
thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
6. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 556-57 (1884) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
7. For a review of the English grand jury system, see Kennedy & Briggs,
Historical and Legal Aspects of the California Grand Jury System, 43 CALIF. L. REv.
251, 251-58 (1955); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REv.
101, 101-18 (1931).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury . . . ." See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362
(1956); Note, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DUKE L.J.
97, 97-101.
9. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) ; Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 545-48 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa.
1933). One function of a grand jury is universal - the indictment of persons
accused of crime upon a finding of probable cause. See Note, The Grand Jury, Past
and Present: A Survey, 2 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 119, 122 (1964).
Generally, a grand jury consists of fifteen to twenty-three people of good reputation. Usually twelve members must concur in order to return a "true bill" of indictment. The body's term is set by the court; its proceedings are conducted in secrecy;
strict rules of evidence are usually not adhered to; it has subpoena power, and can
compel any witness, other than a defendant, to appear. The grand jury has great latitude with respect to what it may probe. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282
(1919) ; In re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1931) ; United States v. Smyth, 104 F.
Supp. 283, 296-98 (N.D. Cal. 1952). The grand jury itself is powerless to adjudge
contempt and must depend upon a court to try and adjudge contempt proceedings.
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49-51 (1959) ; Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d
209, 212-13 (1st Cir. 1954).
11. See, e.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957) (witness before federal grand
jury does not have a constitutional right to representation by counsel). See note 14
infra.
12. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562-64 (1892).
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vestigatory function, statutory grants of immunity have been used as
an effective means of securing needed testimony. s
As an additional means of introducing testimony before the grand
jury, the strict procedural rules normally adhered to at trial have been
greatly relaxed. 14 Thus, "[t]he prevalent judicial attitude seems to be
to permit the grand jury a wide and unfettered range of examination, and
deny the individual witness any standing to protest the nature or scope
of his testimony, so long as his privileges are not transgressed.' 15 Because
of its peculiar characteristics,' 6 there has been much disagreement as to
the applicability of the exclusionary rule in the grand jury context. 17
13. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896). There, the Court held that
the federal government has the power to grant immunity from future prosecution,
thereby enabling it to compel a witness to make what would otherwise be incriminating
statements. The Court's rationale was that the purpose of the fifth amendment is fully
served by the statutory immunity.
Immunity statutes have been employed extensively in administrative agencies, congressional committees, grand juries and trial courts. See Note, Federal Immunity Statutes: Problems and Proposals, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1276 (1969). At the present
time, there is a conflict among the circuit courts as to whether "use" immunity or
"transactional" immunity must be given to the witness in order to effectively displace
the fifth amendment's privilege. Compare Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Kastigar v. United States, 402 U.S. 971 (1971), with In
re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub nonm. Korman v. United
States, 40 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. June 18, 1971) (No. 70-303). See 17 VILL. L. REV.
559 (1972).
14. For example, a witness before a grand jury cannot object to questions posed
on grounds of incompetency or irrelevance. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282
(1919) ; Nelson v. United States, 201 U.S. 92, 115 (1905) ; United States v. McGovern,
60 F.2d 880, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1932). Nor may a witness before the grand jury challenge the authority or the jurisdiction of the grand jury, provided it has a de facto
existence and organization. 250 U.S. at 282. Furthermore, indictments based on hearsay
are valid. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956). Consequently, unless
the witness is able to claim a privilege or object to evidence under rule 41(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor may present any evidence he desires to the grand jury. See notes 92-97 and accompanying text infra. See generally
Note, Exclusion of Incompetent Evidence from Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 72
YALE L.J. 590 (1963).
15. Silverstein, Federal Grand Jury Testimony and the Fifth Amendment, 1960
WASH. U.L.Q. 215, 216. Among the privileges which have been accorded to a witness
before a grand jury are the following: (1) the husband-wife or marital privilege,
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951) ; (2) the attorney-client privilege, United
States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) ; (3) the physician-patient privilege, Application of Grand Jury, 286 App. Div. 270, 143 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1955) ; (4) the reporter's
privilege, Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted., 39
U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. May 3, 1971) (No. 70-1114). Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has held that the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked
by a grand jury witness. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
16. See notes 10, 11 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
17. Compare In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947) and Foley v. United States,
64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933), with Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1952) and
United States ex rel. Rosado v. Flood, 394 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855
(1968). In Fried, the court stated that an attempt should be made to suppress irrelevant
and incompetent evidence. The court first noted that indictments inflict serious harm
upon people, and until reprehensible activity on the part of government officials is
eliminated, our claim to civil liberties will be an empty boast. The court realized
that the judiciary could do little to reprimand such misconduct, although its powers
include the ability to screen from a grand jury evidence secured by official illegality.
161 F.2d at 458-60. In Foley, the court stated that it could restrain aggressive or
unlawful conduct by government officials through controlling, at the pre-indictment
stage, the improper preparation of evidence. 64 F.2d at 3. In Centracchio, the court
stated that permitting prospective defendants to suppress improperly obtained evidence would greatly impede the administration of criminal justice, and reasoned
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Accordingly, some illegally obtained evidence is admissible in grand
8

jury proceedings.1

Congressional concern with the admissibility generally of evidence
obtained through illegal electronic surveillance has led to the enactment
of two major pieces of legislation. The first wiretapping statute, section
605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934,'9 prohibited the interception and publication of any telephonic communication made without
the authorization of its sender. After a series of cases, the Supreme Court,
in 1957, held that "[s]ection 605 contains an express, absolute prohibition
against the divulgence of intercepted communications. '20 The statute
has been applied to both state and federal officers, 21 as well as private
23
persons, 22 and has included intrastate as well as interstate communications.
However, there have been several decisions inconsistent with the above
interpretation. Specifically, the Court has created important exceptions
to its "express, absolute prohibition" construction of section 605 with
respect to: (1) what constituted an "interception" ;24 (2) what constituted
a "divulgence" ;25 and (3) who had standing to object to the use of illegal
26
wiretap evidence.
Congress' second attempt to handle the electronic surveillance problem
is embodied in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
that it would not be in the public interest to allow another dilatory motion at the
pre-indictment stage. 198 F.2d at 388. The holding of Rosado was that a witness
before a grand jury does not have the right to impede its collection of evidence by
raising issues which might be meritorious if raised by an indicted defendant. 394
F.2d at 141.
18. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966). The Court held that even if
incriminating evidence was obtained from a defendant in violation of the fifth amendment, at most the defendant would be entitled to suppress the evidence and its fruits
at trial. The Court further stated that the general common law rule is to admit
evidence at a grand jury proceeding despite its illegal origins. Id. at 255; accord,
Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 348-50 (1958) ; Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) ; United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253, 257 (E.D.N.Y.
1970). The rationale advanced for the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence
is that the adherence to procedural safeguards at trial will adequately protect the
accused and any interference at the grand jury stage would unnecessarily hamper its
investigative function. See Note, supra note 14, at 591. But see notes 92-97 and
accompanying text infra. These latter comments indicate that any "aggrieved person"
may make pre-indictment motions to suppress evidence obtained in violation of his
fourth amendment rights.
19. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964). This section provides in pertinent part:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.
20. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102 (1957).
21. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) ; Nardone v. United States,
302 U.S. 379 (1937).
22. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
23. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 329 (1939). For a discussion of the
Weiss and Nardone decisions, see notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text, infra.
24. See Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957). The Rathbun Court
concluded that listening in on a conversation by means of a regularly used extension
phone did not constitute "interception" of that conversation. Id. at 109. See notes
48 & 49 infra.
25. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) ; Goldstein v. United
States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
26. See Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). For a discussion of
the cases interpreting section 605, see notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text infra.
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Title III is a comprehensive ban of all unauthorized

electronic surveillance, and the interception of wire or oral communications

is authorized only when it is made pursuant to a court order issued upon
a showing of probable cause. 28 Unless so authorized, the information
obtained via the surveillance is inadmissible in any judicial proceeding,
including a grand jury. 29 Title III also provides that any "aggrieved
person," 80 in any trial or other judicial proceeding, may move to suppress
evidence obtained in violation of the Act. 8'
The question of whether a grand jury witness has standing, under
section 605 or under Title III, to suppress evidence illegally obtained
has not been considered by many courts.82 Prior to In re Egan, only two
courts had addressed this question specifically, and both had held that
the witness lacked the requisite standing."
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to 2520 (1970). Title III supersedes section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964). See Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance - Title III of the Crime Control Act of 1968,
23 RUTGERS L. REV. 319, 326 (1969).
28. 18 U.S.C. §§2516, 2518 (1970).
29. 18 U.S.C. §2515 (1970). See note 5 supra.
30. 18 U.S.C. §2510(11) (1970), provides:
"[A]ggrieved person" means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire
or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (10) (a) (1970), provides inpertinent part:
Any aggrieved person in any trial,
hearing, or proceeding in or before any

court .. . or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political sub-

division thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom ...
32. Standing involves the question of whether the person making the motion is
the "proper party to raise the claim of illegality and to seek the remedy of exclusion." Grove, Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence: The Standing Requirement on its Last Leg, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 150 (1968). The Supreme Court has
stated :
[T]he nexus between the status asserted by the litigant and the claim he presents are essential to assure that he is a proper and appropriate party to invoke
federal judicial power.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
With respect to the fourth amendment, the standing requirement is justified on
the grounds that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule will be only marginally
advanced, and the public interest disproportionately injured, by allowing every such
person to suppress. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969). For a
discussion of the exclusionary rule and the standing requirement, see Note, Eavesdropping and the Constitution: A Reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment Framework,
50 MINN. L. REv. 378 (1965).
33. Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 935 (1970) ; United States ex rel. Rosado v. Flood, 394 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968).
In Rosado, the petitioner was granted immunity and compelled to testify. Nevertheless, Rosado refused to answer the prosecutor's questions, claiming that the information upon which the questions were based was secured when the Government
intercepted messages to which he was a party, thereby violating section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act. The court held that:
[A] witness usually cannot impede collection of evidence by the grand jury
even though the issues he seeks to raise could later be litigated - perhaps with
success - by an indicted defendant ....
Id. at 141.
Carter presented a factual situation very similar to Rosado and In re Egan.
Though the court's broad language denied a grand jury witness the right to suppress in accordance with section 2518(10) (a), (see In re Shead, 302 F. Supp. 569,
570-71 (N.D. Cal. 1969)), the situation differed in one significant aspect; namely,
the petitioner was vicariously asserting a fourth amendment violation. Cf. United
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In holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2515 is an express prohibition against the
use, before a grand jury, of evidence derived from the contents of oral
communications improperly obtained, the Egan court reviewed Congress'
purpose in passing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.84 The court recognized that the Act had a dual
purpose: (1) to protect the privacy of wire communications; and (2) to
preserve the integrity of the judicial system by excluding illegally obtained
evidence. 35 Further, the court stated that Congress, in order to effectuate
this two-fold purpose, adopted, in section 2515, the judicially approved
practice of not only excluding from use as evidence the contents of the
illegally obtained communication, but also prohibiting the Government from
using any and all information derived therefrom. 6 Once stating the dual
States v. Gelbard, 443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3279
(U.S. Dec. 14, 1971) (No. 71-110) ; United States v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743 (9th
Cir. 1971) ; Dudley v. United States, 427 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1970).
Within two months of the date of the Third Circuit's decision in In re Egan,
the exact question presented in the instant case was considered by two other circuits. Compare In re Bacon, 446 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1971) (rejecting petitioner's
contention that 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a) grants a grand jury witness standing to
make a motion for the suppression of unlawfully obtained oral communications),
with In re Evans ,..
F.2d -------(D.C. Cir. 1971), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W.
3091 (U.S. Aug. 20, 1971) (No. 71-256) (holding that a grand jury witness does
have the right, under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a), to make a motion for the suppression
of unlawfully obtained oral communications).
34. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510 to 2520 (1970). For the legislative history of the Act, see S. REP. No.
1097 & H. REP. No. 488, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2112-2309 (1968).
35. 450 F.2d at 209. To support this conclusion, the court relied on section 801
of Title III, which provides in part:
(b) In order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications,
to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings . . . it is
necessary for Congress to define on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be
authorized ...
(d) To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or
oral communications where none of the parties to the communication has consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court
of competent jurisdiction. . . . Interception of wire and oral communications
should further be limited to certain major types of offenses ..
18 U.S.C. §2510 (1970). Furthermore, an examination of the legislative history
of the Act amply supports the court's view of the Act's purposes. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1968); 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112,
2156, 2184-85 (1968).
36. 18 U.S.C. §2515 (1970). See note 5 supra. In Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928), the plea for the Government to refrain from exploiting its own
illegality was eloquently stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen ...
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare
that in the administration of criminal law the end justifies the means - to
declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction
of a private criminal - would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious
doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 485 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Brandeis' view has been cited repeatedly with approval. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
This same position was recently reflected by the Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 13 (1968) (by excluding illegally obtained evidence, the Court refused to legitimize unlawful police action by withholding the "constitutional imprimatur").
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purpose of the Act and the method adopted for its accomplishment, the
Egan court had little difficulty in concluding that in the instant case, the
district court had an absolute duty to follow the express direction of
Congress, as found in section 2515.3 7 In ordering Sister Egan to answer

questions which might have been based upon information obtained through
illegal wiretapping and electronic surveillance, the district court had acted
inconsistent with the legislative command and contra its duty under
the statute.
The Egan court found support for its interpretation of section 2515
8
in the case of Nardone v. United States.3
In Nardone, federal agents,
by tapping telephone wires, had obtained information incriminating petitioners. The agents later testified in court as to what they had heard.
The Supreme Court ruled that the agents had violated section 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934, reasoning that the "plain words" of that
section forbade the divulgence of the intercepted communication. Relying
on its supervisory powers, the Nardone Court held that any evidence
obtained by any person, including federal agents, in violation of section
605 was inadmissible in a federal court.3 9 The Egan court stated that
section 2515 is a much stronger prohibition against the use of the contents
of illegally intercepted oral communications than is section 605; the
former expressly excludes such evidence from a criminal proceeding,
whereas the exclusion in Nardone was accomplished through the Court's
40
use of its supervisory powers.
Finally, the Egan court rejected the Government's contention that
the grant of transactional immunity under section 2514 deprived Sister
Egan of standing to raise section 2515 as a bar to the use of the intercepted communication. The court reasoned that although Sister Egan
could no longer complain of any fifth amendment violations, being fully
protected by the immunity provided her, it would be a non sequitur to
conclude that she had also lost her right to complain of fourth amendment
violations. The Sister retained a substantial interest in preventing the
Government from exploiting her illegally invaded privacy by using the
fruits thereof, and consequently could complain of the Government's
41
misconduct.
37. 450 F.2d at 209.
38. 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (hereinafter referred to as Nardone I).
39. Id. at 382. Nardone I was subsequently relied upon by the Court in Benanti
v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 99 (1957), which held that evidence obtained through
illegal wiretaps conducted by state officials was inadmissible in a federal criminal
proceeding. The Court stated:
The crux of those decisions [Nardone and Schwartz] . . . is that the plain
words of the statute created a prohibition against any person violating the
integrity of a system of telephonic communication and that evidence obtained
in violation of this prohibition may not be used to secure a federal conviction.
355 U.S. at 100. In Schwartz, the Supreme Court had held that evidence obtained
from unlawful wiretapping conducted by state agents was admissible in state criminal proceedings. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). The Schwartz decision
was expressly overrulcd by Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385 (1968).
40. 450 F.2d at 210. See note 5 supra.
41. 450 F.2d at 210.
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The reasoning advanced by Egan in rejecting the Government's contention that the granting of immunity cured any fourth amendment
violations is undoubtedly sound. Immunity serves to displace the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, not the fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The fourth
amendment serves a dual purpose: it protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures and prevents governmental use of the fruits of such unlawful
activity. 42 Accordingly, the Government had violated the amendment at
the time of the unauthorized electronic surveillance, and Sister Egan had
a right to complain of this accrued violation. The grant of immunity which
precluded her prosecution would not be an adequate means of vindicating
her rights. The court's reasoning is in accordance with Title III which,
with regard to electronic surveillance, has substantially the same purposes
as the fourth amendment. 43 Moreover, if the Government's argument is
accepted, the Government can invade citizens' privacy at will, so long
as they are granted immunity from prosecution. Such a result would be
directly contrary to the purpose of both the fourth amendment and Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act.
While the majority's opinion is apparently in accord with the congressional purpose, 44 the Egan court has left its ruling susceptible to attack
by deciding the issue on such narrow grounds. Several problems remain
unanswered if section 2515 is interpreted as totally prohibiting the use
of illegally intercepted oral communications. For example, section
2518(10) (a) 45 limits those who may make a motion to suppress illegally
obtained wiretap evidence. By reading section 2515 to be a flat all-inclusive
prohibition, the majority in Egan has implicitly overruled the limitations
of section 2518(10) (a), since section 2515 declares that all such illegal
evidence shall be excluded without defining those who have standing to
suppress it and irrespective of whether the movant is within the pro42. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court stated that the fourth
amendment protects: (1) a man's home from unlawful invasions; and (2) the man
from the use of evidence against him obtained as a result of such invasions. Id. at
656-57. While the fifth amendment has been likened to the fourth amendment, (see
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633, (1968)), and the fourth amendment cannot
be interpreted as establishing a general "right to privacy," (see Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), noted in 13 VILL. L. REV. 643 (1968)), it is submitted
that the privacy granted by the fourth amendment is more comprehensive than any
privacy afforded by the fifth amendment. For example, the fourth amendment protects a citizen from intrusion by the Government any time he has a subjective expectation of privacy and he justifiably relies upon that expectation, (see Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)), while the fifth amendment's protection attaches only when he is asked a potentially incriminating question.
Cf. Camera v. Municipal Court, 287 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). Also, the fourth amendment protects against both the unlawful invasion and the consequences of such action,
(see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)), whereas the fifth amendment only protects against the introduction, at trial, of the fruits of such an invasion. See note 35
and accompanying text supra.
43. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.

44. Id.
45. Section 2518(10) (a) limits those who may make a motion to suppress
to "aggrieved persons." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a) (1970). See note 31 supra. For a
discussion of this limiting phrase, see notes 60-91 and accompanying text infra.
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visions of section 2518(10) (a). 46 Secondly, the Egan court has totally
ignored the legislative history of Title III. While the history does not
clearly express the congressional intent, it contains several statements
which warranted comment, 47 especially in view of the possibly conflicting
commands of sections 2515 and 2518(10) (a). Finally, the court's succinct
reliance on Nardone, while sound, failed to recognize the exceptions to
the Nardone rule48 and to explain why Nardone rather than its exceptions
46. The court based its opinion that the judgment of contempt should be vacated
on the fact that the district court did not follow the express mandate of section
2515, totally ignoring the fact that the district court had an obligation to follow the
express mandate of section 2518(10)(a), as well as that of section 2515. Of course,
if the district court were to follow section 2518(10)(a), it would have to decide
whether Sister Egan, as a grand jury witness who has been granted transactional
immunity, falls within the limiting phrase "aggrieved person," since only an "aggrieved person" may suppress in accordance with section 2518(10) (a). Furthermore,
since the Supreme Court, in Alderman, has stated that the phrase "aggrieved person"
in section 2518(10)(a) is to be interpreted in accordance with the case law construing rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Egan court,
by relying solely upon section 2515, has avoided the problem of determining whether
a grand jury witness has standing, under existing case law, to make a pre-indictment motion to suppress. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 n.9 (1969).
See note 91 infra.
47. See notes 60-82 and accompanying text infra.
48. The Nardone rationale was subsequently reiterated in the second Nardone
case. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (hereinafter referred to as
Nardone II). In Nardone II, federal agents intercepted telephone messages and
the Government used this evidence at petitioner's trial. The Court held that even
though nothing in the language of section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934
would prohibit the Government's actions, in order to effectuate the policy which
Congress had formulated both direct and indirect uses of the illegally obtained evidence must be forbidden. Id. at 340. The Nardone II rationale was applied and extended in Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). In Weiss, intrastate telephone communications were intercepted by federal agents and used to obtain confessions from co-conspirators of the petitioner. These co-conspirators were permitted
to testify as to the contents of the intercepted messages at the petitioner's trial. The
Court held that such governmental use of the intercepted messages violated the Act
since section 605 applied to intrastate as well as interstate communications.
However, the rationale of the Nardone decisions has not been so clearly applied
in later cases. For example, in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942),
federal agents illegally tapped the telephone conversations of two of petitioner's
co-conspirators. When these co-conspirators were confronted with the illegally
obtained information, they agreed to become state witnesses and were allowed to
testify at Goldstein's trial. The Court distinguished the Nardone cases on the tenuous
grounds that the wiretapped information was not introduced at trial and the witnesses did not testify as to the existence or content of the wiretapped messages.
Id. at 118-19. Justice Murphy, dissenting, criticized the Court's distinction. Id. at
122. The Court in Goldstein held that testimony induced by unlawfully intercepted
messages was admissible against a person not a party to the conversation, even
though the wiretaps had been illegal.
Approximately the same time that Goldstein was decided, the official position
of the Department of Justice and the FBI became known. Both agencies took the
position that section 605 did not prohibit wiretapping per se, but only wiretapping
that was followed by "divulgence" or "publication," and, further, that use of the
wiretap information within government agencies was not a "divulgence." See, e.g.,
Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 197-99
(1954); Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 793 (1954). This
position has never been questioned by the Court, even though substantially the same
problem raised by this practice was presented to the Court in Goldstein. 316 U.S. at
122. For a criticism of the Government's position, see Donnelly, Comments and
Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63 YALE L.J. 799, 799-802 (1954).
The third major qualification of the rule and reasoning of the Nardone cases
was created in Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957). In that case, the
Court held that there was no "interception" of a telephone message when wire-
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was followed. 49
Although the vacating of Sister Egan's contempt citation was based
upon the foregoing reasoning, all eight judges, in various combinations,
advanced other lines of reasoning either in support of, or contra to,
Sister Egan's position. 50
Judge Rosenn, in his concurring opinion, asserted that it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue involved 5' and preferred to
predicate his conclusions upon the express language of three provisions
of Title III: (1) section 2510(11),52 which defines "aggrieved person;"
(2) section 2515, 53 which forbids the use before a grand jury of evidence
secured through unlawful electronic surveillance; and (3) section
2511 (1) (c), 4 which makes it unlawful to disclose, or attempt to disclose,
information obtained through unlawful electronic surveillance. Judge
Rosenn concluded that when the Government attempted to disclose information obtained through unlawful electronic surveillance, by interrogation of Sister Egan based upon this information, it violated section
tapping was done with the consent of one of the parties to the telephone conversation. The Rathbun majority reasoned that "one party may not force the other to
secrecy merely by using a telephone." Id. at 110. The dissenting justices maintained
that the wording of section 605 forbade any divulgence "not authorized by the
sender." Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (holding that one
may not object to the use of evidence obtained through illegal electronic surveillance
unless his own fourth amendment rights had been violated by the surveillance).
49. The holdings of the Nardone cases established a broad, all-inclusive rule
prohibiting both direct and indirect use of illegally obtained information through
wiretapping. Even though in subsequent cases the Court qualified its holdings in
Nardone I and Nardone II, it has never allowed the Government to use wiretap
information either directly or indirectly against a surveilled person in a judicial
proceeding, except in the Rathbun case, where the Court found that one party to the
conversation had consented to the wiretap. Thus, while the Court has loosened the
concept of "divulgence" and thereby permitted the Government to make use of
wiretap information outside of a judicial proceeding, the Nardone rationale would
still cover the factual situation presented in the instant case; that is, the use by
the Government of unlawfully obtained evidence in a judicial proceeding against the
victim of the Government's illegality.
50. Four judges (Hastie, Rosenn, Seitz and Van Dusen) agreed with the
majority opinion; that is, part II of Judge Adams' opinion. Three judges (Hastie,
Seitz and Van Dusen) agreed with the concurring opinion of Judge Rosenn. Only
Chief Judge Hastie agreed with parts I and III of Judge Adams' opinion. Judges
Aldisert and Forman concurred in the dissenting opinion of Judge Gibbons.
51. 450 F.2d at 218. Judge Adams, in part III of his opinion in which Chief
Judge Hastie concurred, also discussed the issue of whether Sister Egan had a
constitutional right to refuse to answer the Government's questions.
450 F.2d at
210-17. See notes 98-112 and accompanying text infra.
The majority opinion and the concurring opinion of Judge Rosenn agreed that:
(1) the court's decision was in keeping with the purposes and spirit of the legislation; (2) the court's decision would discourage governmental and judicial misconduct; and (3) the granting of immunity did not cure any fourth amendment violations. 450 F.2d at 220-21.
52. 18 U.S.C. §2510(11) (1970). See note 30 supra. While Judge Rosenn
recognized that "aggrieved person" is to be interpreted according to the existing
standing rules, (see notes 83-91 and accompanying text infra), he had little difficulty in including Sister Egan, a non-defendant witness before an investigating
grand jury, within this definition. Although Judge Rosenn made no attempt to
demonstrate the validity of this conclusion, it would appear that a non-defendant
witness may be an "aggrieved person" under existing standing rules. See notes
83-91 & 98-112 and accompanying text infra.
53. 18 U.S.C. §2515 (1970). See note 5 supra.
54. 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(c) (1970).
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2511 (1) (c), and thereby triggered the evidentiary sanction of section 2515
which forbade such disclosure or questioning. 55
Next, the concurring opinion addressed the Government's contention
that section 2518(10) (a) did not provide a grand jury witness with
standing to make a motion to suppress. Judge Rosenn commented that
even if section 2518(10) (a) were unavailable to a grand jury witness,
the facts of the instant case required the vacating of Sister Egan's contempt
citation.
Judge Rosenn reasoned that when the Government attempts
to elicit testimony directly from an "aggrieved person," as opposed to
introducing information by other means, such a person may refuse to
testify pursuant to section 2515 and cannot be held in contempt for his
refusal.5 7 Therefore, Judge Rosenn concluded that, regardless of whether
section 2518(10) (a) provided standing, section 2515 prevented Sister
Egan, as an "aggrieved person," from being compelled to answer questions
which were based on information obtained through the unlawful electronic
surveillance.5 8
Although the reasoning of Judge Rosenn's concurring opinion is
more comprehensive than that of the majority, and more persuasive, certain
questions remain unresolved. For instance, a grand jury witness is given
standing to object, without an attempt on the part of either the majority
or concurring opinion to explain the effect of the limitations found in
section 2518(10) (a). Secondly, the concurring opinion placed the attempted
elicitation of the contents of an intercepted message from an aggrieved
person himself on a special plateau, without any explanation for the
distinction between that situation and the introduction of the information
by other means. Moreover, it is difficult to understand the relevance of
such a distinction. If section 2515 is to stand alone as the basis for the
majority and concurring opinions, then that section would bar the admission
and use of any evidence obtained in violation of the wiretapping provisions
of Title III, and there would, or should, be no difference whether the
person moving to suppress that evidence is or is not the vehicle through
which the Government seeks to introduce the evidence. Finally, Judge
Rosenn stated that the rule of the instant case was merely that "aggrieved
persons" can not be forced to testify under these circumstances, thereby
55. 450 F.2d at 218.
56. Id. at 219.
57. Id. Judge Rosenn concluded that this constituted the rule of the case. However, this "rule" is enigmatic. Nothing in section 2515 differentiates between the
"aggrieved person" and the evidence itself. Furthermore while section 2511(1) (c)
prohibits one from wilfully disclosing information unlawfully obtained, section 2511(d)
permits one who was a party to the conversation to divulge its contents. A possible
basis for Judge Rosenn's statement is that compounding the invasion of a person's
privacy by compelling him to reveal the message's contents himself would be an
added infringement upon his rights and, therefore, should not be allowed.
Although the holding of every case is limited somewhat by the factual situation
presented in that case, the Eqan court did not state that their holding was to be
restricted to the "rule" stated by Judge Rosenn. In fact, the majority opinion, if
taken in its full import, would make no distinction on the basis of whether the
"aggrieved person" is, or is not, before the grand jury.

58. 450 F.2d at 219-20.
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disavowing a broad interpretation of the majority opinion which would

prohibit the introduction of the evidence through any means.
While the majority opinion found it unnecessary to decide either
the constitutional issue involved or the questions concerning section
2518(10) (a) and the Act's legislative history, and the concurring opinion
ignored the constitutional question presented by the instant case, five judges
addressed these problems specifically. On both issues, the judges disagreed. 50
Since Sister Egan, in her capacity as a witness before an investigating
grand jury, had attempted to prevent the use of information obtained
through allegedly illegal electronic surveillance of her conversations, the
first major question raised by the facts was whether a grand jury
witness has standing to make a motion to suppress under section
2518(10) (a). This section is the appropriate statutory provision under
which an aggrieved person may attempt to suppress evidence excludable
by section 2515. However, a reading of the text and legislative history
of section 2518(10) (a) reveals two problems. First, while section 2515
states specifically that information obtained in violation of the Act may
not be received in evidence before a grand jury,6 0 section 2518(10) (a)
does not expressly include the grand jury as an appropriate forum for
the making of a suppression motion. 6' Secondly, the legislative history
of section 2518(10) (a) states: "[b]ecause no person is a party as such to
a grand jury proceeding, the provision does not envision the making
2
of a motion to suppress in the context of such a proceeding itself. '6
Judge Gibbons in his dissenting opinion argued that by reading the language
of section 2518(10) (a) and its legislative history together, the congressional
intent that the grand jury be permitted to consider the improperly obtained
evidence was made apparent.6 8
With respect to the first problem, Judge Adams asserted that the
absence of the words "grand jury" in section 2518(10) (a) was of no conse59. Judge Hastie concurred with Judge Adams in parts I and III of his opinion.
judges Aldisert and Forman concurred with Judge Gibbons in dissent. The reasoning of Judge Adams is particularly important since his opinion answers many of the
questions which the majority opinion raises. Thus, it is Judge Adams' reasoning
that provides the justification or legitimacy for the majority's decision. Part I of
Judge Adams' opinion, dealing with the application and legislative history of sections
2515 and 2518(10) (a), takes on added significance since Chief Judge Bazelon, in
writing the opinion of the court in In re Evans . ......
F.2d _--- (D.C. Cir. 1971),
petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3091 (U.S. Aug. 20, 1971) (No. 71-256), relied
very heavily upon the reasoning advanced by Judge Adams in this portion of his
opinion.
60. 18 U.S.C. §2515 (1970). See note 5 supra.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a) (1970). See note 31 supra.
62. S.REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1968), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 2112, 2195 (1968).
63. Judge Gibbons noted that section 2518(10) (a) reads "[a]ny aggrieved person in any trial, hearing" and reasoned that since a person in a trial is referred to
as a "party," section 2518(10) (a) was meant to include "aggrieved parties" only.
Furthermore, Judge Gibbons stated, a witness before a grand jury is not a "party,"
citing Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919). When the judge combined this
analysis with the statement in the legislative history that section 2518(10) (a) was
not envisioned for use in a grand jury proceeding, he concluded that the congressional intent to exclude the suppression motion at a grand jury proceeding became
evident. 450 F.2d at 228-30.
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quence, noting that the general language of the section read: "any aggrieved
person [may make a suppression motion] in any ... hearing or proceeding
,,64 A grand jury
. . . before any . . . authority of the United States ....

operates under the "authority of the United States" and consequently is
included within the general language of the section. 65 Next, Judge Adams
observed that Sister Egan was an "aggrieved person" according to the
statutory definition contained in section 2510(11),66 since she was a party
to the intercepted communication and was the person against whom the
interception was directed. Therefore, he concluded, the absence of the
words "grand jury" from section 2518(10) (a) was not meant to preclude
an "aggrieved person" from making a motion to suppress in such a
proceeding if the prohibition of section 2515 was about to be violated.
Satisfied that Sister Egan, as an "aggrieved person," could move to
suppress illegally obtained surveillance evidence in a grand jury proceeding pursuant to section 2518(10) (a), Judge Adams faced the more
formidable problem presented by the legislative history. After a careful
analysis of what had been said concerning section 2518(10) (a), 6 7 the
judge concluded that the history was ambiguous and therefore not dispositive of the issue of whether Sister Egan could use the section.
Although the legislative history declared that a suppression motion
was not meant to be made in a grand jury proceeding, Judge Adams
observed that confusion resulted when this statement was juxtaposed with
the sentence that followed it in the Senate report and which stated that
normally all relevant evidence may be presented to the grand jury.08
Judge Adams reasoned that the qualifying word, "normally," implied exceptions, and supported this analysis by reference to several situations in
which relevant evidence may be excluded from grand jury proceedings.
For example, the witness need not give testimony that would be self64. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a) (1970). See note 31 supra.
65. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). There, the Court held that the examination of witnesses before a grand jury is a "proceeding" within the meaning of a provision which declared that "no person shall be prosecuted . . . in any proceeding . . .
under certain acts. Id. at 66. The Court declared that "[the word [proceeding]
should receive as wide a construction as is necessary to protect the witness in his
disclosures .

. . ."

Id. at 66. In Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327

(1940), the Court stated that "[tihe Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part
of the judicial process." In any event, federal law defines the proceedings in which a
motion to suppress may be made and specifically includes a grand jury as an appropriate forum for a motion to suppress. 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (1970).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1970). See note 30 supra.
67. The passage in the legislative history which "explained" the scope of section
2518(10) (a) reads in pertinent part:
This provision must be read in connection with sections 2515 and 2517, discussed
above, which it limits. It provides the remedy for the right created by section
2515. Because no person is a party as such to a grand jury proceeding, the provision does not envision the making of a motion to suppress in the context of such
a proceeding itself. Normally, there is no limitation on the character of evidence
that may be presented to a grand jury, which is enforcible by an individual. (Blue
v. United States, 86 S. Ct. 1416, 384 U.S. 251 (1965)). There is no intent to
change this general rule.

S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1968), 2 U.S.

CODE CONG.

2112, 2195 (1968).
68. See note 67 supra.
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incriminating;69 certain witnesses may move to suppress evidence in
accordance with rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ;70
and the common law privileges of husband-wife, attorney-client, and
physician-patient may prevent the grand jury from hearing relevant evidence. 71 The conclusion drawn by Judge Adams was that if common
law doctrines, such as the privileges last mentioned, are sufficient to
permit a grand jury witness to refuse to testify in certain limited situations,
a similar result was compelled by an express statutory command that certain
evidence be excluded - section 2515.72 Furthermore, with respect to
the reference in the legislative history to United States v. Blue,73 purportedly supportive of the general rule regarding the admissibility of all
evidence before a grand jury, it was reasoned that since Blue involved an
alleged violation of the fifth amendment and a subsequent motion to quash
74
an indictment, it was inapposite to the facts of the instant case.
Judge Adams' analysis of the legislative history's explanation of
section 2518(10) (a) adequately displays the confusion inherent in the
Senate report. Not only does the legislative history fail to qualify the
overly broad statement as to the admissibility of evidence before a grand
jury, 75 but a literal reading of its explanation would create an anomaly
in the Act.76 It is apparent that section 2515 excludes from the grand
jury's consideration evidence obtained in violation of Title II, and it is
69. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (e). See notes 92-97 and accompanying text infra.
71. See note 15 supra. Cf. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. May 3, 1971) (where a reporter was
granted the qualified privilege of not revealing the sources of his information to an
investigating grand jury).
72. 450 F.2d at 206.
73. 384 U.S. 251 (1966). Blue involved a pre-trial motion to quash an indictment
because incriminating evidence had been obtained in violation of petitioner's fifth
amendment privilege. The Court held that even assuming petitioner's contentions were
correct, at most, Blue would be entitled to suppress the evidence at trial. The Court
reasoned that petitioner's remedy did not extend to the barring of the prosecution
altogether since the ends of the exclusionary rule would not be increased significantly
by such a ruling. Id. at 255-56.
74. 450 F.2d at 212.
75. See note 15 supra and notes 92-97 and accompanying text infra.
76. Judges Gibbons, Forman and Aldisert did not address this point. The thrust of
the dissenting opinion was that the majority had created a "witness-privilege" that
would greatly impede the administration of criminal justice by causing excessive delay
and the exclusion of relevant evidence. According to Judge Gibbons, this unqualified
witness-privilege would allow the aggrieved person to testify or to withhold his
testimony as he chose to do; neither the Government nor the defendant would be able
to compel that person's testimony. 450 F.2d at 221-22. However, the dissent never
explained why it interpreted the majority opinion as creating a witness-privilege.
Although the legislative history mentions certain common law doctrines that may be
used to exclude evidence from the grand jury, (see note 71 and accompanying text
supra), the majority opinion made no reference to these exceptions, but instead
grounded its holding solely in the wording of section 2515. Furthermore, the majority
opinion did not create a witness-privilege, but, in fact, stated specifically:
In framing the legislation in question [section 2515], Congress adopted a traditional
judicial approach to Fourth Amendment problems - a prohibition against the use
of evidence seized in violation of the Amendment, and also a prohibition against
the use of evidence acquired by the Government as a result of the inhibited conduct.
450 F.2d at 209. Even Judge Adams in part I of his opinion specifically stated that
his opinion did not create a witness-privilege. 450 F.2d at 202.
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also clear that section 2518(10) (a) provides the procedure for the enforcement of the prohibition which section 2515 establishes.7 7 A literal reading
of the legislative history would indicate that the statute should be interpreted as meaning that a grand jury is precluded from hearing illegally
obtained surveillance evidence, but that there is no means of preventing
its introduction. There would be in effect a right to exclusion of the
evidence but no remedy for the vindication of that right. Such an
interpretation would not only invite ridicule, but would also be contrary to
one of Congress' purpose in enacting Title III - the preservation of the
integrity of the judicial system by the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence.7 8 Accordingly, Judge Adams' interpretation of the two provisions follows the general principle of judicial construction that a statute
is to be interpreted so as to give effect to all of its provisions.7 9 Moreover,
his reading avoids the apparent effect of the majority opinion; that is,
the implied overruling of the limitations imposed by section 2518(10) (a).8o
Finally, in view of the purposes of the legislation,"' Judge Adams has
interpreted the statute in accordance with the principle expressed in
Nardone v. United States, that "meaning must be given to what Congress
has written, even if not in explicit language, so as to effectuate the policy
' 82
which Congress has formulated. "
A related problem confronted by Judge Adams in part I of his
opinion concerned the Supreme Court's reference to section 2518(10) (a)
in Alderman v. United States.s8 In Alderman, the defendant had moved
to suppress evidence allegedly obtained through the illegal electronic surveillance of his co-defendant. In the course of explaining its ruling that
fourth amendment rights may not be vicariously asserted,8 4 and therefore
that the defendant lacked standing to object," the Alderman Court stated
that Congress has the authority to enact legislation abolishing the standing
requirement, thereby permitting anyone to suppress improperly obtained
evidence. The Court referred to section 2518(10) (a), indicating that
the phrase "aggrieved person" was to be interpreted in accordance with
77. See notes 5, 31 & 67 supra.

78. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1970) ; note 35 and accompanying text supra.
79. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1886).
80. See notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1970) ; note 35 and accompanying text supra.
82. 308 U.S. at 339.
83. 394 U.S. 165, rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 939 (1969).
84. Id. at 174-75. Fourth amendment rights are personal rights and, therefore,
only that person whose personal rights have been violated by illegal government action
may move for the suppression of evidence obtained thereby. For example, if the fourth
amendment rights of A have been violated, and evidence obtained from that violation
were introduced at the trial of B, B would have no standing to complain of the violation of A's rights or to object to the introduction of the evidence. See note 91 infra.
85. The Court stated:
[S]uppression of the product of a fourth amendment violation can be successfully
urged only by those whose rights were violated by the introduction of the damaging evidence. Co-conspirators and co-defendants have been accorded no special
standing.
Id. at 171-72. Faced with this clear holding, Judge Adams did not attempt to justify
Sister Egan's right to move for the suppression of evidence on the basis of her status
as a co-conspirator.
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rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 0 and with existing
87
standing rules.
With respect to its applicability in the instant case, Judge Adams
quickly dismissed one of the remarks of the Alderman Court concerning
section 2518(10) (a) ; namely, that the section was to be construed in
accordance with existing standing rules. The Supreme Court, in Alderman, as Goldstein v. United States 9 and Jones v. United States,90 enunciated
these guidelines for determining who has standing to object. However,
since these cases dealt with defendants in a trial setting, Judge Adams
declared them inapposite to the instant case. 91
86. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) provides in pertinent part:
(e) Motion for Return of Property and to Suppress Evidence. - A person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court . . .
for the return of the property and to suppress for use as evidence anything
so obtained ....
87. 394 U.S. at 175 n.9.
88. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
89. 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
90. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
91. In Jones, the Court stated:
In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
one must have been a victim of a search and seizure, one against whom the search
was directed ....
362 U.S. at 261. The following language appears in the Goldstein opinion:
It has long been settled that evidence obtained in violation of the prohibition
of the Fourth Amendment can not be used in a prosecution against the victim of
the unlawful search and seizure if he makes timely objection.
316 U.S. at 120. See note 85 supra.
The major factual distinction between these cases and the instant case is that
the three Supreme Court cases dealt with a defendant in a criminal trial, while the
instant case concerned an unindicted and unindictable witness before a grand jury.
Nevertheless, the common basis of these Supreme Court cases is that in order for one
to have standing, one must have had his personal rights violated; he must have been the
"victim" of the illegal activity. When it is recalled that the purpose of the fourth
amendment is to protect the individual's privacy, as well as to prevent the introduction
at trial of the fruits of the invasion, (see note 42 supra), it is apparent that Sister
Egan's rights were violated by the unlawful surveillance of her. Thus, she falls within
the guidelines set down by the Supreme Court and should be protected from further
invasions of her privacy. Sister Egan would have standing under existing standing
rules. See notes 109-112 and accompanying text infra.
In declaring these cases inapposite, Judge Adams dismissed another problem
raised by the legislative history. The Senate Report stated that the phrase "aggrieved
person" mentioned in section 2518(10) (a) was "intended to reflect existing law,"
citing, inter alia, Goldstein and Jones. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 91
(1968), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2179-80 (1968). Both Goldstein and Jones
dealt with a defendant's right to standing. By declaring them inapposite, Judge Adams
avoided the implication that Congress had intended to limit the class of persons who
had a right to suppress to defendants alone. 450 F.2d at 204.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gibbons took the opposite view. When he
read the legislative history, he understood Congress to mean that section 2518(10) (a)
was to be limited to the facts of the cases mentioned; that is, the phrase "aggrieved
person" was intended to include only defendants in a criminal action. 450 F.2d at
226-27. Examining this passage of the legislative history in isolation, it appears that
Judge Gibbons' interpretation is the more appropriate. However, when the legislative
history is viewed in toto, this particular passage becomes just one more instance of
the confusing references contained in that history, and the interpretation of the legislative history given by Judge Adams gains more credence. See notes 60-82 and
accompanying text supra. Furthermore, although reports are entitled to weight when
construing a statute, the reports are not the provisions enacted by Congress. Consequently, it is the wording of the statute itself, and not the legislative history, that
ultimately must be interpreted by the court. Cf. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss3/4

16

Editors: Recent Developments

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

Judge Adams then proceeded to analyze rule 41(e), in accordance
with Alderman's directions. Since the rule provides the procedure through
which one obtains a remedy when his fourth amendment rights have been
violated, the pertinent question presented in the instant case was who
may make use of rule 41(e). In deciding this question, Judge Adams
relied principally upon two cases: Grant v. United States9 2 and Centracchio
v. Garrity.9 3 In both cases petitioners had voluntarily furnished Internal
Revenue agents with books and materials containing income tax information. When petitioners learned that the information was about
to be used as the basis for indictments against them, they moved for its
suppression pursuant to rule 41(e). In both cases the district courts
entertained the petitioners' motion, and on appeal, both circuit courts
94
determined that the district courts had jurisdiction to hear the motions.
From these cases, Judge Adams concluded that those whose fourth
amendment rights have been violated may, under rule 41(e), move for
the suppression of evidence obtained through the violations even prior
to indictment.
An examination of the cases applying rule 41(e) leaves little doubt
that the rule may be used by an "aggrieved person" prior to indictment. 95
643, 648 (1961). See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538-39 (1947).

92. 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1960).

93. 198 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1952).

94. Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1960). In Grant, jurisdiction
was based on Judge Hough's statement in United States v. Maresca, 266 F. 713
(S.D.N.Y. 1920):
Whenever an officer of the court has in his possession or under his control
books or papers, or (by parity of reasoning) any other articles in which the
court has official interest, and of which any person (whether party to a pending

litigation or not) has been unlawfully deprived, that person may petition the
court for restitution. This I take to be an elementary principle, depending upon
the inherent disciplinary power of any court of record ....
. . . It is further true that the riqht to move does not at all depend on the
existence of this indictment; it might be made, were no prosecution pending.
Id. at 717 (emphasis added).
After determining that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the suppression motion, the Grant court held that the district court's order was not appealable.
282 F.2d at 165-71.
In Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1952), the court likewise
found that the district court was correct in entertaining petitioner's motion to suppress
even prior to indictment, but concluded that the petition lacked equity. Therefore, it
was dismissed without prejudice to renewal after indictment. Id. at 382-89.
95. In addition to Grant and Centracchio, the following cases have allowed an
"aggrieved person" to make a suppression motion prior to indictment: Russo v. United
States, 241 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Lapides v. United States, 215 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.
1954) ; In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 762 (1933). Foley, decided prior to the enactment of rule 41(e), was based upon the court's inherent power to discipline its own
officers. The following courts have held rule 41(e) applicable to pre-indictment
motions for the return of property: United States v. Foley, 283 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.
1960) ; United States v. Bell, 120 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1954).
The case of Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931),
was also cited by Judge Adams as authority for this proposition, although Go-Bart
was decided prior to the adoption of rule 41(e). In Go-Bart, two employees of the
company were arrested inside the company's office, and they and the premises were
searched. A quantity of material was taken from both the men and the office. The
two employees and the company (referred to as the "petitioners" by the Court) moved
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However, all of these cases have dealt with so-called "target" or potential
defendants. 96 In his opinion, Judge Adams did not consider this point
significant. Rather, he impliedly equated an unindicted potential defendant
with a grand jury witness who will never be a defendant - Sister Egan.
Since rule 41(e) speaks only in terms of "aggrieved person," and not
defendants, Judge Adams' analogy appears sound. Nevertheless, it must
be recognized that the instant case is somewhat distinguishable from
those cases which have construed rule 41(e), and the Supreme Court
decisions involving standing, all of which were concerned with "target
defendants." To that extent, Judge Adams' position may not be "in
'9 7
accordance with existing standing rules.
In addition to the foregoing arguments, Judge Adams asserted that
Sister Egan had a constitutional right to refuse to answer the questions
propounded to her because the basis for the questions was wiretap evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. 98 To support this conclusion, the judge relied primarily on Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States.99 In Silverthorne, photographs and copies of documents, obtained
in violation of petitioners' fourth amendment rights, were used as the
basis for an indictment. The Supreme Court held that "the essence of a
provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but
that it shall not be used at all."' 0 0 Reading Silverthorne literally, Judge
Adams concluded that under the fourth amendment the Government could
not use, in the instant case, any evidence obtained unlawfully. This conclusion would prevent the Government from asking Sister Egan any
questions that were based on unauthorized electronic surveillance of her.
Judge Adams then confronted decisions of the Second and the Ninth
Circuits dealing with a grand jury witness and his standing to object to
the use of evidence obtained from illegal electronic surveillance. In
United States ex rel. Rosado v. Flood,10 1 the Second Circuit held that
Rosado could not object to the source of the questions which the grand
for the suppression of the evidence and the return of this material prior to indictment.

Although the Court recognized that the "company . . . is a stranger to the proceeding," (id. at 356), it enjoined the use of "papers as evidence and [ordered] the
same returned to petitioners." Id. at 358. Despite the fact that the Court consistently
referred to the "petitioners" as the ones making the motion to suppress, the Court's
holding was read narrowly by Judge Gibbons in his dissenting opinion in the instant
case. That is, Judge Gibbons contended that the evidence was suppressable only as
to the two employees and that the company was only interested in the return of the
material. 450 F.2d at 228 (dissenting opinion). But see DiBella v. United States,
369 U.S. 121, 131 (1962) (overruling Go-Bart to the extent that Go-Bart distinguished, for the purposes of appeal, between pre-indictment and post-indictment
motions to suppress).
96. 450 F.2d at 227-28 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
97. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 n.9 (1969) (emphasis added).
98. 450 F.2d at 210-17. In Katz v. United States, the Court extended the fourth
amendment's coverage to include electronic eavesdropping. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
99. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
100. Id. at 392.
101. 394 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968). See note 33 supra.
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jury wished to ask him.102 It was the court's conclusion, with reliance
being placed on the Supreme Court's portrayal in Blair v. United States'03
of the grand jury as a wide-ranging investigatory body, that the grand
jury's scope should not be narrowed in light of its function as an investigative tool. In Egan, Judge Adams first attempted to distinguish
Rosado from the present case by noting that Rosado involved a federal
court interfering with a state grand jury. 10 4 Then, declaring that the
Second Circuit had read Blair too broadly, 105 the judge refused to follow
Rosado because, by permitting the Government to introduce illegally
obtained evidence at a grand jury proceeding, 10 it conflicted with
Silverthorne's command that such evidence may not be used at all.
In Carter v. United States,1° 7 the Ninth Circuit, relying on Rosado,
denied a grand jury witness standing to object to the use of alleged
illegally obtained electronic surveillance evidence. Judge Adams first
distinguished Carter on the ground that Carter had dealt with illegal
wiretaps directed at a third person, and not at the witness, as in the
instant case. Then, realizing that he must respond to the broad lan guage in
Carter which implied that even a grand jury witness claiming violations
of his own fourth amendment rights would be denied standing because,
should he become a defendant, the procedures at trial would provide ample
opportunity for the suppression of illegally obtained evidence, Judge Adams
refused to follow Carter because it too conflicted with Silverthorne.08
102. Id. at 141-42.
103. 250 U.S. 273 (1919). See notes 10, 11 & 14 supra. Despite its characterization of the grand jury, the Blair Court was not considering what remedies a grand
jury witness has when his constitutionally protected rights have been violated. Instead,
the Court in Blair was faced with the issue of whether a grand jury witness may
inquire into the constitutionality of the statute proscribing the offense being investigated by the grand jury. It was held that he could not. Id. at 281-83.
104. 450 F.2d at 215. Although the Rosado court mentioned this situation, it
stated specifically that its decision did not rest upon this fact. 394 F.2d at 141.
105. Judge Adams read Blair narrowly, first stating that the specific holding of
B!air was that a grand jury witness may not question the constitutionality of the
statute under investigation, and then noting the section of the Blair opinion which
stated that some testimony is excludable from a grand jury. Since some privileges
may be exerted even before a grand jury, Judge Adams reasoned that the ability to
raise the protection of a privilege is analogous to the ability to object to illegal
evidence. See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970) (declaring the first amendment privileges available to a news reporter); United States v.
Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) (declaring the attorney-client privilege available
to a witness).
106. 450 F.2d at 215.
107. 417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969). cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935 (1970). See note 33
supra. The portion of the Carter opinion that dealt with the witness' claim of standing
was not carefully developed by the Ninth Circuit. It was an extremely short section
of the opinion and its only citation in support of the proposition that a grand jury
witness lacks standing to make a motion to suppress was to Rosado. 417 F.2d at 388.
The court reasoned that the procedural safeguards at trial would adequately protect
the witness' constitutional rights, should the witness become a defendant. Furthermore,
as Judge Adams noted, the Ninth Circuit when presented with a very similar question
in a later case, decided it on first amendment grounds, refusing to reach the question
of standing and to rely on Carter as authority on this point. Caldwell v. United States,
434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). But see In re Bacon, 446 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1971),
where, subsequent to In re Egan, the Ninth Circuit held that a grand jury witness
lacks standing to suppress illegally obtained oral communications.
108. 450 F.2d at 213.
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The reasoning of Judge Adams' opinion concerning the fourth amendment's applicability to witnesses before a grand jury is of special significance, since the other parts of In re Egan dealt only with electronic surveillance. Thus, Judge Adams attempted to justify a broad holding that
would extend to all illegally obtained evidence. Unfortunately, his reliance on a literal reading of Silverthorne is somewhat simplistic, as that
case has not received a literal application by the courts.' 09 In fact, the
very requirement that one must have standing before he may object to
the use of evidence constitutes a limitation upon the Silverthorne holding." 0
Also, Judge Adams made no attempt to explain why a literal reading of
Silverthorne should be applied to the instant case. Indeed, he did not even
face the first obstacle presented by the different factual situation of Silverthorne; that is, that the petitioner therein had been indicted already and
was not a witness, before a grand jury, who was immune from prosecution.
Because Judge Adams failed to explain adequately why Silverthorne should
control the instant case, and because he relied to a large extent on Silverthorne to support his conclusion, it is not likely that this portion of his
opinion will be much authority to other courts faced with the problem
herein presented should those courts attempt to extend to the grand
jury witness the right to suppress all illegally obtained evidence.
Though Sister Egan was not a defendant in a trial, a cogent argument can be made that pursuant to the guidelines enunciated by the Supreme
2
Court in its major standing decisions,"' she had standing to object."
That is, these decisions have indicated that in order for one to have
standing he must have been the victim of the illegal search and seizure and
his own fourth amendment rights must have been violated thereby. In
such cases, the Supreme Court made no mention of the adverse effect
on the individual which occurs when that evidence is introduced in a trial.
Rather, the Court focused on the movant's status at the time that the
violation occurred; that is, at the time of the unlawful search and seizure.
Under this test, Sister Egan, who was the victim of an unlawful search
and seizure and whose personal fourth amendment rights were violated
thereby, would have standing to object to the use of the unlawfully
obtained evidence under existent standing rules.
109. Since 1920, when Silverthorne was decided, the Court has gradually developed

exceptions to the rule laid down in that case. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971) (petitioner's confession, obtained in violation of Miranda, may be used to
impeach the petitioner's credibility even where the testimony bears directly on the
crimes charged) ; Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (under certain circumstances, illegally obtained evidence may be used by the government for impeachment purposes). See notes 18 & 48 and accompanying text supra.
110. Because a person must have standing before he may move for the suppression
of evidence, the Government may make use of illegally obtained evidence against a
person who does not have standing. To the extent that the Government is allowed to
do this with the unlawfully obtained evidence, the Silverthorne prohibition "that it
shall not be used at all," (251 U.S. at 392), is undermined.
111. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) ; Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257 (1960) ; Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
112. See note 91 supra.
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The issue of whether a grand jury witness has standing to object to
the introduction of unlawfully obtained oral communications in a grand
jury proceeding requires a re-evaluation of the benefits of the exclusionary
rule. When one recognizes: (1) that the exclusionary rule is based
"only on the nicest balance of competing considerations ;,113 (2) that the
rule does not operate when only marginal deterrence is gained ;114 (3) the
wide-ranging powers of the grand jury;"5 and (4) the possibility of
suppression at trial," 6 the benefits of the exclusionary rule in this context
are open to question. In the final analysis, however, the value of extending the exclusionary rule into the grand jury context must be measured
by the relative losses or gains to society resulting from the rule's extension.
Recognizing that the public has a right to every man's evidence,'" and
that by exclusion of probative evidence the lawbreaker may escape his
punishment, the existence of the exclusionary rule is "heavily handicapped.""u 8 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the facts of the instant case
overcome this handicap and rightfully call for the exclusion of relevant
evidence in order to protect an individual's privacy.
The dangers of permitting the technique to which Sister Egan was
subjected are readily apparent. In a conspiracy situation, the Government
may think it well worthwhile to violate the privacy of a minor member
of the conspiracy through the improper use of electronic surveillance,
grant him immunity, and as a reward for its illegal actions, return indictments against the major conspirators based on the information obtained
by the surveillance. If the courts were to sanction the use of this tactic,
more crimes would be solved but at the expense of destroying the fourth
amendment," 9 as well as the statutory scheme of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act. Secondly, the oft-repeated reason for
allowing the grand jury to consider illegal evidence is that the victims'
rights will be adequately protected at trial. 20 Yet, Sister Egan would
have no opportunity for such protection because she had been granted
immunity from prosecution. If she, or future witnesses like her, are to
vindicate invasions of their privacy, they must be permitted to do so at
the grand jury stage. Thirdly, the fact that electronic surveillance is
being discussed requires the court to be especially cautious. The danger
posed to a free society by the misuse of such instruments is widely acknowledged.' 2 1 In addition to the danger of violating fourth amendment
113. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2225: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 378, 388 (1964).
114. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
115. See notes 10, 11 & 14 supra.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966).

117. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1950).
118. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 339 (1939).

119. See Granspan & White, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U.
PA. L. REv. 333, 351-52, 364 (1970).
120. See note 18 supra.
121. See, e.g., S. DASH, R. KNOWLETON & R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAvESDROPPERS
(1959).
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rights, electronic surveillance may seriously impede a citizen's first amendment rights.122 Finally, it must be remembered that the police are not
deprived of the proper use of electronic eavesdropping. The Omnibus
Crime Control Act specifically authorizes court-approved electronic surveil123
lance, and such surveillance is constitutional under certain circumstances.
Nevertheless, it appears that the Egan court has extended the exclusionary rule at a time when the continued existence of the rule
itself, at least as a constitutional requirement, is being questioned by
members of the Supreme Court. 2 4 Thus, it is conceivable that on appeal
the Court may not be willing to push the rule to its logical bounds and,
therefore, may well refuse to permit the use of the rule by a witness
before a grand jury, especially when the witness has been given immunity.
Nicholas Scafidi

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

- CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SEARCHES AND
WIRETAP OF DOMESTIC SUBVERSIVES WITHOUT WARRANT BUT AUTHORIZED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY REASONS HELD VIOLATIVE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT.
SEIZURES -

United States v. United States District Court for Eastern
District of Michigan (6th Cir. 1971)
Defendants were indicted in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan by a federal grand jury for destruction
of government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361.1 During the
course of the pretrial proceedings, defendants filed a motion for disclosure
of certain electronic surveillance information. This information, gathered
by government agents monitoring wiretaps, was obtained for the purpose
of accumulating intelligence data deemed necessary to protect the nation
122. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 469-70 (1963)

(Brennan, J., dis-

senting) S

123. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) ; Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967).
124. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Although four justices
in Coolidge expressed the opinion that Mapp v. Ohio should be overruled, a decision of
that nature would not directly effect the instant case since Mapp merely extended the
exclusionary rule to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1. The statute makes it unlawful for anyone to wilfully injure or depredate any
property of the United States. If the damage is $100 or less, the penalty is a fine
of not more than $1,000, or imprisonment for one year or less, or both. If the damage
exceeds $100, the maximum fine is $10,000 and the maximum imprisonment is ten
years, the defendant being punishable by either fine, imprisonment, or both. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1970).
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from the threat of domestic subversion. 2 These wiretaps had been expressly
approved by the Attorney General as agent for the President, but no warrant
or other judicial authorization had been obtained. 3 The district court
ruled that the Government's wiretap in this case was unlawful, and
therefore ordered full disclosure of the monitored conversations to the
defendant whose conversations were involved. 4 The Government then
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for
a writ of mandamus to the district court judge to vacate the disclosure
order of the district court.
The court of appeals refused to issue the writ of mandamus, holding:
(1) that the Government's wiretapping in this case was illegal, since
the Executive Branch, in dealing with the threat of domestic subversion,
is subject to the limitations of the fourth amendment when undertaking
searches and seizures of oral communications by wire; and (2) that a
defendant whose personal conversations have been illegally intercepted
is entitled to full disclosure of such illegally intercepted material without
requiring a judge's in camera inspection to determine the material's
relevance. United States v. United States District Court for Eastern
District of Michigan, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 930
(1971).
The validity of wiretapping as a tool of law enforcement has been
a cause of controversy during the latter part of this century.5 In the
Supreme Court's initial encounter with the wiretapping issue, it held
that since there was no physical trespass involved, wiretapping was not
a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 6 In
response to the proliferation in the use of wiretaps, by both law enforceinent personnel and private persons, Congress enacted section 605 of the
2. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1075-76 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
3. Id. at 1076. The Attorney General's affidavit filed at the evidentiary hearing
did not even assert that, "at the time these wiretaps were installed, law enforcement
agents had probable cause to believe that criminal activity (e.g., the illegal overthrow
of the Government through force or violence) was being plotted." Id. at 1079. Therefore, the court might assume that the Government could not have obtained a warrant
even if it had sought one.
4. Id. at 1079-80. The purpose of this disclosure was to permit defense counsel
to examine the records in order to determine whether any evidence presented by the
Government at trial was tainted by its relationship to the illegal wiretaps. See notes
20 & 21 infra.
5. See generally Brownell, The Public Security and Wire-Tapping, 39 CORNELL
L.Q. 195 (1954) ; Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy,
63 YALE L.J. 799 (1954) ; Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792
(1954); Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Title III of the Crime
Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 319 (1969).
6. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). Defendants in this
case were convicted of conspiring to unlawfully import, possess, and sell liquor on
the basis of evidence obtained by federal prohibition officers through wiretaps on
defendants' residential telephones. In sustaining the convictions, the Court stated that
a fourth amendment search is "of material things - the person, the house, his papers
or his effects," and consequently, oral conversations are not covered by the amendment's protections, even if overheard by the use of wiretaps, so long as there is no
physical trespass involved. Id. at 464, 466. In a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Brandeis
condemned wiretapping as such an inherently oppressive practice, that "espionage,
writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny" in
comparison with the tapping of a telephone. Id. at 476.
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Federal Communications Act of 1934, 7 making unlawful the interception
and divulgence or publication of any communication by anyone not
authorized by the sender.8 Subsequent to this enactment, the Supreme
Court, in a series of cases, held that the statute prohibited: (1) the use
in federal courts of wiretap evidence which had been obtained by federal
agents ;9 (2) the use in federal courts of wiretap evidence which had been
obtained by state law enforcement officers ;10 and (3) the use in state courts
of wiretap evidence which had been obtained by state law enforcement
officers. "I Hence, there had existed, prior to the passage of Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, an absolute
ban on the use of wiretap evidence 12 in any state or federal prosecution.
With the supersession of section 605 by Title III,'3 the general ban
on wiretapping was removed, and the constitutional standards for all
7. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 605 (1970).
8. Prior to its supersession by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, (see note 13 infra), section 605 provided in pertinent part:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any . . . communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person . . . . No person having
received [such] communication . . . shall divulge or publish the existence . . . or
any part thereof or use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto ....
Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
9. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). The Court in Nardone
found that the phrase "no person" in section 605 included federal law enforcement
officers. Id. at 381. The Court also stated that "divulgence" included use of wiretap
evidence at trial. Id. at 382.
10. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957). In Benanti, wiretapping by
state law enforcement officers was held violative of section 605 and hence, evidence
so obtained was inadmissible in the federal prosecution, despite the absence of collusion
between federal and state authorities. Id. at 100.
11. Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968). Lee, in applying the exclusionary rule
to state prosecutions, distinguished Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957),
and overruled Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). 392 U.S. at 381, 383-85. In
Rathbun, admissibility was sustained on the basis of "consent" by one party to the
telephone conversation permitting law enforcement officers to listen by use of an
extension phone. The non-consenting party was held to have assumed the risk of
such an event, and hence, there was no interception within the meaning of section 605.
355 U.S. at 111. In Lee, police had connected a phone to defendant's party line and
had set up a device to record all of the defendant's phone conversations. 392 U.S.
at 379. Hence, the critical element of consent, present in Rathbun, was absent and
despite the lack of an actual wiretap, the police action was held to violate section 605.
Id. at 381-82. In view of the extension of the exclusionary rule's application to the
states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which overruled Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), the foundation for Schwartz, namely Wolf, had clearly been
eroded. 392 U.S. at 385.
12. Evidence obtained by a wiretap should be distinguished from that obtained
by other electronic surveillance techniques. Wiretapping generally involves an actual
physical entry into telephone or telegraph circuits, whereas electronic "bugging" can
be effective without necessitating such entry. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act outlawed wiretapping, but did not apply to the more sophisticated surveillance method of "bugging." The latter's use was limited only by the fourth
amendment, which, prior to Katz, was not considered violated unless the "bugging"
involved a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area. See note 16 infra.
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to 2520 (1970). Although the statute generally bans
interception and use of wire or oral communications, (18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1970)),
eavesdropping (including wiretapping) is authorized in the investigation of certain
enumerated crimes, provided application for such eavesdropping is made by the
Attorney General or his designate to a federal judge and is approved by the same
in accordance with section 2518. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss3/4

24

Editors: Recent Developments
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

electronic surveillance became applicable to wiretapping as well. 14 These
standards were set forth in Berger v. New York 15 and Katz v. United
States.'0 Berger set forth the standards for an eavesdropping warrant
by pointing out what constitutional defects were present in a state statute
permitting eavesdropping. l Katz determined when such warrants are
necessary, holding that a warrantless search is illegal when the party
against whom the eavesdropping is directed justifiably expects that his
conversations are not being overheard.' 8 Subsequent to these decisions,
the Court in Alderman v. United States'9 imposed the requirement of
full disclosure of the records of all illegally intercepted conversations. 20
The full disclosure requirement of Alderman facilitated a defendant's
search for a causal relationship between the illegal evidence, which is
per se inadmissible, and the otherwise legal evidence which the prosecution
2
has chosen to use at trial. '
14. The Senate Report on Title III indicates that the statute's standards are
"intended to reflect existing law" and makes specific reference to Katz. S. REP. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968). See note 16 infra.
15. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger, the Court struck down as contrary to the
fourth amendment a New York statute which established a warrant procedure for
eavesdropping. The statute was found defective for six reasons: (1) it did not
require probable cause that a particular offense had been or was being committed;
(2) it did not require particular description of the conversations sought; (3) its
authorization of eavesdropping for a two-month period with extensions was deemed
too broad an authorization; (4) it placed no termination date on the eavesdrop once
the conversation sought had been obtained; (5) there was neither a notice requirement nor a requirement of exigent circumstances in the absence of the former; and
(6) it did not require a return on the warrant. 388 U.S. at 58-60.
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz set forth a standard for determining when a
search warrant is required for eavesdropping. In overruling the trespass doctrine of
Olmstead, (see note 6 supra), Katz emphasized that the fourth amendment was intended to protect people, not places. Id. at 351-53. Government agents in Katz had
"bugged" a public telephone booth by placing a microphonic device on the outside of
the booth. Thus, there had been no physical entrance into the booth itself. Id. at
348-49. In enunciating the new standard of a justifiable expectation of privacy, the
Court stated:
[A] person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.
Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
17. See note 15 supra.
18. See note 16 supra.
19. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
20. Id. at 182. In Alderman, the Government conceded the illegality of the surveillance in question, but insisted that it need only turn over those logs which were
"arguably relevant" to defendant's convictions. Id. at 181. It further contended
that
the determination of relevance should be made by the trial judge in camera. Id. at 181.
The Court, however, concluded that the in camera requirement would impose too
great a burden on the trial judge and that the defendant, with his counsel, is in a
better position to discover the "taint." See note 21 infra. The Court stated that "the
task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in
camera judgment of the trial court to identify those records which might have contributed to the Government's case." Id. at 182 (citations omitted).
21. If the police have obtained evidence illegally which leads them to sources of
otherwise legal evidence, the latter will also be excluded under the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine, unless the police can demonstrate: (1) that they also obtained
the latter evidence through an "independent source," Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) ; or (2) that the "taint" of the illegal evidence
has been sufficiently dissipated; i.e., that by the time the latter evidence is obtained,
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Notwithstanding the requirements of Berger, Katz and Alderman,
certain judicially-created exceptions to the warrant requirement have
developed through the years. 22 However, the "national security" exception,
the pivotal issue in the instant case, lacks the judicial recognition which
these other exceptions enjoy. 28

The basis for this exception is primarily

historical and political, rather than judicial. Its development is largely
attributable to the policy which the Department of Justice established
24
under section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.
the initial illegal action is so attenuated from the present discovery that it can no
longer be considered the proximate cause of the latter source of evidence uncovered
by the police. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
22. Generally, these exceptions include: (1) a search made with probable cause
where the exigencies of the situation make the obtaining of a warrant impractical;
(2) a search made in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect of a crime; and (3) a search
of the person and the immediate area around him incident to his arrest. See, e.g.,
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (search of car stopped on the highway) ; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (pursued suspect was armed) ; and
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search of entire home was too inclusive),
respectively. Despite the significance of these exceptions in the general area of
searches and seizures, they are not especially relevant to the instant case.
23. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled explicitly on the validity of this
exception, although several opinions in the Katz case dealt briefly with the subject.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Katz, expressed some hesitancy in
extending the Katz standards to national security cases:
Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would
satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a
question not presented by this case.
389 U.S. at 358 n.23. Justice White, concurring, expressed the view that the decision
clearly did not and should not reach national security matters:
We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if
the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General,
has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic
surveillance as reasonable.
Id. at 364. However, in a separate concurring opinion, Justice Douglas took specific
issue with Justice White's comment. Mr. Justice Douglas found it highly inappropriate
for "properly interested parties," such as the President and Attorney General, to
substitute their judgment for that of a neutral magistrate. Id. at 359-60.
24. Since section 605 prohibited interception and divulgence of intercepted information, (see note 8 supra), successive Attorneys General interpreted the statute to
permit wiretaps, so long as no divulgence ensued. Brownell, supra note 5, at 197.
In a confidential memorandum to Attorney General Jackson in 1940, President Roosevelt explicitly authorized the use of "listening devices directed to the conversation or
other communications of persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies." Confidential Memorandum for
the Attorney General, from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Attorney General
Jackson, May 21, 1940, reproduced at 444 F.2d at 670 (Appendix A). In his authorization, however, President Roosevelt requested that these investigations be minimized
and that they be limited as much as possible to aliens. Id. A similar authorization
was given to Attorney General Clark by President Truman, shortly after he entered
office, which varied from the Roosevelt memorandum in that the limitations (to
minimize the frequency and to confine to aliens, if possible) were excluded. Letter
from Attorney General Tom C. Clark to President Harry S. Truman, July 17, 1946,
reproduced at 444 F.2d at 670 (Appendix A). President Truman was requested in
this letter to authorize the Attorney General to continue the policy presented in
President Roosevelt's memorandum. However, in quoting part of the 1940 memorandum, Attorney General Clark omitted the sentence requesting limitation to aliens.
President Truman endorsed the latter at the bottom, thus granting the requested
authorization. In his letter to the President, the Attorney General stated:
While I am reluctant to suggest any use whatever of these special investigative
measures in domestic cases, it seems to me imperative to use them in cases vitally
affecting the domestic security, or where human life is in jeopardy.
Id. (emphasis added). Hence, the policy under President Truman was broader than
that under President Roosevelt in that it appeared to extend to domestic subversives
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By the time Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 was being considered by Congress, the historical basis for the
"national security" exception was well established. Title III removed
the absolute ban on wiretapping which had existed under section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act, and outlined procedures to be used by
law enforcement officers in the use of all types of electronic surveillance.2 5
More significant, however, is section 2511(3) of Title III, which purports
to grant a national security exception to the warrant requirement. This
section provides, inter alia, that nothing in Title III or in section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act of 1934 shall limit the President in
dealing with threats from foreign powers, in obtaining foreign intelligence
information, or in protecting the nation from "any clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Government. ' 26 It is not clear
from the statute's language whether Congress intended to grant presidential
power, or whether it merely intended not to limit such power.2 7 It is also
unclear what actions constitute a "clear and present danger to the
structure or existence of the Government."
The issue raised by section 2511(3) regarding the scope of the
"national security" exception had not been reached at the appellate level
prior to the instant case.2 8 Of equal significance is the fact that the
as well as to foreign spies. In a memorandum filed by the Government in Black v.
United States, 384 U.S. 983 (1966), Solicitor General (now Justice) Marshall stated
that the Truman policy had been perpetuated throughout subsequent administrations.
Supplemental Memorandum for the United States at 3-4, Black v. United States, 384
U.S. 983 (1966). However, in 1965, this policy was modified when President Johnson
set forth the following guidelines:
(1) No federal personnel is to intercept telephone conversations within the United
States by any mechanical or electronic device, without the consent of one of
the parties involved (except in connection with investigations related to the
national security).
(2) No interception shall be undertaken or continued without first obtaining the
approval of the Attorney General.
(3) All federal agencies shall immediately conform their practices and procedures
to the provisions of this order.
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, from President
Lyndon B. Johnson, June 30, 1965, reproduced at 444 F.2d at 671 (Appendix A).
25. See note 13 supra. The statute also provides for judicial approval after the
interception has begun in "emergency situations," provided an application for an order
approving the eavesdrop is made within forty-eight hours after the interception
commences. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1970).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970).
27. Note, supra note 5, at 336.
28. Several lower court decisions have sustained the "national security" exception
in dealing with activities of a foreign power. See, e.g., United States v. Butenko, 318
F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1970); United States v. Brown, 317 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. La.
1970). In Butenko, the district court, in affirming defendants' convictions for conspiring to transmit national defense information to the Soviet Union, ruled that the
wiretaps employed by the Government for the sole purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information were not in violation of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, and hence, the logs of such wiretaps were not discoverable by the defendants.
318 F. Supp. at 74. Similarly, in Brown, the court held wiretaps employed for the
purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information lawful and therefore not subject
to disclosure. 317 F. Supp. at 537. In its opinion, the court concluded:
[I]f the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney
General, have considered the requirements of national security and authorized
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constitutionality of the "national security" exception itself in the area
of electronic eavesdropping (including both "bugging" and "wiretapping")
29
has not yet been tested in the Supreme Court.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had
to determine: (1) whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the case;
(2) whether the Government's wiretap was illegal; and (3) whether the
defendant was entitled to any or all of the Government's surveillance
records obtained by the wiretap.30
Prior to its treatment of the paramount issues of legality and disclosure, the court considered the jurisdictional challenge asserted by the
respondent. The respondent argued that mandamus was not an appropriate
procedure for review in this case because the district court's order was not
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,31 28 U.S.C. § 1292,32 or 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731. 83 The court acknowledged the general rule that mandamus may
not be substituted for appeal. 34 However, the court accepted the position
that the All Writs Statute 5 was a valid basis for the court's review, since
this was an "extraordinary case," and, as such, was reviewable under
the doctrine set forth in Black v. Boyd.3 6 The court based its decision
on the fact that this was clearly an extraordinary case, not only because
of the consequences of what denial of jurisdiction would mean to petielectronic surveillance as reasonable, the judiciary should not question the decision
of the executive department.
Id. at 536. In addition to the district court in the present case, (see notes 2-4 supra),
at least one other district court expressly held that no "national security" exception
exists in dealing with domestic subversion. See United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp.
424 (C.D. Calif. 1971). In Smith, the court ordered the Government to disclose its
surveillance records to the defendant since the electronic surveillance involved was
held to be constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 429. The court condemned the Government's treatment of dissident domestic organizations as if they were unfriendly foreign
powers, and found itself "forced to conclude that in wholly domestic situations there
is no 'national security' exemption from the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment." Id. The court noted that the issue of a "national security" exception
in the domestic area had been decided in favor of the Government in two unreported
district court cases. 444 F.2d at 656 n.2.
29. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
30. 444 F.2d at 655, 656-67, 668.
31. This section grants power to the courts of appeals to review only final orders
of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). The disclosure order in the present
case was an interlocutory, not a final order.
32. Section 1292 authorizes appellate power in certain limited classes of interlocutory orders (those dealing with injunctions, receiverships, admiralty and patent
infringement), but does not deal with the type of situation before the court in this
case. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970).
33. Section 3731 authorizes appeals by the United States in criminal cases from
orders dismissing an indictment, suppressing evidence or ordering the return of seized
property. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970). There is no reference to disclosure orders.
34. 444 F.2d at 655.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970). This section provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
36. 248 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1957). In Black, the court noted that:
[I]t is well settled that although sparingly used, the power to issue a writ of
mandamus exists and will be exercised by the court when in its discretion the
exceptional circumstances of the case require its use.
Id. at 159-60.
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tioner,37 but also because the issue presented was one of first impression
at the appellate level. 88

Hence, the court's exercise of jurisdiction was
well founded in both precedent and reason. 9
In approaching the principal issue of the legality of the wiretap
involved, the court initially reviewed the history of fourth amendment
protection 40 in the area of electronic surveillance. In so doing, the court
placed special emphasis on Katz' general requirement of judicial authorization for all searches and seizures. 4 1 The petitioner's position, however,
was that in national security cases the President, in his capacity as Chief
Executive, has unique powers as a sovereign which exempt him and his
agents from the judicial review requirement of the fourth amendment

under KatZ. 42

Consequently, the court focused its attention on the

Government's presidential power argument.
The Government asserted that the President, as Commander-in-Chief
and as Chief Executive, has the inherent power to safeguard the security
of the nation, which includes the power to authorize wiretaps in cases
involving national security.4
In response to this assertion, the court
37. The court noted that if the district court's disclosure order were permitted
to stand, the Government might be forced to dismiss its prosecution for security
reasons. Hence, an order with such potential repercussions, although interlocutory,
required reviewability. 444 F.2d at 655.
38. Id. at 656, relying on Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964).
39. In addition to the Black case cited by the court, (see note 36 supra), the
court found support in Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967). In Will, the Court
vacated a writ of mandamus issued by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
which had directed the vacating of a pretrial order of the district court. In so doing,
however, the Court noted that "exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial
Iusurpation of power' will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy."
Id. at
95. It is submitted that the Government's contention in the present case - that the
respondent's order was illegal - established an allegation of exceptional circumstances.
The Government, however, had to prove the illegality of the order to justify the
issuance of the writ. In order for the Government to have an opportunity to present
its case, and in order for the determination of the order's legality to occur, the instant
court was required to accept jurisdiction.
40. 444 F.2d at 656-60.
41. Id. at 657. The court quoted language from Katz indicating that searches
without judicial authorization were unreasonable per se with a few exceptions; a search
made in "hot pursuit," a search incident to an arrest and a search made with a suspect's consent. In the same quote, the Katz Court noted that none of these exceptions
would apply to an electronic eavesdropping situation. 389 U.S. at 357-58. In a recent
case, however, the "consent" exception has been made applicable to certain electronic
surveillance situations. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), noted in 17
VILL. L. REv. 350 (1971). The White Court held that whenever one speaks face-toface to another, the former takes the risk that the latter may relate or transmit such
conversations to government agents. Id. at 752. This assumption of risk can be
construed as "constructive consent ;" however, the Court rendered its decision in terms
of the defendant's lack of "justifiable expectation of privacy." Id.
42. 444 F.2d at 657.
43. The court's opinion quoted the following sections from the petitioner's primary
and supplemental briefs:
The President, in his dual role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces
and Chief Executive, possesses another serious power and responsibility - that
of safeguarding the security of the nation against those who would subvert the
Government by unlawful means.
This power is the historical power of the sovereign to preserve itself. The
power at issue in this case is the inherent power of the President to safeguard
the security of the nation.
Id. at 658 (emphasis added). This position, as the court recognized, suggests neither
a limitation on such presidential power nor a recognition that the sovereign power of
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examined the Constitution as it relates to the President's power, 44 and
noted that "[n] o express grant of power to the President to make searches
and seizures without regard to the fourth amendment may be found in
these constitutional provisions. '45 It then examined the cases cited by
the petitioner to support the proposition that the President had such implied
power, and found them all distinguishable on their facts.48 These cases
dealt with the war and foreign relations powers of the President 47 and
with the power of the judiciary where the executive acts in domestic
affairs. 48 The court instead looked to the case of Youngstown Sheet &
the United States is distributed among the three branches of Government by the
Constitution. Id.
44.. The Constitution of the United States delineates the principal powers of the
President as follows:
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together
with the Vice President, chosen for the Same Term, be elected, as follows ....
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of
the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
[He] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of
the United States.
U.S. CONST.art. II,§ 3.
45. 444 F.2d at 658 (emphasis added).
46. The petitioner cited the following cases: Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) ; Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) ; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) ; Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) ; and Totten v. United States, 92 U.S.
105 (1875). As accurately noted by the court, none of these cases were criminal cases,
and none dealt with a domestic security problem. 444 F.2d at 659.
47. The distinguishability of these cases could hardly be deemed surprising. Since
the issue in this case was one of first impression, it follows that there could not exist a
prior appellate case precisely on point.
48. The Government cited In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); and Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Debs dealt with contempt sentences for
violating an injunction, subsequent to which petitioner had sought a writ of habeas
corpus, which the Court denied on the basis of valid jurisdiction by the court which
had issued the injunction. 158 U.S. at 592. The court in the instant case accurately
noted that Debs could not be considered authority for "ignoring judicial processes."
444 F.2d at 659. Marbury, the court noted, was also non-supporting in that its thrust
was to establish the doctrine of judicial review of acts of Congress and to affirm the
supremacy of the Constitution over all three branches of Government. Clearly, it did
not deal with domestic subversion, nor did it deal with the fourth amendment. Further,
it is submitted that any analogy between President Jefferson's refusal to deliver a
judicial commission in Marbury and President Nixon's authorization (per the Attorney
General) of wiretaps in the instant case is strained both in logic and in temporal setting.
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Tube Co. v. Sawyer"9 as its authority for limiting presidential power in the
domestic area. In Youngstown, President Truman's seizure of the steel
mills to avert a nationwide steel strike was held improper by the Supreme
Court on the basis that presidential powers did not include any implied
power to take private property for public use without congressional
authorization as required by the fifth amendment." The instant court
recognized that Youngstown was not a wiretap case but maintained that
it was "the authoritative case dealing with the inherent powers of the
Presidency . ... 51
The validity of Youngstown as authority in the present case was
contingent on the court's subsequent determination that there had been
no congressional authorization for the Government's actions as is required to safeguard fourth amendment rights. 2 The critical fact in
Youngstown was the lack of congressional authorization of the President's
order either before or after the fact. 53 Indeed, the Court stated that
"[t] he power of Congress to adopt such public policies as those proclaimed
by the order is beyond question. '54 Youngstown established a limitation
on the actions of the President acting alone, and did not purport to limit
executive activity pursuant to legislative mandate. It was thus necessary
for the court to determine whether the President had received congressional
authorization in this particular case.
After outlining judicial approaches to the wiretapping problem, the
court reviewed the history of congressional action in that area. Initially,
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 193415 was examined.
The court acknowledged the Justice Department policy under section
605 of tapping without divulging, 56 and then examined Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196857 to determine
its impact on both section 605 and that policy.
In its interpretation of the statute, the court first noted the existence
of a remedy to the Government's dilemma in this type of case in the
"emergency situation" provision of Title 111.58 However, since the
49. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In Youngstown, President Truman had directed the
Secretary of Commerce to seize the steel mills in order to avert a national steel strike,
which the President thought would jeopardize national defense. Congress had not
authorized this action either before or after the seizure occurred. The Court held
the order invalid, finding no authority for the action by the President either as
Commander-in-Chief or as Chief Executive. Id. at 587-89.
50. Id.
51. 444 F.2d at 661.
52. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text infra.
53. See note 49 supra.
54. 343 U.S. at 588.
55. See note 8 supra.
56. 444 F.2d at 662. For a discussion of this policy, see note 24 supra.
57. See notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text supra.
58. 444 F.2d at 664. The "emergency situation" provision is summarized in note 25
supra. It is submitted that the remedy provided in this section might not be considered adequate by the Government, since the danger of a "security leak" might still
be present if the Government were required to submit an application to a judicial
officer within forty-eight hours after the interception commences. The fact that Congress provided special procedures in cases of national security supports, however, the
argument that Congress did not intend to exempt such a situation entirely. See Com-
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petitioner had failed to utilize this provision in the instant case, the court
turned to section 2511(3),1 9 upon which the Government relied. The
broad language of this section could be read to support an interpretation
that the President may authorize electronic surveillance in dealing with
both foreign espionage and domestic subversion. However, the legislative
history seems to indicate a narrower view of "national security."60 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the language of the statute, reserving presidential power to take necessary measures "against any other clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of the Government," 61 is
sufficiently clear on its face that an examination of legislative intent might
be deemed unwarranted. 2 However, the court adopted the narrower
interpretation that this section6" was not indicative of a grant of power,
but was intended to place Congress in a neutral position with respect to
64
the type of controversy involved in this case.
ment, Privacy and Political Freedom: Application of the Fourth Amendment to
"National Security" Investigations, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1205 (1970). There, the author
summarized and refuted the government's arguments for the "national security"
exception. One such argument was that it would not be feasible for the Government
to bring to a court's attention all the factual and policy considerations upon which
a decision to employ electronic surveillance should be based. This assertion of "lack
of feasibility" is possibly due to the Justice Department's distrust for the courts and
to the need for maintaining secrecy on certain matters. Id. at 1241-42. The court
noted, however, that the Attorney General could deal with untrustworthy members of
the judiciary. 444 F.2d at 666.
59. For the text of this section, see note 26 supra.
60. The Senate Report on Title III states in part:
It is obvious that whatever means are necessary should and must be taken to
protect the national security interest. Wiretapping and electronic surveillance
techniques are proper means for the acquisition of counter-intelligence against the
hostile action of foreign powers. Nothing in the proposed legislation seeks to
disturb the power of the President to act in this area. Limitations that may be
deemed proper in the field of domestic affairs of a nation become artificial when
international relations and internal security are at stake.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1968) (emphasis added). It is unclear
from this statement whether Congress intended to include domestic subversion as a
national security threat. The context in which the terms "domestic affairs" and
"internal security" are used seems to imply a distinction between them. Later in the
Senate Report, the writers seem to assume that the national security provision
(section 2511(3)) applies only to actions undertaken on behalf of foreign powers,
although there is a possible overlap into the domestic area in that Communist party
"front" organizations are considered instruments of a foreign power:
Where foreign affairs and internal security are involved, the proposed system of
court ordered electronic surveillance envisioned for the administration of domestic
criminal legislation is not intended necessarily to be applicable. The two areas
may, however, overlap. Even though their activities take place within the United
States, the domestic Communist party and its front group remain instruments of
the foreign policy of a foreign power. . . . Consequently, they fall within the
field of foreign affairs and outside the scope of the proposed chapter. Yet, their
activities may involve violations of domestic criminal legislation.
Id. at 94. It is submitted that this statement of legislative intent, while clarifying the
domestic-foreign dichotomy to some extent, raises another problem, namely, a need for
standards to help in classifying groups as Communist party "front groups."
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
62. Even if the statute is interpreted this broadly, the constitutional questions
regarding such presidential power remain unanswered.
63. "Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President ....
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
64. 444 F.2d at 664. By so construing the statutory language, the court avoided
confrontation with the potential issue of the constitutionality of section 2511 (3). Had
the court interpreted this section as authorizing the Government's action in this case,
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,The court concluded that the President and his agents were subject
to the limitations of the fourth amendment in dealing with the threat of
domestic subversion.6 5 Judgment was expressly reserved, however, with
respect to warrantless wiretapping which is directed against espionage
or sabotage by agents of a foreign power.6 6 In rendering its decision,
the court emphasized the basic historical and constitutional relationship
between the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures and the first amendment freedoms of speech and press. Noting
the danger of abuse if unrestricted wiretapping power were placed in
the Executive Branch, and noting the purpose of the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers to restrict such power, the court stated:
The argument for unrestricted employment of Presidential power
to wiretap is basically an argument in terrorem. It suggests that
constitutional government is too weak to survive in a difficult world
and urges worried judges and worried citizens to return to the
security of "sovereign" power. We are earnestly urged to believe
that the awesome power sought
for the Attorney General will
always be used with discretion.67
The court characterized the fourth amendment's role in this contest as
that of "guardian of the First [Amendment]. '"68
The court's observation was particularly relevant in the present
case. The nexus between these two amendments is especially close in the
area of electronic surveillance. Such surveillance, since it is virtually
undetectable, may have a "chilling effect" upon both uninhibited expression
of ideas and free association.69 The fear of exposing oneself to electronic
surveillance could have a significant impact on the membership and
vitality of dissident groups. Injunctive relief may be available to individuals or groups against whom eavesdrops are indiscriminately emit would have been compelled either to rule section 2511(3) unconstitutional or to
abandon the constitutional rationale it adopted.
65. 444 F.2d at 667.
66. Id. The court also declined to decide the question whether the Government
in the instant case had probable cause to obtain a warrant if one had been sought. See
note 3 supra.
67. Id. at 665-66. Petitioner had cited articles by Attorney General Rogers and
Assistant Attorney General Brownell which had presented the argument that despite
the "dirty business" inherent in wiretapping, it is no worse than other permissible
means of eavesdropping, and it is vitally necessary as a measure of self-protection in
view of the widespread infiltration of Communists into the Government. Brownell,
supra note 5, at 201-05; Rogers, supra note 5, at 794-95. It is submitted that these
articles are the product of the "McCarthy era" of the early 1950's, and, as such, reflect
the paranoia inherent in the term "monolithic communism," a doctrine of dubious
viability for the 1970s in light of present political realities.
68. Id. at 666.
69. See Owen, Eavesdropping at the Government's Discretion - First Amendinent Implications of the National Security Eavesdropping Power, 56 CORNELL L. REV.
161 (1970). In this article, the author outlines the dangers inherent in "national
security" wiretaps without judicial supervision. He specifically notes the danger of
abuse in utilizing wiretaps against those individuals and groups which espouse an
unpopular ideology, and describes the impact of such potential abuse on freedom of
association. Id. at 163-64. See also Comment, supra note 58, at 1205.
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ployed. 70 However, if the Attorney General's authorization is deemed
sufficient in itself to render the eavesdrop justified, the equitable remedy
of injunction would be virtually unavailable.
That a potentially greater danger of suppression of these freedoms
is posed by "domestic subversion" wiretaps than by "foreign espionage"
wiretaps further. supports the court's distinction between the two categories. 71 Although that distinction is susceptible to criticism, 7 2 there is
significant authority for its support from several commentators 7 and from
the American Bar Association as well. 7 4 Further support for the distinction
is provided by Justice Fortas' definition of "national security" in Alderman:
By the term "national security material," I mean to refer to a rigid
and limited category. It would not include material relating to any
activities except those specifically directed to acts of sabotage, espi75
onage, or aggression by or on behalf of foreign states.
Although the Sixth Circuit was a pioneer among the appellate courts
in articulating the domestic-foreign distinction in the instant case, it is
clear that the idea had been entertained by others prior to this decision.
In treating the final issue of disclosure, the court relied on the
Alderman decision. 7 6 The Alderman Court held that once an eavesdrop
is determined

to have been illegal, the defendant whose conversations
were involved is entitled to full disclosure of all such illegally intercepted
conversations. 7 7 In the present case, the Government contended that
70. See Owen, supra note 69, at 170. The author refers to Dombrowski, where a
civil rights group was being harassed by state investigations and prosecutions. The
Court held that the group was entitled to seek injunctive relief rather than await
the outcome of prosecutions. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The
author asserts that the holding of Dombrowski could be extended to groups seeking
injunctive relief, where they can show: (1) reasons for their fear of eavesdropping;
(2) the "chilling effect" on the first amendment freedoms produced by such fear; and
(3) the lack of any alternative means of relief. However, where groups fear eavesdropping but cannot substantiate their fears, the injunctive remedy would appear to
be unavailable.
71. At the outset, when one is dealing with foreign espionage, many of those
involved are likely to be aliens, not United States citizens, and hence, subject to
deportation procedures as an alternative to criminal prosecution. See generally 8
U.S.C. § 1252 (1970). More important, however, is the danger of uncontrolled, subjective judgment in determining what individuals and groups should be classified as
"domestic subversives."
72. Judge Weick, dissenting in the instant case, rejected the distinction since the
threat to the structure of the Government posed by domestic subversion is, in his view,
just as great as that posed by foreign espionage. 444 F.2d at 676.
73. See Theoharis & Meyer, The "National Security" Justification for Electronic
Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 749, 753 (1968); Note,
supra note 5, at 349.
74. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 3.1 (1971). Section 3.1 permits electronic surveillance under "Presidential
and Congressional standards and supervision" to deal with the military and espionage
activities of foreign powers, but is silent (as are the other sections) on the threat of
domestic subversion.
75. 394 U.S. at 209.
76. See note 20 supra.
77. 394 U.S. at 182-83.
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Taglianetti v. United States78 required an in camera inspection of surveillance records for a determination of their relevance, and that only
relevant material need be disclosed. However, the court had no difficulty
distinguishing Taglianetti from the instant case, 79 since the primary issue
in the former involved standing,80 while in the latter the Government
conceded that the defendant's own voice was involved. 8' The Government
also relied on Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Giordano v. United
States8 2 as authority for requiring an in camera determination of the
relevance of wiretap records. The court distinguished Giordano also,
noting that:
The full text of Justice Stewart's opinion makes it clear that the
"preliminary determination" with which he was concerned was
whether or not "any of the surveillances did violate the Fourth
Amendment." This determination Justice Stewart held could be made
by in camera inspection - as 8 has
been done in this case both by the
3
District Judge and this court.
Concluding that Alderman was unimpaired by Taglianetti and Giordano,
the court denied the Government's petition and affirmed the district court's
84
disclosure order.
One practical implication of this decision may be to significantly deter
the Government from making warrantless wiretaps on suspected domestic
subversives. Not only will the direct evidence so obtained be inadmissible
in court, but the Government will additionally face the onerous choice of
either turning over to the defendant all the logs containing his conversations
or discontinuing the prosecution entirely 5
The instant holding, however, does not prevent the Government from
effectively dealing with threats of domestic subversion. As was pointed
78. 394 U.S. at 316 (1969). In Taglianetti, the Court denied the defendant access
to the transcripts of intercepted conversations to which the defendant was not a party.
Id. at 317.
79. 444 F.2d at 668.
80. See note 78 supra.
81. 444 F.2d at 668.
82. 394 U.S. 310 (1969). Concurring in Giordano, Justice Stewart stated:
Moreover, we did not in Alderman, Butenko, or Ivanov [all decided together,
394 U.S. 165 (1969)] and we do not today, specify the procedure that the District
Courts are to follow in making this preliminary determination. We have nowhere
indicated that this determination cannot appropriately be made in ex parte, in
camera proceedings ....
Id. at 314. The "preliminary determination" to which Justice Stewart referred, and
for which the Court remanded the case, was the determination of legality, not relevance.
83. 444 F.2d at 668.
84. Id. at 669.
85. Although the difficult question in this case was the legality of the wiretap, it
is submitted that the disclosure requirement mandated by Alderman provides the
strongest deterrent to illegal wiretapping. While the Government may be willing to
accept the inadmissibility of its wiretap evidence in court, the disclosure of its surveillance records to a suspected subversive may involve a significant security risk
which the Government may be unwilling to take. Even if the Government does not
offer wiretap records as evidence, it may be subject to a disclosure order if the
defendant discovers that he has been the subject of electronic surveillance and subsequently requests disclosure at an evidentiary hearing, provided the eavesdrop is rendered illegal.
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out in the opinion, the fourth amendment does not prohibit the President
or other officials from defending the existence of the state; it merely
prescribes what methods must be followed. 6 One permissible course for
the Government to follow is to comply with the warrant procedures
outlined in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act.8 7 These provisions appear to provide adequate means for dealing
with the type of situation faced in the present case.88 Should the Government disagree with this conclusion, however, it may seek to establish a
connection between apparent domestic dissident groups and foreign governments in order to invoke the "foreign espionage" national security exemption from judicial supervision.8 9 This is a problem with which the instant
case did not deal. However, if the present decision is upheld,9 0 it is likely
that this problem will arise in the future. Nevertheless, the court's recognition of a qualitative difference between the ramifications of permitting
warrantless wiretaps against domestic vis-t-vis foreign security threats
provides an excellent foundation for later judicial treatment of problems
in the fourth amendment-national security area.
David L. Williams
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Stewart v. United States (9th Cir. 1971)
In re Korman (7th Cir. 1971)
In separate criminal proceedings, the appellants were adjudged to be
in civil contempt and ordered confined pursuant to section 301(a) of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.1 Each of the appellants had refused to answer questions during federal grand jury proceedings which
86. 444 F.2d at 666.
87. See notes 13 & 25 supra.
88. When time factors make compliance with section 2516(1) impractical, the
emergency situation" provision of section 2518(7) should be adequate to fill the gap.
See notes 13, 25 & 58 supra.
89. See note 60 supra. There, it is noted that the Senate Report on Title III
mentioned the classification of Communist party "front groups" as activities of foreign powers.
90. The instant case has been granted certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court. 403 U.S. 930 (1971).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970).
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occurred in two separate forums - Illinois and California.2 Despite
the fact that an order had been issued commanding them to answer and
granting them immunity, in any future prosecution, from the use of
their testimony or any evidence obtained therefrom, 8 appellants remained
steadfast in their refusal, invoking the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. In both cases, appellants' continued refusal to answer
questions directed to them was based on the belief that only transactional
immunity 4 could adequately protect their fifth amendment privilege in
5
light of Counselman v. Hitchcock.
The Government in both cases urged that the statements in Counselman
relating to absolute immunity were mere dicta, and have been either
limited or overruled sub silentio by Murphy v. Waterfront Commission
of New York Harbor.6 The United States Court of Appeals for the
2. In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub noma. United
States v. Korman, 40 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. June 18, 1971) (No. 70-303) ; Stewart v.
United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nora. Kastigar v. United
States, 402 U.S. 971 (1971).
3. Such order was granted pursuant to the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970), which provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the
proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege of
self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the
order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or
other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except
a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order.
4. Appellants asserted that the immunity provision of the Act was invalid because
it afforded only a "use immunity." The phrase "use immunity" means only that the
witness' testimony and other information derived therefrom may not be used against
him in a subsequent prosecution. In the case of use immunity, if independent evidence
is found of the crime which the witness has divulged, he can be prosecuted and that
evidence may be used against him. Appellants urged that such a limited immunity did
not adequately preserve their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
and that the Constitution requires nothing less than "transactional immunity." "Transactional immunity" means that the witness may not be subsequently prosecuted for any
matter divulged by his testimony concerning the transaction for which he was granted
immunity. Thus, while use immunity merely precludes the use of the immediate
testimony and its fruits, transactional immunity precludes prosecution and terminates
liability for the crime itself. United States v. Cropper, __ F.2d ___ (5th Cir. 1971).
5. 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The Court in Counselman stated the requirement to be:
In view of the constitutional provision [against self-incrimination], a statutory
enactment to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution
for the offense to which the question relates.
Id. at 586.
6. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In Murphy, the Court considered the question of
whether one federal jurisdiction, to which testimony had been given by a witness who
was granted immunity, might use that testimony to convict him of a crime against
another jurisdiction. The Court held that:
[A] state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be
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Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court's contempt order, holding that
Counselman remains authoritative on the issue of the minimum constitutional requirement for immunity statutes, and if the federal government
seeks to compel a witness to testify, it must grant him full transactional
immunity from prosecution under its laws. In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32
(7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub nom. United States v. Korman,
40 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. June 18, 1971) (No. 70-303). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took the position that
the immunity statute in question adequately implements the protections
of the fifth amendment as construed by Murphy.7 Affirming the district
court's opinion, the court held.,that the immunity granted need not bar
all future prosecution for the transaction to which the witness' testimony
relates, but only that the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used
in a subsequent prosecution of the witness. Stewart v. United States,
440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub norm. Kastigar v. United States,
402 U.S. 971 (1971)'.
Many would agree that the "privilege against self-incrimination is
one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized."
Indeed, the historical evolution of this privilege in American law consists
of various attempts to reconcile two conflicting principles - liberty and
authority.9 The first influential interpretation of the privilege, propounded
by Chief Justice Marshall, gave it a broad scope:
Many links frequently compose that chain of testimony which is
necessary to convict any individual of a crime. It appears . . .to
be the true sense of the rule that no witness is compellable to furnish
any one of them against himself. It is certainly not only a possible
but a probable case that a witness, by disclosing a single fact, may
complete the testimony against himself, and to every effectual purpose
accuse himself as entirely as he would by stating every circumstance
which would be required for his conviction. That fact itself might
be unavailing, but all other facts without it would be insufficient ....
The rule which declares that no man is compelled to accuse himself
would most obviously be infringed by compelling a witness to disclose
a fact of this description. 10
used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution
against him.
Id. at 79.

7. Id.
8. E. GRISWOLD,

FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955). One of the major evils
sought to be prevented by the privilege against self-incrimination was the use of

torture or any coercion to extract a confession. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Con-

struction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mica. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930). The
importance of the privilege is evidenced by the fact that it extends to protect any
witness in any type of proceeding which can legally demand testimony, when such
testimony might ultimately be used against the person in a criminal prosecution.
Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and The Fifth Amendment Privilege:

New Developments and Confusion, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 327, 329 (1966).
9. The demands of governmental authority have never been more clearly stated
than by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke: "The public has a right to every man's evidence."
12 CORBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 693 (1812).
10. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38, 40 (No. 14,692e) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
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Because it has been so broadly interpreted," the privilege can present
a significant barrier to the government in its attempt to obtain information
necessary for regulation. 12 For more than a century, Congress has
attempted to resolve the apparent conflict between private right and
governmental authority by adopting immunity legislation for witnesses
giving compelled testimony.'x Such immunity statutes are based on a
literal interpretation of the fifth amendment; namely, that a person cannot
be forced to give evidence which might be used to his detriment in a
subsequent criminal prosecution. 14 In exchange for the right to compel
this testimony, the government is barred from imposing penal sanctions
upon the witness for matters relating to his testimony.' 5
The immunity concept applied in the instant cases is contained in
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.16 The purpose of the Act is
to eradicate organized crime in the United States 17 by increasing the
number of legal tools to be used in the evidence gathering process,' 8 by
establishing new penal prohibitions 19 and by adding enhanced sanctions
and new remedies to deal with those engaged in organized crime.20 The
pertinent section of the Act has been adopted as the general immunity
11. See Wendel, supra note 8; Note, Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory
and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1569 (1963).
12. Among the many powers of the federal government is the power to compel
persons to testify in court or before a grand jury. The testimony of the citizenry is
one of the government's primary sources of information. The duty to testify was first
recognized by the First Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which contained a
provision for compulsory attendance of witnesses in the federal courts. Act of Sept.
24, 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 88. The corresponding duty of a witness to testify
is particularly important to the continued functioning of the federal government in
its regulatory roles. "[W]ithout the power to compel testimony, the courts, upon
whom the ultimate responsibility for an orderly society rests, would be unable to
function." Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony,
39 HARM. L. REV. 694 (1926). See also Note, supra note 11, at 1570.
13. An immunity statute has been defined as an act which grants to a government
agent "the power to compel a witness to testify about any matter, despite the selfincriminating nature of the testimony." Note, supra note 11, at 1570. Wigmore, in his
analysis of the immunity provisions, stated four essential factors:
[T]he state, (1) having in view that its crimes are the subject of a privilege...
(2) calls upon an individual for a testimonial disclosure [of the crime], (3)
invoking compulsion of law as a means of obtaining it and (4) granting immunity
as a concomitant of the disclosure.
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2282 (McNaughton rev. 1961). "Immunity" denotes that
the witness cannot be held liable for the offense itself, while "privilege" signifies that
the witness may not be compelled to speak about the offense. Thus, by immunity the
offender's guilt ceases, while under the privilege, it continues. Id.
For a concise history of American immunity legislation, see Wendel, supra
note 8, at 331. Summaries of the immunity principle may also be found in various
congressional committee reports on proposed immunity legislation. See, e.g., Hearings
on S. 30 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970).
14. Wendel, supra note 8, at 327.
15. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1970) ; 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) ; 38 Stat. 722-23
(1914).
16. 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1073 (1970). The immunity provision is
codified in 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
17. 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 1073 (1970).
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3503, 3504 (1970) ; 18 U.S.C. § 3331 (1970); 18 U.S.C. §§
6001 et seq. (1970).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970) ; 18 U.S.C. § 1995 (1970).
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3775 to 3778 (1970).
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provision on the federal level, deviating from the Counselman requirement
of transactional immunity in that it affords the witness only a use
21
immunity.
Two conflicting considerations were primarily responsible for the
contrary results reached by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in their
decisions as to the constitutionality of the immunity statute. The Seventh
Circuit expressed the view that the immunity conferred must provide the
witness with the same protection he would be afforded by a proper invocation of his fifth amendment privilege. Since the main thrust of this
position is the protection of individual rights, it necessarily leads to the
conclusion that the immunity must be transactional. 22 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that while the grant of immunity should afford as nearly as
possible the same protection as the fifth amendment, the grant should be
as narrow and precise as possible in order to minimize any disruptive
effects on law enforcement activity. In the opinion of that court, this
requirement is met by providing the witness with the narrower use
immunity. 2 Before looking further into the basis for these divergent
decisions, it is first necessary to examine the two major cases upon
which each court relied in reaching its conclusion - Counselman24 and
25
Murphy.
In Counselman, the Supreme Court was confronted with the problems
raised by a witness who would not testify despite a statutory grant of
immunity. In that case, the witness, subpoenaed before a grand jury
investigating violations of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,26 refused
to testify on fifth amendment grounds, and continued in his refusal after
being informed of his immunity 27 and ordered to testify.2 8 It was held that
in order to comply with the mandates of the Constitution, an immunity
statute must provide the same protection as the fifth amendment. 29 Since
the witness remained subject to prosecution after he answered the incriminating questions,80 Counselman deemed the protection afforded by
21. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
[N]o such testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) ... may be used against the witness in any criminal case ....
22. 449 F.2d at 40.
23. 440 F.2d at 956.
24. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
25. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
26. 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
27. Immunity was provided under the Act of February 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat.
37. The Government brought suit in England in an attempt to recover from English
banks certain assets deposited by the dead Confederacy. An agent of the Confederate
government refused to testify, claiming that to do so would result in a forfeiture of
his property. The above immunity act was specifically passed to obtain his testimony.
28. 142 U.S. at 550.
29. Id. at 585.
30. Id. The Court stated:
We are clearly of [the] opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness
subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to him, can
have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the
United States.
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the Act to be too narrow and thereby intimated that a grant of transactional
immunity is constitutionally required in such statutes.
Notwithstanding this indication that transactional immunity is required, there is also languge in Counselman supporting the theory that
use immunity, which operates to bar the use of the compelled testimony
and its fruits, may indeed be constitutionally permissible. Justice Blatchford, writing for the majority, enumerated the vices in the statute then
at issue as follows:
It [the statute] could not, and would not, prevent the use of his
testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence
against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding in such court.
It could not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and
evidence which should be attributable directly to the testimony he
might give under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted,
when otherwise, and if he had refused to answer, he could not
possibly have been convicted. 8'
However, in ruling that the immunity provision of the Act was insufficient
in light of the fifth amendment privilege, the Court formulated the standard
by which future federal immunity statutes would be tested:
In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be
valid, must afford absolute immunity against
future prosecution for
82
the offense to which the question relates.
Thus, the seeds of discord were sown in the explicit language of the
opinion; i.e., statements in support of both use and transactional immunity
may be found. Counselman's susceptibility to two interpretations provides
the first basis for the conflict inherent in the instant cases.
A second basis for the present confusion is the Court's decision in
Murphy.83 After having been granted immunity under New York and
New Jersey laws, 8 4 Murphy and others claimed the privilege against

self-incrimination before the Waterfrort Commission of New York
Harbor which was investigating work stoppages. 83 Their basic contention
was that the state immunity laws were invalid since the immunity granted
did not preclude federal prosecution."6 Mr. Justice Goldberg delivered the
opinion of the Court on the vital question of "whether one jurisdiction
within our federal structure may compel a witness, whom it has immunized
31. Id. at 564.
32. Id. at 586. This passage has been considered the key passage in the evolution

of compulsory immunity legislation since 1892. It has been historically regarded as
demanding the immunization of any "transactions, matters, and things revealed in
compelled testimony." Wendel, supra note 8, at 370.

33. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
34. Id. at 53.

35. Id. at 52.
36. Id. Prior to the Murphy decision, even if the United States or a state had
compelled testimony through a grant of immunity under its law, a second sovereign
was totally free to disregard the grant. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141
(1931). Thus, Murphy broadened the effect of a state's grant of transactional immunity, but simultaneously narrowed its scope by prohibiting only the use of the
compelled testimony and its fruits by the non-questioning sovereign.
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from prosecution under its laws, to give testimony which might then be used
to convict him of a crime against another such jurisdiction.""7
The Murphy Court held that once New Jersey had granted immunity
to the witness, the United States could not use the compelled testimony
or its fruits against him. a8 The Government did, however, remain free
to prosecute based on independent evidence for a federal crime related
to the transaction for which New Jersey had granted transactional
immunity.8 9 The Court concluded that New Jersey may require the
witness to testify even though he was guaranteed, as against another
sovereign, nothing more than protection against use of that testimony
which. New Jersey had compelled. 40 In the view of Justice Goldberg,
the immunity statute which the Court had invalidated in Counselman
was unconstitutional because, in the words of the Counselman Court, the
statute "could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to
search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him or his
property, in a criminal proceeding .... ,,41
In an attempt to reconcile these two decisions, it can be argued that
the Murphy decision was merely a reaffirmation of the transactional
immunity requirement of Counselman, coupled with a supplementary ruling
that another sovereign must respect so much of that grant of immunity
as prohibits the use of the testimony or its fruits in a prosecution under
its laws. 42 This was the reasoning employed by the Seventh Circuit in
37. 378 U.S. at 53. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), extended the application of the fifth amendment privilege to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. However, the basic issue remains the same; that is,
whether the testimony is compelled by the federal government and used by a state, or
compelled by a state and used by the federal government.

38. 378 U.S. at 78.
39. Id. at 79.
40. Id. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Court, stated:
[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compelled
to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials
in connection with a criminal prosecution against him. We conclude, moreover,
that in order to implement this constitutional rule and accommodate the interests
of the State and Federal Governments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the
Federal Government must be prohibited from making any such use of compelled
teitimony and its fruits. This exclusionary rule, while permitting the States to

secure information necessary for effective law enforcement, leaves the witness
and the Federal Government in substantially the same position as if the witness
had claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant of immunity.
Id. (emphasis added). A footnote to this statement read:
Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified under a state grant of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have
the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they
had an independent legitimate source for the disputed evidence.
Id. at n.18.
41. 142 U.S. at 564, quoted in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 78

(1964).

42. See United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3198 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1971) (No. 71-377). In Catena, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a New Jersey statute
which failed to grant transactional immunity constituted an inadequate basis for compelling an unwilling witness to testify.
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In re Korman.4 3 The Ninth Circuit, however, interpreted Murphy as
indicating that a state may compel testimony concerning any violation of
its criminal laws via a grant of less than transactional immunity."4 These
two interpretations of Murphy represent another conflict found in the
instant circuit court decisions.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the statements
in Counselman announced a constitutional doctrine to the effect that a
45
grant of transactional immunity must be given on a single sovereign level.
4
6
The court reasoned that the ground for the Counselman holding was
that "no [immunity] statute which leaves the party or witness subject to
prosecution after he answers the criminating questions put to him can
have the effect of supplanting the privilege." 47 The Korman decision,
however, was not based upon Counselman alone, 48 and reliance was
also placed on Brown v. Walker,49 decided four years later. In that case,

the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a statute which compelled
testimony under a grant of full transactional immunity. 50 In considering
Counselman, the Brown Court quoted with approval the language that
a witness must be afforded "absolute immunity against future prosecution
for the offense to which the question relates." 51 This led the Seventh
Circuit to conclude that Brown stands for the proposition that only a
grant of full transactional immunity can be a substitute for the fifth
amendment privilege.

52

The Seventh Circuit bolstered its conclusion that Counselman and
Brown required transactional immunity by pointing to the fact that the
Brown Court included four dissenting Justices who took the position that
not even a transactional immunity statute can empower the state to
43. 449 F.2d at 39.
44. 440 F.2d at 955.
45. 449 F.2d at 40.
46. The court stated that "the holding of Counselman was that a statute prohibiting only the direct use of the compelled testimony was insufficient to displace the
constitutional immunity .

. . ."

Id. at 35. Although a narrower ruling might have

been made, the Seventh Circuit chose the instant case to give the privilege a broad
scope, holding that nothing less than full transactional immunity would suffice.
47. 449 F.2d at 39, quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892).
48. 449 F.2d at 35.
49. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
50. Act of February 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443.
51. 161 U.S. at 594. The language in the statute which led the Court in Brown
to conclude that transactional immunity was required stated that "no person shall be
prosecuted . . . for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning
which he may testify .

. . ."

Act of February 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443. The first

protection flowing from this phrase was to preclude any future prosecution of the
witness based not only upon his testimony, but also upon any leads or tips derived
by the prosecuting sovereign from that testimony. In addition, a broader shield of
protection provided that the witness could not be subjected to any future prosecution
which could be shown to be logically related to his testimony. Under such a statute,
the witness need only show that his compelled testimony bears a logical relationship
to the transaction which was the subject of future prosecution. See Dixon, Comment
on Immunity Provisions, in
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compel an unwilling witness to incriminate himself. 53 The court further
substantiated its holding by examining the evolution of the Counselman
requirement.5 4 In so doing, it stated:
Those minimal constitutional requirements prohibit the federal government, absent a grant of absolute immunity from prosecution for any
transaction to which his compelled testimony relates, from committing
who relies on his fifth amendment privilege
for contempt a witness
55
and refuses to testify.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Murphy did not restrict

or limit the Counselman requirement of transactional immunity.5 6 Rather,
the court regarded the Murphy decision as an attempt to deal with the
constitutional limitations on the powers of the interrogating sovereign to
57
grant immunity against prosecution by a non-interrogating jurisdiction.
Thus, Murphy attempted to reconcile, within the framework of federalism,
the problem that the immunity granted a witness by one state infringes
upon another state's independent power to prosecute. 58 The Seventh
Circuit thereby restricted Murphy to the question of what type of immunity
must be granted a witness in a dual sovereign setting,5 9 and concluded
that Murphy "did not reach the question of the extent of the immunity
which the questioning jurisdiction must grant ....
60
53. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610, 628 (1896) (Shiras, Gray, White &
Field, JJ., dissenting). More recently, Justices Black and Douglas made it clear that
they did not consider any immunity statute to be a valid device for compelling testimony. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 440 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
54. 449 F.2d at 36-37. In Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), the
Court reviewed the decisions of previous cases and upheld a transactional immunity
statute. Justice Frankfurter stated that the 1893 transactional immunity statute upheld
in Brown had become part of our constitutional fabric. 350 U.S. at 438. United States
v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943), reaffirmed the view that Counselman required transactional immunity. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924), held that Congress
could not require a witness to testify unless it provided complete immunity from
prosecution. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), also recognized that Counselman
required transactional immunity from prosecution.
55. 449 F.2d at 35.
56. The court also relied on an independent interpretation of the fifth amendment
in reaching its decision. In leaving the viability of Murphy an open question, the
court stated:
[T]he language of the fifth amendment requires that any jurisdiction which seeks
to compel a witness to testify grant full transactional immunity ....
Id. at 40. Mr. Justice Brennan expressed a similar view in Piccirillo v. New York,
400 U.S. 548 (1971):
I believe that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination requires
that any jurisdiction that compels a man to incriminate himself grant him absolute
immunity under its laws from prosecution for any transaction revealed in that
testimony.
Id. at 562 (dissenting opinion).
57. 449 F.2d at 39.
58. United States ex rtI. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 44 (3d Cir. 1971). See
note 42 supra. To deprive a state of the right to prosecute a violation of its criminal
law on the basis of another state's grant of immunity would, in the opinion of that
court, obstruct its administration of justice. 449 F.2d at 44.
59. 449 F.2d at 39. See In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Judge
Motley stated for the court in Kinoy that Murphy "minimized interference with the
law enforcement prerogatives of the non-questioning jurisdiction." 326 F. Supp. at 416.
60. 449 F.2d at 38.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a
cursory opinion, took the position that Murphy overruled or limited the
Counselman requirement of transactional immunity. 61 In that court's opinion, Murphy required only use immunity, and the Counselman language
from which the theory of transactional immunity had been derived was considered mere dictum. 62 Moreover, in adopting Murphy as the controlling
precedent by which immunity statutes are to be tested, the Ninth Circuit
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's argument that a rule prohibiting
the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived therefrom,
would leave "the witness and the Federal Government in substantially
the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in absence
of a state grant of immunity." 63 The court went on to hold that a grant
of immunity from prosecution affords the witness greater protection than
64
the fifth amendment, which itself affords no protection against prosecution.
The court reasoned, through its adoption of the Murphy holding, that if
the prosecuting sovereign may not use the compelled testimony and its
fruits, that testimony can in no way "lead" to the criminal prosecution
of the witness. 65
The Ninth Circuit also examined Mr. Justice White's concurring
opinion in Murphy to further support the statute under attack in the
instant case. 66 Inherent in Justice White's statement is the view that
there must be an independent legitimate source for evidence other than
the evidence and its fruits derived from the compelled witness :67
In my view it is possible for a federal prosecution to be based on
untainted evidence after a grant of federal immunity in exchange for
testimony in a federal criminal investigation .. . .It is precisely this
possibility 68of a prosecution based on untainted evidence that we must
recognize.
Using this language in combination with its adoption of Murphy as a
replacement for the Counselman doctrine, the Ninth Circuit found the
statute in question to be clearly in accord with the mandates of the
fifth amendment. 69
61. 440 F.2d at 956.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 956-57. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
But see In re Zicarelli, 55 N.J. 249, 261 A.2d 129 (1970), prob. juris. noted sub nom.
Zicarelli v. State Comm'n of Investigation, 401 U.S. 933 (1971). In Zicarelli, a witness before a state investigatory agency refused to answer questions, pleading his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thereafter, the witness was granted
use immunity but, nevertheless, continued in his refusal to respond. The New Jersey
supreme court held that the New Jersey statute's failure to grant transactional immunity from prosecution made it an inadequate basis for compelling an unwilling
witness to incriminate himself.
64. 440 F.2d at 956.

65. Id. at 957. The court, in addition, placed reliance on Justice White's concurring opinion in Murphy to sustain the statute under attack in the instant case.
See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 100 (1964) (White, J.,concurring).
66. 440 F.2d at 957.
67. Id.
68. 378 U.S. at 106 (White, J.,concurring).

69. 440 F.2d at 957.
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The Court in Murphy had made it clear that any evidence used in
70
the prosecution of a witness must be free from all taint of compulsion.
This rule is based not on state legislative power to immunize against federal
prosecution, but rather on the operation of the fifth amendment itself.
In a non-immunity setting, Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court in
United States v. Blue,71 said that if the Government had acquired evidence
in violation of the fifth amendment, the remedy would be to suppress the
evidence and its fruits at trial, not to dismiss the indictment.7 2 He
further stated:
So drastic a step [barring prosecution altogether] might advance
marginally some of the ends served by exclusionary rules, but it would
with the public
also increase to an intolerable degree interference
73
interest in having the guilty brought to book.
If the concept of immunity is accepted to this extent, as is suggested by
Justice Harlan, then Justice White's concurring opinion in Murphy is
persuasive.
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Stewart leaves a great deal to be desired
in its justification for considering Murphy as a sub silentio overruling of
Counselman. In reaching its conclusion, the Murphy Court carefully
avoided language which would conflict with Counselman's holding that the
fifth amendment requires the questioning sovereign to grant transactional
immunity. 74 Lack of even passing reference to the various precedents and
legislative practices suggests that the Murphy Court did not consider that
the situation presented to it - immunity in a dual sovereign setting in any way involved the question in Counselman of immunity in a single
sovereign setting. 75 This argument is further supported by the fact that
the holding in Murphy mentioned both state and federal policies and not
merely a sole sovereign. 76 The state and federal governments were spoken
70. 378 U.S. at 79 n.18.
71. 384 U.S. 251 (1966). The defendant in Blue was charged in a criminal proceeding with wilfully attempting to evade income taxes. The district court dismissed
the indictment on the basis that the defendant had been compelled to be a witness
against himself because of the necessity of filing petitions for review of jeopardy
assessment in the Tax Court. The Supreme Court held that the indictment should not
have been dismissed, reasoning that even if the Government had acquired incriminating
evidence in violation of the fifth amendment, the defendant would be entitled to suppress
the evidence and its fruits if they were sought to be used against him at trial.
72. Id. at 255.
73. Id.
74. See Wendel, supra note 8, at 371. Justice Goldberg quoted the portions of
Counselman which spoke of immunizing testimony, but failed to mention the passage
from which the transactional immunity requirement is derived. That Justice Goldberg
would unintentionally fail to mention the large number of federal immunity statutes
which immunized "any transaction, matter, or thing revealed in compelled testimony"
seems unlikely. Id. at 370.
75. Id. at 371. In fact, the statute in Murphy granted transactional immunity
with respect to the interrogating sovereign. This statute conferred immunity upon the
witness to the extent that "such person shall not be prosecuted . . . for or on account
of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which ... he gave answer or produced
evidence .... ." N.J. REv. STAT. § 32:23-86(5) (1956).
76. 378 U.S. at 79. See Wendel, supra note 8, at 372.
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of in the sense that one acted for the other and, thus, in the light of dual
sovereign limitations.

77

The court's particular reliance upon Justice White's concurring
78
opinion in Murphy further undermines the Ninth Circuit's position.
Justice White, stating that Counselman did not require transactional
immunity,7 9 cited four cases.80 While these cases were cited to support
this proposition, in fact they upheld immunity statutes which provided
for transactional immunity. Justice White compounded the confusion by
citing two federal immunity statutes which actually demanded transactional
immunity.8 '

There are recent indications that the Supreme Court has recognized that
Murphy was limited to grants of immunity in a dual sovereign situation.
Two years following the decision in Murphy, the Court in Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Board8 2 struck down a federal immunity
statute providing for only use immunity. The Albertson Court, making
no mention of Murphy, based its decision on Counselman which, it said,
had "held that no [immunity] statute which leaves the party or witness
subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to
him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege ....8 Subsequently,
in Stevens v. Marks,8 4 the Court stated:

We need not stop to determine whether the immunity said to be
conferred here - which merely prevents the use of the defendant's
testimony or its fruits in any subsequent prosecution but, apparently,
does not preclude prosecution based on "independent" evidence

. . .

77. 378 U.S. at 79. See note 40 supra.
78. 440 F.2d at 956.
79. Justice White stated:
[Counselman] does not require that absolute immunity from state prosecution be
conferred on a federal witness and the Court has declined on many occasions to

so read it ....

378 U.S. at 104 (White, J.,
concurring).
80. Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960) ; Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422 (1956); Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954); Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591 (1896). In Reina, the Court upheld immunity coextensive with the constitutional privilege - transactional immunity. Adams held that an act not providing
complete immunity from prosecution was not broad enough to permit a federal grand
jury to hear incriminating testimony. These cases cited by Justice White were also
used by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to illustrate the history of transactional immunity. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
81. Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 620, tit. II, § 201, 70 Stat. 574 (repealed by 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6001 et seq. (1970)) ; Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 833 (repealed by 18
U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq. (1970)).
82. 382 U.S. 70 (1965). In Albertson, the Subversive Activities Control Board
ordered petitioners to register and submit a list of its members. The Supreme Court
held that the immunity provision did not preclude the use of an admission of Communist party membership as an investigatory lead, and the use of such an admission
was barred by the privilege against self-incrimination.
83. Id. at 80, quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892).
84. 383 U.S. 234 (1966). In Stevens, a New York City police officer refused to
testify when subpoenaed before one of the grand juries investigating alleged bribery
of public officials. The Court held that a witness has a right to refuse to incriminate
himself until it can be demonstrated that the immunity offered him is as broad in scope
as the privilege that it replaces.
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constitutes that "absolute immunity against future prosecution" about
which the Court spoke in Counselman ....85
Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissenting in Stevens, intimated that the
question of transactional immunity should only be considered after a
full briefing by the parties in light of Counselman.Y'
Both of the above decisions assumed that Counselman's holding
remained in force and neither cited Murphy. Since there is evidence that
the Supreme Court has not interpreted Murphy as overruling Counselman
sub silentio or otherwise, it is submitted that the Ninth Circuit erroneously
concluded that Murphy had such an effect.
It cannot reasonably be asserted that use immunity places an individual in substantially the same position as does the fifth amendment
privilege. The individual is compelled to testify, and, if granted only a
use immunity, is compelled to do so in matters for which he might ultimately
be prosecuted. 7 He is still forced to admit criminal conduct for which
88
he may be punished, albeit not on the basis of his compelled testimony.
If the witness is prosecuted after a grant of use immunity, he will be
confronted with serious problems of proof.8 9 Although Murphy indicated
that the burden of proving that the independent evidence is untainted rests
on the government,9 ° there is the danger that this evidence, as a practical
matter, will not be subject to challenge. 91 All of the evidence will be in
the hands of the government, and it would be virtually impossible to tell
what subtle influences the compelled testimony had on the decision to
prosecute.9 2 One must also assume the normal margin of human fallibility
where many persons are involved in the investigation and ultimate
93
prosecution of a criminal suspect.
Mr. Justice Brennan has said that "use immunity literally misses
half the point of the [fifth amendment] privilege, for it permits the com85. Id. at 244.
86. Id. at 249 (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). See also Piccirillo v. New
York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971), where Justice Brennan stated in dissent:
Mere use immunity, which protects the individual only against the actual use of his
compelled testimony and its fruits, satisfies neither the language of the Constitution
itself nor its values, purposes, and policies that the privilege was historically
designed to serve and that it must serve in a free country.
Id. at 563. The Court in Piccirillo,denying a writ of certiorari, based its ruling upon
a subsequent decision of the Court of Appeals of New York which had made it clear
that transactional immunity must be granted to compel a witness to answer incriminating questions.
87. See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 565 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 565 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. See United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 43 (3d Cir. 1971).
The witness must be able to show that his compelled testimony influenced the decision
to prosecute. In the investigation and prosecution of crimes, many persons are involved,
and it would be next to impossible to determine whether any one of them used the
coerced testimony during the process of investigation. Id. at 44.
90. 378 U.S. at 79 n. 18. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
91. The Seventh Circuit recognized such a danger. 449 F.2d at 35 n.5.
92. Id.
93. 400 U.S. at 568 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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pulsion without removing the criminality." 94 Nonetheless, it seems that
the Ninth Circuit viewed the immunity-fifth amendment relationship in
light of the interests of the Government in having criminal violators
prosecuted.9 5 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the protection
of the individual, including the psychological effects of compelling him
to admit guilt under a fear of later prosecution. What is needed is a final
evaluation as to which of these competing considerations will prevail, and
therefore whether it is more desirable to immunize a witness and forgive
his crimes in return for testimony which will help to convict others, or
whether it is better to run the risk of losing some valuable testimony in
exchange for a single conviction.
Consideration must also be given to the effect of compelled disclosures
on the witness' defense to possible later criminal charges. If an individual
who has been granted use immunity and is subsequently prosecuted elects
to testify at trial in his behalf, he will be subject to cross-examination.
The prosecutor will be able to tailor his questions on the basis of his
knowledge of the prior compelled testimony and can do so without any
reference to the testimony given under immunity.9 6 This possibility may
influence a defendant to forego his right to testify in his own behalf, even
though he is advised that his prior compelled testimony cannot be used
against him. 97 Thus, the only way to insure that immunity statutes and the
fifth amendment privilege will not be abused in a subsequent prosecution
by the questioning sovereign is to preclude prosecution by that sovereign. 8
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that Counselman's
requirement of transactional immunity is still viable. Murphy must be
considered in light of the dual sovereign situation which confronted the
Court in that case, and its protection is insufficient when applied in a
single questioning sovereign context.99 Were courts totally free to consider the fifth amendment in its literal form as it relates to the issue presented in the instant cases, a different result might be reached - that of
the Ninth Circuit. 10 0 However, the lower federal courts are constrained to
follow the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, and, in this respect, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should have waited for that Court
to make such a "major extirpation of a part of our constitutional fabric,"
94. Id. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting). justice Brennan stated:
[Transactional immunity] provides the individual with an assurance that he is not
testifying about matters for which he may later be prosecuted. No question arises
of tracing the use or non-use of information gleaned from the witness' compelled
testimony. The sole question presented to a court is whether the subsequent
prosecution is related to the substance of the compelled testimony.
Id. at 568-69.
95. See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966).
96. See United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1971).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Use immunity is also insufficient in a dual sovereign situation. However, in
such a situation questions of federalism tend to modify the considerations which otherwise compel transactional immunity.
100. See United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 46 (3d Cir. 1971)
(Adams, J., concurring). See note 42 supra.
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and should have refrained from anticipating any such changes.'°1 The
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to re-examine the Counselman
doctrine in light of the immunity afforded by the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970.102 In fact, the Court has recently heard argument on the
very question that has divided the circuit and state courts for quite
some time: the extent of an immunity grant given in exchange for
compelled self-incrimination. 08 However, until the confusion is put to rest,
the inferior courts should continue to adhere to the rationale of Counselman
and Brown.
Alan J. Hoffman
101. See In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Judge Motley stated:
Since the Supreme Court has not overruled its requirement that as between the
questioning sovereign and the witness only an immunity statute granting transactional immunity is sufficiently broad to replace the constitutional privilege, this
court is without power to do so. Upholding the constitutionality of Title II of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 would represent a reversal of long established precedent. Clearly, any such major extirpation of a part of our "constitutional fabric," in addition to being decreed by the Congress, must be affirmed by
the Supreme Court before this court is asked to do so.
Id.
102. As previously noted, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Stewart
case. Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub non.
Kastigar v. United States, 402 U.S. 971 (1971). In addition, certiorari has been
granted to the Supreme Court of Illinois in Sarno v. Crime Investigating Comm'n, 45
Ill. 2d 473, 259 N.E.2d 267 (1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 935 (1971). Probable
jurisdiction has been noted in one other case. In re Zicarelli, 55 N.J. 249, 261
A.2d 129

(1970), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Zicarelli v. State Comm'n of Investigation, 401
U.S. 933 (1971).
103. Argument has been heard in the Stewart, Sarno and Zicarelli cases. 40
U.S.L.W. 3325 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1972). See note 102 supra.
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STATE AID TO NONPUBLIC ELEMENTARY

AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS HELD VIOLATIVE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
FEDERAL STATUTE AUTHORCLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT COLLEGES AND
NONPUBLIC
TO
GRANTS
IZING CONSTRUCTION
UNIVERSITILS HELD CONSTITUTIONAL.

Lemon v. Kurtzman (U.S. 1971)
Tilton v. Richardson (U.S. 1971)
"Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... I
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 individual taxpayers, nonprofit corporations
and unincorporated associations joined as plaintiffs in an action against
officials of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and certain nonpublic
schools within the Commonwealth, to enjoin the expenditure of state
funds, which, they alleged, constituted an establishment of religion, an
abridgement of the free exercise thereof, and a denial of equal protection.
A three-judge federal district courts granted the Commonwealth's motion
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, holding
that since the purpose and primary effect of the Pennsylvania statute
was neither to advance nor inhibit religion, it violated neither the
4
establishment nor the free exercise clauses.
The Pennsylvania statute 5 authorized the Secretary of Education
to "purchase" specified "secular educational services" from nonpublic
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1. The establishment clause of the first amendment
was made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell V. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
The Lemon Court placed great emphasis upon the precise language of the
first amendment.
Its authors did not simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a state
religion . .

.

. Instead they commanded that there should be "no law respecting

an establishment of religion."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (emphasis supplied by the Court). A
law, it was felt, could be one
"respecting" the forbidden objective while falling short of its total realization....
A given law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be one "respecting" that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment
and hence offend the First Amendment.
Id. (emphasis supplied by the Court).
The Court's decisions in these cases rest heavily upon this questionable excursion into linguistics. It furnishes the constitutional underpinnings for the new
entanglement rationale - a crucial instance of Auden's insight into how the words of
dead men are "modified in the guts of the living." Auden, In Memory of W.B. Yeats,
in AN OXFORD ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH POETRY 1297 (2d ed. H. Lowry & W. Thorp
1956). That the Court's distinctions between these cases are more visceral than
cerebral is suggested in the text accompanying note 67 infra.
2. 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3. Since the suit challenged the constitutionality of a statute of statewide application, a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1970).
4. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969). For a discussion of
the Lemon case in the federal district court, see 15 VILL. L. REv. 477 (1970).
5. Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, PA. STAT. tit. 24, §§
5601 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
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schools.6 The Commonwealth directly reimbursed such schools for their
actual expenditures for teachers' salaries, textbooks and instructional
materials. 7 To qualify for such reimbursement, a nonpublic school was
obliged to maintain prescribed accounting procedures identifying the
separate costs of the secular educational service which the Commonwealth
was purchasing.8 These accounts were subject to State audit. 9 Courses
for which reimbursement might be obtained were limited to those "presented
in the curricula of the public schools," and specifically to the "secular"
subjects of mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical science and
physical education. 10 Textbooks and instructional materials had to be
approved by the Secretary," and no reimbursement could be made for
any course containing "any subject matter expressing religious teaching,
' 2
or the morals or forms of worship of any sect.'
8
In DiCenso v. Robinson,' citizens and taxpayers of Rhode Island
brought suit, on the same grounds alleged in Lemon, against state officials
to enjoin the expenditure of state funds under a statute similar to that
in Pennsylvania. After hearing evidence on the nature of the secular
instruction offered in the state's Roman Catholic schools, the threejudge federal district court 4 found that, although "concern for religious
values [did] not necessarily affect the content of secular subjects in diocesan
schools,"'15 the parochial school system was "an integral part of the
religious mission of the Catholic Church."'1 The court concluded that
it fostered
the Rhode Island act violated the establishment clause in that
"excessive entanglement" between government and religion.' 7
The Rhode Island statute'8 authorized state officials to supplement
the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools
6. Id. § 5604.
7. Id. "Instructional materials" mean books, documents, pictorial or graphic
works, maps or any printed or published instructional material. This term includes
portable instructional equipment, but does not include non-portable equipment or items
normally affixed to the realty or forming a part of a building structure. PA. DEP'T OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT: DEFINITIONS § 5 (1969).

NONPUBLIC

8. PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 5607 (Supp. 1971).
9. Id.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
316

§ 5604.
§ 5604(i).
§ 5603(3).
F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970), aff'd sub nom.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971).
14. See note 3 supra.
15. 316 F. Supp. at 117.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 122. The conflict between the federal district court decisions in Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania is largely attributable to the fact that Lemon was decided

before (November 28, 1969), and DiCenso after (June 15, 1970), Walz v. Tax Commission (May 4, 1970), which first crystallized the entanglement rationale.

Walz is

cited at 397 U.S. 664.
18. Salary Supplement Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 16-51-1 et seq. (Supp.
1970).
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by paying directly to the teacher an amount not in excess of fifteen
per cent of his current annual salary, limited, however, to the maximum
paid to teachers in Rhode Island's public schools. x9 Further, the Salary
Supplement Act required that teachers eligible for salary supplement
teach only those subjects offered in the state's public schools, 20 use "only
teaching materials which are used in the public schools," 21 and agree in
writing "not to teach a course in religion for so long as or during such
22
time as he or she receives any salary supplements" under the Act.
The United States Supreme Court decided that both state statutes were
unconstitutional, holding that the "cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive
entanglement between government and religion." Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
In Tilton,23 taxpayer-residents of Connecticut instituted an action
against federal officials and certain church-related colleges and universities
located in Connecticut, challenging the constitutionality of expenditures of
federal funds under Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 196324
as violative of the religion clauses of the first amendment. A three-judge
federal district court 25 upheld the federal act, although the institutional
defendants were sponsored by religious organizations. The court concluded
that Title I authorized grants to church-related colleges and universities,
and that the Act had neither the purpose nor the effect of promoting
religion.

26

Title I of the federal act provides for construction grants for buildings
and facilities used exclusively for undergraduate secular educational purposes.27 The Act authorizes federal grants and loans up to fifty per cent
of the total cost 28 to institutions of higher education for the construction
19. Id. §§ 16-51-3, 16-51-4. The subsidy was available only to those teachers

certified by the State Board of Education in substantially the same manner as public
school teachers. Id. § 2. In addition, the recipient must have taught in a nonpublic
school in which the average per-pupil expenditure on secular education was less than
the average in the state's public schools. Id. §§ 16-51-2(1), 16-51-3.

20. Id. § 16-51-3(1).
21. Id. § 16-51-3(4).

22. Id. § 16-51-3(5).
23. Tilton v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Conn. 1970), modified sub nom. Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
24. 20 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. Federal funds were used for five projects at four
institutions: (1) a library building at Sacred Heart University; (2) a music, drama
and arts building at Amhurst College; (3) a science building at Fairfield University;
S4)a library building at Fairfield; and (5) a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus
ollege. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 676 (1971).
25. The court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1970).
26. Tilton v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 1191, 1198-99 (D. Conn. 1970).
27. Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. §§ 711 to 721 (1970).
28. Id. § 717(b).
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of "academic facilities." 29 Further, under the Act, the United States
retains an interest for twenty years in any facility constructed with its
funds. 30 Congress reasoned that after twenty years "the public benefit
accruing to the United States" from the use of the federally financed
8
facility would "equal or exceed in value" the amount of the federal grant. '
In this respect, the Court unanimously agreed that the Act transgressed
the religion clauses, holding that "[t]he restrictive obligations of a recipient institution . . . cannot, compatible with the Religion Clauses,
expire while the building has substantial value."8 2 The Court found,
however, that the twenty year limit provision of the Act was severable,
and that the entire Act need not be invalidated since it had neither the
purpose nor primary effect of advancing religion and did not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. 8 It was therefore a constitutionally
valid exercise of legislative power. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971).
The history of the Court's decisions in this area was succinctly
summarized by Justice White:
No one in these cases questions the constitutional right of
parents to satisfy their state-imposed obligation to educate their
children by sending them to private schools, sectarian or otherwise,
as long as those schools meet minimum standards established for
secular instruction. The States are not only permitted, but required
by the Constitution, to free students attending private schools from
any public school attendance obligation. Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925). The States may also furnish transportation
for students, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947),
and books for teaching secular subjects to students attending parochial
and other private as well as public schools, Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); we have also upheld arrangements
whereby students are released from public school classes so that they
may attend religious instructions. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952). Outside the field of education, we have upheld Sunday
closing laws, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), state
and federal laws exempting church property and church activity from
taxation, Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and govern29. Id. § 711. "Academic facilities" are defined as:
[SItructures suitable for use as classrooms, laboratories, libraries, and related
facilities necessary or appropriate for instruction of students or for research ...
programs ....

Id. § 751(a) (1). Expressly excluded is:
[Any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious
worship, or ...

any facility which ...

is used or to be used primarily in connection

with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity ....
Id. § 751(a) (2).
30. Id. § 7 54(a).
31. Id. If, during this period, the recipient institution violated the statutory conditions, the United States would be entitled to recover a proportional amount of the
existing value as determined by the ratio of the federal grant to the original cost of
the facility. Id. § 754(b).
32. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971). The Court reasoned that
a structure, built with federal funds, would be of "some value" to a religious body
even after twenty years, and that the unrestricted use of that property would be, in

effect, a contribution to a religious body. Id.
33. Id. at 684.
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mental grants to religious organizations for the purpose of financing
improvements in the facilities of hospitals managed and controlled
4
by religious orders. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291

(1899).3

The Chief Justice, who delivered the opinion of the Court in each
case, prefaced the decisions with an apology that "[c]andor compels
85

acknowledgement

. . . that we can only dimly perceive the lines of

demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." 6
The Court hinged its decisions on the "cumulative criteria" developed in
previous establishment cases:
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) ; finally, the
statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
religion." Walz, supra, at 674.37
As to the first part of its test, the Court concluded that the state
statutes challenged were decisive evidence of legislative intent. 88 The Court
further indicated that Congress clearly intended to include as beneficiaries
of the federal act all colleges and universities regardless of any affiliation
with or sponsorship by religious bodies.8 9
The second phase of the Court's test requires that the primary effect
of challenged legislation be neither to advance nor inhibit religion. While
ostensibly expressing the opinion that it need not reach the primary effect
portion of its test, it is submitted that the Court, in its determination of
the effect of the challenged legislation, actually distinguished the permissible
34. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 663 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part,

dissenting in part).
35. In Lemon, Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun joined
the Chief Justice to form the majority. Justice Douglas concurred, joined by Justice
Black. Justice Brennan concurred in a separate opinion. Justice White concurred in
part and dissented in part. In DiCenso, Justice Marshall joined the majority in addition
to those above. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the
Lemon case.
In Tilton, Justices Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun joined the Chief Justice
writing for a plurality. Justice White concurred; Justice Douglas dissented in part,
joined by Justices Black and Marshall; Justice Brennan also dissented.
36. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 678 (1971). Most members of the Court would agree with Justice White that:
[Neither affirmance nor reversal of any of these cases follows automatically from
the sparse language of the First Amendment, from its history, or from the cases of
this Court construing it ....
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 662 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Chief Justice Burger had remarked earlier that the religion clauses were
"not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution." Walz v. Tax Comm'n,

397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
37. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). For a discussion of the
genesis and development of the Court's tripartite test, see 16 VILL. L. REv. 374 (1970).
38. In Lemon, the Court stated:
[T]he statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the
quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance
laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything else.
403 U.S. at 613.
39. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 676-77 (1971).
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federal program from the impermissible state programs. It was the belief
of the Court that nonpublic elementary and secondary schools, the primary
40
beneficiaries of both state programs, were "factories of the faithful.
That, more than any other consideration, seems to have motivated the
Court in deciding these cases as it did. The Court repeated the proposition
that the religious and educational functions of church-related elementary
schools are separable. 41 However, this proposition was qualified as follows:
In Allen the Court acknowledged that secular and religious teachings were not necessarily so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the State were in fact instrumental in the
.
teaching of religion
42
this conclusion.

. .

. In the abstract we have no quarrel with

In its analysis of the specific facts at hand, however, the Court stated:
We cannot ignore the danger that a teacher under religious control
and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the purely
education. The conflict of functions
secular aspects of pre-college
43
inheres in the situation.

The Court appears to have assumed, notwithstanding its protestations
to the contrary, that religion so permeates the secular education provided
by the nonpublic elementary and secondary schools of Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island as to make their secular and religious functions inseparable.
It has, in fulfillment of the fears of Professors Valente and Stanmeyer,
raised to the status of a "constitutional presumption" the conviction that
"all education in [elementary and secondary] church-related schools
amounts to sectarian activity. '44 In this respect, the Court is apparently
40. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
41. Id. at 613.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
44. Valente & Stanmeyer, Public Aid to ParochialSchools
fessor Freund, 59 GEo. L.J. 59, 66 (1970).

-

A Reply to Pro-

Justice Jackson, concurring in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,

237-38 (1947), contended:
It is idle to pretend that this task is .one for which we can find in the Constitution
one word to help us as judges to decide where the secular ends and the sectarian
begins in education. Nor can we find guidance in any other legal source. It is
a matter on which we can find no law but our own prepossessions.
The Court reasserted the "three main evils against which the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). Or, in the words of
Justice Brennan:
What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under the Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of religious with secular
institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes;

or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular

means would suffice ....
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 643 (1971) (separate opinion).
The Court in these cases appears to have enshrined its complex of personal
"prepossessions" into constitutional doctrine; to have substituted "presumption for
proof that religion is or would be taught in state financed secular courses or . . . that,
enforcement measures would be so extensive as to border on a free exercise violation."

Id. at 670. (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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45

in good company.
The Court's understanding of the proper relationship of state to
church is, most basically, that the first amendment "requires the state to
be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers ;-46 albeit a "benevolent neutrality. ' 4 The limitations of "neutrality" as an analytical tool, however, are especially noticeable when
applied in the instant state cases. If neutrality is properly understood as
absolute separation - the state as much as possible ignoring the existence
of church-related schools - then the constitutionality of aid will be
judged by one standard. If, however, neutrality is understood as an active,
positive relationship recognizing the existence of dual functions, secular and
religious, of these church-related schools, then a different standard must
be applied. The essential conflict in these cases can be more clearly
illustrated by juxtaposing two often cited excerpts from Everson:
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or
48
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does
not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more
to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them. 49
It was, ironically, the statutory restrictions, designed to guarantee the
separation between secular and religious educational functions of parochial
schools, and to insure that state financial aid supported only the former,
that constituted the "excessive entanglement" between government and
religion upon which the Court based its holding.5 0
45. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle,81 HARv. L. REV. 513 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Giannella, Religious Liberty]. Professor Giannella states:
I believe that one conclusion should be widely accepted: the state should be allowed
more involvement with religion on the higher levels of education than on the
lower levels.
Id. at 516. See also Freund, Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680,
1691 (1969).
For a reflective discussion of the practical value of the Court's decisions in
these cases in predicting the fate of any of the presently discussed forms of aid
(including vouchers, tax rebates and the like), see Giannella, Lemon and Tilton:
The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 147.
46. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
47. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
When the state encourages religious instruction . . . it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
48. 330 U.S. at 16.
49. Id. at 18.
50. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-22 (1971). The Court stated:
We need not decide whether these legislative precautions restrict the principal or
primary effect of the programs to the point where they do not offend the Religion
Clauses, for we conclude that the cumulative impact ... of the statutes involve[d]
excessive entanglement between government and religion.
Id. at 613-14.
Moreover, the Court expressed its concern for the "divisive political potential"
inherent in state programs of financial assistance to nonpublic schools, and indicated
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By the third phase of its test, prohibiting excessive government involvement with religion, the Court isolated another aspect of the effect
of legislation, which, if objectionable, would independently render it unconstitutional. 51 It is submitted that the second and third phases of the
Court's test are both "effect" tests; the second focuses upon the effect of
legislation on religion; the third focuses upon the effect of legislation on
the relationship existing between church and state. It is clear that the
52
two tests are to be applied in close connection.
In order to determine whether the government activity in these cases
was constitutionally permissible, the Court examined:
the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority.55
It is certainly relevant to consider the character and purposes of institutions benefited in order to determine whether they are properly termed
"religious. ' 54 It is also relevant to consider the resulting administrative
relationship between the donor and the recipient, in order to determine
the degree, if any, of "entanglement" or governmental involvement with
religion. However, in distinguishing the instant cases, it is the second
that state aid to parochial schools would inevitably lead to political division along
religious lines, which would, in turn, "tend to confuse and obscure other issues of
great urgency." Id. at 622-23. The Court's analysis is similar to the position of
Professor Freund:
A choice between the permissible and the forbidden is in essence a choice whether
to leave the issue to the political process . . . or to defuse the political issue.
Ordinarily I am disposed, in grey-area cases of constitutional law, to let the
political process function .... The religious guarantees, however, are of a different
order.... This basic preference may help to account for what otherwise may seem
a too rigid, and not sufficiently permissive, view of constitutional commands.
Freund, supra note 45, at 1691-92. It is clear, however, that "[i]f avoidance of strife
were an independent value, no legislation could be adopted on any subject which
aroused strong and divided feelings." Schwartz, No Imposition of Religion: The
Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 711 n.5 (1968).
It is submitted that legislative attempts to make funds available to parochial
schools comprise only one aspect of the multifaceted public education issue - certainly
an issue of "great urgency" and of legitimate political concern to legislators and their
constituents. The Pennsylvania Legislature in its declaration of policy stated:
That, should a majority of parents of the present nonpublic school population
desire to remove their children to the public schools of the Commonwealth, an
intolerable added financial burden to the public would result, as well as school
stoppages and long term derangement and impairment of education in Pennsylvania.
Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 5602(6)
(Supp. 1971).
51. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
52. The relationship between these two phases of the Court's test appears to be
such that where the degree of advancement of religion is slight and subordinate, a
greater degree of entanglement would be justified. On the other hand, where the
advancement of religion is significant and substantial, a significantly lesser degree of
entanglement would be sufficient to render a program unconstitutional.
53. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
54. Justice Brennan advocated remand in Tilton "limited to the direction of a
hearing to determine whether the four institutional appellees were sectarian institutions" which he defined as institutions having a "purpose or function to propagate or
advance a particular religion." Id. at 642, 661.
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factor which the Court emphasized; i.e., the nature of the aid which the
state provides. 5
As to the character and purposes of the institutions benefited, the
Court disposed of both state cases upon the assumption that the parochial
school system was "an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic
Church." 56 It should be noted, however, that the challenges to the statutes
were in different stages of litigation. In DiCenso, there had been
a trial on the merits at which evidence had been taken, supplying the
Court with a record upon which to make factual determinations necessary
to apply its factually-oriented tests. In Lemon, no evidence had been
taken. 57 There were significant factual differences between the two cases.
Teachers in Roman Catholic schools had been the sole beneficiaries of
the Rhode Island statute,58 while in Pennsylvania, other denominational
and nondenominational private schools had received funds.5 9 Further, the
Rhode Island statute provided only for salary supplements to teachers,6 0
while the Pennsylvania Act provided for reimbursement for textbooks and
62
instructional materials, 6' which appeared to have the Court's imprimatur.
Although both statutes contained severability clauses,68 the provisions
for severance of invalid applications from valid applications appear to
have been ignored by the Court.
In dealing with the federal statute, the Court stated that the cardinal
64
principle of statutory construction was to save, not destroy the statute.
Unless the legislature clearly evidences its intent not to enact the constitutionally valid piovisions, independently of those which are infirm, the
invalid portion may be deleted, provided the valid provisions are operative
of themselves. 65 The absence of an express severability provision does not
dictate the demise of an entire statute. 66 By construing the federal statute
involving aid to higher education to be severable, while at the same time
absolutely ignoring an express severability clause in each of the respective
state statutes providing aid at the elementary and secondary levels, the
55. Id. at 616; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1971).
56. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971). The assumption was based
on the record in the Rhode Island case and on allegations in the complaint in the
Pennsylvania case which were, of course, assumed to be true since the complaint

had been dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. Id. at 616, 620.
57. See note 56 supra.

58. Lemon v.Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
59. Id. at 610.

60. Salary Supplement Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 16-51-1 et seq. (Supp.
1970). See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
61. Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, PA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 5601
et seq. (Supp. 1971). See text accompanying notes 5-12 & 50 supra.
62. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
63. Salary Supplement Act, R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 16-51-8 (Supp. 1970);

Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 5609
(Supp. 1971).
64. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684 (1971).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Court indicated its aforementioned willingness to distinguish between aid
at these differing levels. 67
Appellees in the Lemon case have petitioned for rehearing and a
supplemental opinion distinguishing the Pennsylvania from the Rhode
Island cases on the above grounds. 8 Since, however, both statutes were
found to be unconstitutional on their face, it is doubtful whether the
petition will be granted, and, if granted, it is even more unlikely that
reargument would cause the Court to reverse its position. In Lemon,
Justice White would have reversed the dismissal of the complaint and
remanded the case for trial, as appellees now request. 69 However, since it
could hardly be submitted that any state's Roman Catholic school system
'
was not "an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church , 70
it would seem that the Court was, at least, consistent in deciding these
cases as it did, and in not remanding for further proceedings. 71 In Board
of Education v. Allen, 72 the Court refused to hold, without evidence about
"particular schools, particular courses, particular teachers, or particular
books,"'73 that a statutory program of lending textbooks in secular subjects
to church-related schools challenged therein constituted a violation of the
establishment clause.T4 In DiCenso, and particularly in Lemon, the Court
has largely rejected such an attitude toward the need for detailed evidence
expressed in Allen.

75

As to the nature of the aid provided, the Court emphasized that it
has in the past "permitted the States to provide church-related schools
67. In Tilton a majority of the Court felt that the federal program had "less
potential for realizing the substantive evils against which the Religion Clauses were
intended to protect" and substantially less "potential for divisive religious fragmentation in the political arena." Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971). However, Justice White convincingly criticized the attempted distinction between the recurring nature of the payments in the state plans involving annual appropriations
(which the majority considered seeds of controversy and friction) as opposed to the
one-time grant under the federal program. "It is," he said, "apparent that federal
interest in any grant will be a continuing one since the conditions attached to the
grant must be enforced." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 669 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
68. Petition of Appellees for Rehearing and Supplemental Opinion, Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
69. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 671 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
70. Id. at 616.
71. The critical finding would be that education is "an integral part of the religious
mission of the Catholic Church." The oft-repeated observation of the District Court
in DiCenso was characterized by Justice White as "an observation that should neither
surprise nor alarm anyone, especially judges who have already approved substantial aid
to parochial schools in various forms." Id. at 666 (White, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
72. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
73. Id. at 248.
74. See Valente, Aid to Church Related Education - New Directions Without
Dogma, 55 VA. L. REv. 579, 612 (1969). The author suggested:
In subsidized subjects such as the natural sciences, vocational skills, and language
studies, which are not easily susceptible to substantial religious coloration, the de
minimis concept may be invoked as a matter of judicial discretion, at least where
countervailing proofs are absent.

Id.

75. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971).
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with secular, neutral, or non-ideological services, facilities, or materials." 7 6
In deciding the instant cases, the Court attributed great significance to
the fact that teachers have a "substantially different ideological character
than books," in terms of "potential for involving some aspect of faith or
morals in secular subjects.17 7 It is submitted that whether a state chooses
to supplement the salaries of individual teachers or to supply those teachers
with what is thought to be an objective or neutral text from which to
teach should be of absolutely no import in determining whether or not that
particular state aid is constitutional, since both forms of aid are directly
translatable into financial aid. Moreover, aid in each case flows to the
same transaction - the secular learning process, involving teacher, text
and student.
A majority of the Court recognized that total separation between
church and state is neither possible nor constitutionally required.78 Bus
rides, 79 secular textbooks8 and tax exemptions 8l extended to religious
institutions or their individual members have been upheld. In each case,
the Court examined the nature of the aid in depth, leading however to
distinctions, like those in the instant cases, which are patently artificial.
In Tilton, the Court emphasized the non-ideological character of the
aid which government provided by way of buildings.8 2 In Lemon and
DiCenso, however, where state programs "subsidize teachers, either
directly or indirectly," 83 it felt that such great governmental surveillance
would be required to guarantee that state salary aid would not, in fact,
subsidize religious instruction, that excessive entanglement with religion
would necessarily ensue.8 4 The majority argued that where government
76. Id. at 616.
77. Id. at 617. The Court emphasized the "potential if not actual hazards" of
state aid in the form of salary supplements to teachers. Id. at 618. It thus characterized the relationship of the faculty to the administration in elementary and secondary
schools of the Rhode Island Roman Catholic diocese:
The teacher is employed by a religious organization, subject to the direction and
discipline of religious authorities, and works in a system dedicated to rearing
children in a particular faith.
Id. at 618. However, it is submitted that to extend this reasoning to suggest, as does
the Court, that potential hazards are "not lessened by the fact that most of the lay
teachers are of Catholic faith" is improper. Id. at 618.
78. Id. at 614. For a recitation of the pervasive interrelationship of church and
state in this country, see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437-42 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
79. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
80. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
81. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). It is submitted that if, as in
Walz, tax exemptions for real property owned by religious organizations and used
for religious worship are constitutionally permissible, the decisions of the Court in
these cases border on intellectual dishonesty. Such preferential tax treatment clearly
advances religion by direct economic measures which impose on the state a continuing
burden to ascertain that exempt property is in fact being used for religious worship,
which is certainly an awkward position for government under the religion clauses of
the first amendment. For a discussion of the relationship, in fact interchangeability,
of tax preferences and direct expenditures, see Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device
for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Governmental
Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
82. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971).
83. Id. at 687.
84. Id. at 687-88.
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provided secular, neutral or non-ideological services, facilities or materials,
the risk of government aid to religion and the corresponding need for
surveillance were reduced.8 5 It is, however, difficult to understand how
the same sum of money, appropriated from the coffers of the state to
benefit nonpublic educational institutions, can be constitutional or not,
depending upon whether it is spent to supply secular texts, buildings in
which secular courses are taught, or teachers of those secular subjects. s3
85. Advocates of the strict no-aid position have consistently objected to the nature
of the aid criterion for determining constitutionality. In Lemon and DiCenso, Justice
Douglas reasoned:
The school is an organism living on one budget. What the taxpayers give for the
salaries of those who teach only the humanities or science, without any trace of
proselytizing enables the school to use all of its own funds for religious training.
403 U.S. at 641.

In Tilton, the Douglas rationale was once again that:
A parochial school operates on one budget. Money not spent for one purpose
becomes available for other purposes. Thus the fact that there are no religious
observances in federally financed facilities is not controlling because required
religious observances will take place in other buildings. . . . Money saved from
one item in the budget is free to be used elsewhere. By conducting religious
services in another building, the school has - rent free - a building for nonsectarian use.
403 U.S. at 693, 695.
In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1963), in which
the Court banned prayers from the public schools, Justice Douglas had argued that:
Financing a church either in its strictly religious activities or in its other activities
is equally unconstitutional as I understand the Establishment Clause. Budgets for
one activity may be technically separable from budgets for others. But the institution is an inseparable whole, a living organism, which is strengthened in any
department by contributions from other than its own members.
Such contributions may not be made by the State even in a minor degree
without violating the Establishment Clause. [Footnotes omitted.]
In Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 253-54 (1968), Justice Black, dissenting, asserted that:
I still subscribe to the belief that tax-raised funds cannot constitutionally be used
to support religious schools, buy their school books, erect their buildings, pay
their teachers, or pay any other of their maintenance expenses ...
From the very first, Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 48 (1947), had argued that:
Payment of transportation is no more, nor is it any the less essential to education,
whether religious or secular, than payment for tuitions, for teachers' salaries, for
buildings, equipment and necessary materials. Nor is it any the less directly
related, in a school giving religious instruction, to the primary religious objective
all those essential items of cost are intended to achieve.
Professor Giannella places such statements in their proper context:
The establishment evil here envisioned is that church funds used to provide secular
instruction in church schools are released for application to religious uses. But
this is a simplistic application of a simplistic no-aid theory of nonestablishment.
This approach carries the strict no-aid theory to its improper and absurd extreme
of denying religious interests the opportunity to share in the strictly secular
benefits of the prevailing civic order. One bound so slavishly to the logic of the
no-aid position should deny parochial school students the opportunity to use public
libraries in preparing school assignments. Indeed, he is required to ask whether
children attending churches preaching personal study of the Bible should be barred
from the public schools so as not to relieve those churches of the heavy financial
burden of teaching their members to read. All these examples illustrate the
absurdity of claiming that the state aids religion by taking over public functions
previously performed by the churches.
Giannella, Religious Liberty, supra note 45, at 567-68.
86. A majority of the Court (Justices White, Douglas, Black, Marshall and
Brennan), although coming to different conclusions, were in agreement that the state
and federal legislation involved in these cases were more similar than dissimilar and
that either all of them or none of them were constitutionally permissible. These
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Likewise, it is difficult to comprehend why a one-time, multi-million
dollar construction grant (Tilton) is constitutionally preferable to annual
allocations of smaller amounts of funds over a period of years (Lemon
and DiCenso) 87
The Court indicated that whether or not "excessive entanglement"
characterized the relationship between church and state under specific
legislation, there was an independent measure of its constitutionality under
the religion clauses. 88 Further, the Court stated that certain factors
substantially diminished the extent and the potential danger of entanglement under the federal, as compared to the state, programs.8 9 The most
crucial distinction was, as suggested above, the Court's belief that there
are "significant differences between the religious aspects of church-related
institutions of higher learning and parochial elementary and secondary
schools." 90 The Court compared the skepticism of college students to
the malleability of children of impressionable ages in the lower grades. 9 '
In support of its position, the Court emphasized that theology courses
at higher educational levels, although required, were taught "according
to the academic requirements of the subject matter and the teacher's
concept of professional standards," and "covered a range of human
religious experiences .

.

. not limited to courses about the Roman Catholic

Justices reasoned that both state and federal programs included educational institutions
in which the progagation and advancement of a particular religion is one function of
that institution, and that the benefit to those institutions is not essentially different
whether it be in the form of salary supplements or construction grants. They failed
to see:
any significant difference in the Federal Government's telling the sectarian university not to teach any non-secular subjects in a certain building, and Rhode
Island's [and Pennsylvania's] telling the Catholic school teacher not to teach
religion.
403 U.S. at 660 (Brennan, J.) . These Justices rejected the myth that the "nonideological" character of a building, as contrasted with a teacher, reduced the need
for policing. The federal government, Justice Brennan explained, imposed restrictions
on every class taught in the federally-financed building, and it is the courses and
teachers and not the building which government must police. Id. at 661.

87. The wit of Justice Douglas is incisive:

The fact that money is given once at the beginning of a program rather than
apportioned annually as in Lemon and DiCenso is without constitutional significance ....
The majority's distinction is in effect that small violations of the First
Amendment over a period of years are unconstitutional (see Lemon and DiCenso)
while a huge violation occurring only once is de minimus. I cannot agree with
such sophistry.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 692, 693 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971).
89. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685 (1971). Professor Giannella suggested that:
The nature, function, ends and values of academic scholarship on the college and
university level justify considerable state involvement with religion at this level....

The church-related college, unlike the church-related elementary or secondary

school, does not attempt to form the religious character of the student by maintaining a highly controlled regime designed to inculcate certain values and attitudes.
Giannella, Religious Liberty, supra note 45, at 581-83.
90. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685 (1971). All four schools involved in
Tilton were governed by Catholic religious organizations and the faculties and student
bodies at each were predominantly Catholic. There was no required attendance at
religious services, although theology courses were required. Id. at 686.
91. Id. at 686.
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The Court characterized the institutional defendants in Tilton

as "institutions with admittedly religious functions ...

whose predominant

higher education mission is to provide their students with a secular
education."'9 3 It is clear that if the Court had sought to, it could have
found that the church-related schools of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
were likewise "institutions with admittedly religious functions, but whose
predominant . . . education mission is to provide their students with a

secular education," since such a determination is, it is submitted, merely
an opinion or "prepossession, '94 and not a finding of fact or conclusion
of law.
Justice Brennan pointed to a further complication in these cases,
irrespective of the establishment clause, by suggesting that "when a
sectarian institution accepts financial aid it becomes obligated under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not to discriminate
in admissions policies and faculty selection. ' ' 95 The parochial school, as
the Rhode Island district court warned, becomes public for more purposes
than the Church would wish, and its victory on the establishment clause
might well come to mean abandonment of the free exercise clause. 6
The opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas anticipated one such situation. He
argued that a faculty member dismissed from a public school can seek
redress in the courts and is guaranteed a hearing ;97 but if a faculty member
in a parochial school is disciplined or dismissed, he has no legal recourse. 9
Assuming that the above proposition is correct and that teachers in private
schools are entitled to due process guarantees by reason of state aid to
those schools, it is submitted that the state would again be in the position
of violating the Constitution by acting to enforce a teacher's rights
(entanglement) or by failing to so act (establishment).
92. Id. at 686-87.
93. Id. at 687.
94. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). See note 44 supra.
95. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 651 (1971)
(Brennan, J.). See
DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 121-22 (D.R.L 1970). Plaintiff-appellants
in Lemon had also claimed that the Act violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment by providing state assistance to private institutions that discriminated on racial and religious grounds in their admissions and hiring policies.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The district court held
that no plaintiff had standing to raise that claim because the complaint did not allege
that the child of any plaintiff had been denied admission to any nonpublic school on
racial or religious grounds. Id. at 42. The Court stated that it was unnecessary
because of its disposition of the matter on establishment grounds, to reach these questions. Future legislation which satisfies the Court's establishment criteria, however,
will have this second issue to face, the parameters of which have as yet only been hinted
at by the Court. With regard to "religious discrimination which sectarian schools must
of necessity practice," District Court Judge Coffin, in DiCenso,warned that:
Whatever their solution, these problems indicate that we would have to rethink
much of our law, especially the law of equal protection, in order to accommodate
an institution which receives significant state aid and yet discriminates on principle.
316 F. Supp. at 122.

96. Id. at 121-22.
97. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 636 (1971)
quoting L. BOETrNE, ROMAN CATHOLICISM 375 (1962).
98. Id.
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In Pennsylvania, a new statute has already been enacted to replace
the one struck down in Lemon. On August 27, 1971, the Governor of
Pennsylvania signed into law the Parent Reimbursement Act for Nonpublic
Education."9 The Act appropriates funds for reimbursement to the parents
of children attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. 10 0
It is a simple, straightforward attempt to solve a complex problem of
church-state relations, and seeks to avoid the evils of entanglement by
the expedient of payment to the parent instead of to the institution
directly. 01 Parents obtain reimbursement upon submission of a receipted
tuition bill or a copy of the executed contract under which a student
attended a nonpublic school for the previous year. 10 2 The new legislation
is open to criticism in that it seems to elevate form over substance to an
extent that should not be of constitutional dimension. In criticizing the
new statute, however, it should be remembered that the form of the now
defunct Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act was crucial
to the Court's finding of its unconstitutionality. 0 3 The prior cases,
particularly Everson and Allen, make it clear that "merely because a
secular program may incidently benefit a church in fulfilling its religious
mission," this does not transform such legislation into a "law respecting
an establishment of religion" forbidden by the first amendment.10 4 The
99. PA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 5701 to 5711 (Supp. 1971).
100. Parents of children in nonpublic schools receive seventy-five dollars per
child per year in elementary school, and twice that amount for children in secondary
school. The Act provides for the creation of the Pennsylvania Parent Assistance
Authority to administer the program, specifically providing that:
[I]t shall exercise no direction, supervision or control over the policy determinations, personnel, curriculum, program of instruction or any other aspect of the
administration or operation of any nonpublic school or schools.
Id. § 5704. The Act has been challenged in the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, on much the same grounds as the original statute. Lemon v. Sloan,
Civil No. 71-2223 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 13, 1971).
101. PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 5706 (Supp. 1971). Professor Freund noted that "the
sharp dichotomy between pupil benefit and benefit to the school seems to me a chimerical constitutional criterion," an attitude shared by this author. Freund, supra note
45, at 1682.
The "aid to the child" theory was relied on in Everson in which the Court
upheld "reimbursement to parents of money expended by them for the bus transportation of their children on regular buses operated by the public transportation system."
330 U.S. at 3. It is submitted that such emphasis on the identity of the grantee, the
direct beneficiary of government funds, contributes to an unfortunate sense of gamesmanship as to the form which constitutionally valid aid must assume. The new Pennsylvania statute provides aid in a form more analogous to that upheld in Everson by
direct state payments to parents who choose not to utilize public school facilities.
The Everson rationale, that aid to the child is acceptable while aid to the school is
not, has certainly been eroded by Tilton. While not alone constitutionally determinative, it is still a factor of some significance.
102. PA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 5606 to 5607 (Supp. 1971).
103. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
104. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 663-64 (1971) (White, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). However, Everson and Allen did involve extending services
(bus rides) and goods (textbooks), respectively, to students in sectarian schools
which were previously available to public school students. It is submitted that a
realistic analysis of the new Pennsylvania act would consider it to be an extension of a
public school benefit (no tuition) to students of nonpublic schools. It is arguable,
however, that this benefit is not analogous to the forms of aid upheld in Everson and
Allen, particularly in light of the Court's distinction in Wals between active and
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new statute has at least solved the entanglement problem in that its aid is
to the parents, in money, and is distributed with no greater involvement
between church and state than is now effected by compulsory attendance
and accreditation laws. Since the Court has shown itself unwilling to
look beyond the stated legislative purpose to find an unconstitutional intent
to advance religion, the only problem remaining is that of its primary effect.
If the Court, as newly constituted, were to return to its position in Allen,
that the secular and religious functions of sectarian elementary and
secondary schools were separable, the new statute might well pass constitutional muster. In any event, a decision by the Court in a case concerning
such a statute would be extremely helpful to make more explicit the
limits on such aid. 10 5
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently upheld the constitutionality
of an interesting statutory variation of aid to lower level nonpublic
schools. 10 6 The statute provided for payments to supply auxiliary, nonclassroom services and materials to pupils attending nonpublic schools, for:
guidance, testing and counseling programs; programs for the deaf,
blind, emotionally disturbed, crippled and physically handicapped
children; audio visual aids; speech and hearing services; remedial
reading programs; educational testing services; programs for the
improvement of the educational and cultural status of disadvantaged
pupils . . . and for programs of non-religious instruction other than

basic classroom instruction . . . on the same basis as such services,
materials and programs are provided for pupils in the public schools.
107

In response to plaintiff's charge that the statute constituted a "direct
grant of public money to religious schools which are permeated by a
sectarian religious atmosphere,' u08 the court stated that the materials and
services provided did not "lend themselves to the religious aura of the
recipient sectarian schools," and enhanced "only the secular educational
process" which was "properly the concern of the state."'1 9 Although it
found the materials and services involved not to be identical with the
textbooks in Allen and the free busing in Everson, the distinction was
passive aid, since it is only available to students in nonpublic schools, and it is a form
of active aid - payment of a portion of tuition in nonpublic schools. Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 690-91 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
105. On remand, a three-judge court ruled that the Supreme Court's holding was
prospective only. Therefore, the lower court only enjoined payments pursuant to the
unconstitutional Act after the date of the decision. This would implicitly allow payment for services rendered prior to the Court's holding. Lemon v. Kurtzman, Civil
No. 69-1206 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 28, 1971), appeal docketed,
106. P.O.A.U. v. Essex, 28 Ohio St. 2d 79, ___ N.E.2d __ (1971).
107. Id. at 80-81,
N.E.2d at
; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(H) (Page
Supp. 1968) (as effective between Dec. 1, 1967 and Aug. 18, 1969). The present
statute, to the extent it is similar to the statutes struck down in Lemon, is, of course,
unconstitutional. The amendments of Aug. 18, 1969 removed the "other than basic
classroom instruction" limitation, authorized aid to teachers, and prescribed certain
procedures for enforcement of the secular strings attached to the aid. Id. (Page
Supp. 1971).
108. 28 Ohio St. 2d at 82, __ N.E.2d at
109. Id. at 83, N.E.2d at _
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viewed by the court as one without significance. The court was of the
opinion that all these forms of aid were indistinguishable, for constitutional
purposes, in that their religious implications were negligible. 10
This litigation was unique, however, and different from that in
Pennsylvania or Rhode Island in that the parties stipulated that:
None of the services, materials, or programs .

.

. have been provided

for use in religious instruction or devotional exercises, and none of
said services, nmterials, or programs . . . are used in, especially
suitable for use in, or were selected for use in religious instruction
or devotional exercises."'
The court distinguished Ohio's plan from the statutes struck down in
Lemon and DiCenso in that it supplied aid for auxiliary personnel only,
as opposed to teachers of secular subjects." 2 Likewise, it distinguished
"specialized services, attuned to the needs of the physically, emotionally,
and culturally handicapped children" of the state from the "informal,
day-to-day teaching situation.""$
The Ohio court's reaction to the possibility of excessive entanglement
under such a statute" 4 might presage the rationale which would justify
the new Pennsylvania statute." 5 The Ohio court admitted that the program
did involve a degree of entanglement between church and state "greater
than if no aid were extended at all, but . . . not . . . that degree of

'official and continuing surveillance,' or an initial excessive degree of
'involvement,' ... such as would render it constitutionally objectionable."" 6
It is that elusive, permissible degree of entanglement which each new
statute will, undoubtedly, press to the limit."

7

The federal government has instituted a program of considerable aid
to church-related educational institutions and it seems inevitable that a
viable state program will emerge from attempts to deal with the Court's
strictures on such aid. The need is great, the legislatures are responsive,
110. Id.
111. Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
112. Id. at 87N.E.2d at ------113. Id. The new statute is clearly different. See note 107 supra.
N.E.2d at .......
114. 28 Ohio St. 2d at 84-86,
115. See text accompanying notes 99-102 supra.
N.E.2d at ----The specific contacts involved were:
116. 28 Ohio St. 2d at 85,
a dual approval of applications at the local and state level; a signature of the parent
representative on a receipt indicating that none of the services or materials would be
used to any extent for religious purposes; the placing of an identifying stamp of
ownership on the educational equipment by the local public school district; an on-thespot periodic inventory of the nonconsumable equipment loaned (the record did not
indicate that such checks were used to reveal illegal religious usages, but rather, to
ascertain the effects of continuing usage on the physical condition of the items) ; and
the letting of contracts for speech and hearing therapists, remedial reading teachers
and guidance counselors. Id. at 84-85, ___ N.E.2d at ......
The court was of the opinion that the authorized degree of contact between
church and state caused by the Ohio Act was "no more than minimal," no more involved than the contact which exists in the reimbursement procedures for busing
(Everson), the allocation procedure for free books (Allen), or the administrative
relationships inherent in the tax exemption of church property (Walz). Id.
117. The "caveat against entanglements" is, indeed, a "blurred, indistinct and
variable barrier." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
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and the public, whose public school system is inextricably entwined with the
success or failure of the parochial school systems in this country, does not
seem to be aroused against it.
Finally, it should be remembered, as Justice White reminded his
colleagues, that the establishment clause coexists in the first amendment
with the free exercise clause, and that:
[F]ree exercise considerations at least counsel against refusing support for students attending parochial schools simply because in that
setting they are also being instructed118in the tenets of the faith they
are constitutionally free to practice.
Denis James Lawler

DOMESTIC RELATIONS THE

CONTROLLING

FACTOR

ADOPTION IN

RELIGION MAY NOT BE

DETERMINING

SUITABILITY

OF

ADOPTIVE PARENTS.

In re Adoption of "E" (N.J. 1971)
Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Burke, applied to the Children's Aid and
Adoption Society of New Jersey seeking to adopt a child, E (Eleanor).
In response to the couple's request, the Society in June of 1969 placed E
in the Burke home.' In May of 1970, after having received the consent
of the Society, plaintiffs filed a petition for adoption with the Superior
Court of New Jersey. At the hearing, the court questioned the couple
as to their religious affiliation and elicited the response that they did not
believe in the existence of a Supreme Being.2 Noting that the judiciary's
paramount concern is the best interests of the child, the court determined
8
that the child had a right to believe in God, and thus denied the adoption.
Since all other factors had been favorable to the Burkes, the court considered the religious issue to be controlling. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey certified the case and reversed, holding that although
religion may constitute a factor for consideration, in the absence of other
factual support, it is not and cannot be controlling. In re Adoption of "E,"
59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 (1971).
118. Id. at 665 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
1. Prior to this instance the Children's Aid and Adoption Society had placed a
male child with the plaintiffs. Upon the favorable recommendation of the Society, an
award of adoption was made on September 10, 1968. In re Adoption of "E," 112 N.J.
Super. 326-28, 271 A.2d 27-28 (Essex County Ct. 1970), rev'd, 59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d
785 (1971).
2. John Burke characterized his faith as "humanism." 59 N.J. at ----, 279
A.2d at 788.
3. 112 N.J. Super. at 330, 271 A.2d at 30.
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The development of the law of adoption in the United States can
be traced to Roman law. 4 Adoption, however, never became part of the
English common law; rather, legislation 5 in the states authorized judicial
proceedings through which a parent seeking to adopt a child could obtain
an adoption decree. The courts thereby acquired supervisory powers over
the adoption procedure. A uniquely American contribution to the law of
adoption is the best interests of the child doctrine." Courts have not been
uniform in their determinations as to the content of this doctrine, but
the following factors are generally included: the conduct, position and
attitude of the parties ;7 the moral character, financial ability, age, intelligence, health and temperament of the petitioners; and the age, sex,
health, temperament and other characteristics of the child.8 The development of this doctrine has formed the basis for one of the more challenging
issues facing modern American adoption practice; i.e., religion in adoption. 9
Courts have taken three paths in dealing with religious objections.
Some courts have attributed controlling weight to religious differences
between the child and adoptive parents or between the natural parents
and adoptive parents, and have denied the decree of adoption on this
basis.' 0 A second line of decisions has included the religious factor with
other considerations in applying the best interests of the child doctrine,
whereas other courts have disregarded the religious factor entirely."
New York courts have consistently accorded controlling weight to
the religious factor in adoption proceedings. The importance of the religious factor is due partly to the statutory scheme,' 2 which incorporates
4. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS 602-03 (1968). This early Roman
law continued in the civil law countries of France and Spain and later developed in
Texas and Louisiana, states which followed the civil law background of those
countries. See, e.g., Vidal v. Commagere, 13 La. Ann. 516 (1858) ; Fuselier v. Masse,
4 La. 423 (1832); Teal v. Sevier, 26 Tex. 516 (1863). For a development of this
historical background, see Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9
VAND.

L.

REV.

743 (1956).

5. The Massachusetts statute of 1851 is generally considered the forerunner
of the modern adoption statutes authorizing judicial supervision of the adoption process.
H. CLARK, supra note 4, at 603.
6. This doctrine is the primary guideline in custody and adoption cases. It
developed independently in the different jurisdictions, but the leading case is Chapsky
v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881). See List, A Child and a Wall: A Study of "Religious
Protection" Laws, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 9, 14 (1963).
7. Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56 (1956).
8. State ex rel. Children's Aid Soc'y v. Hughes, 352 Mo. 384, 177 S.W.2d 474
(1944).
9. See Huard, supra note 4, at 753.
10. A refinement of this position is where the decree has been conditioned to the
extent that the child must be reared in a religion different from that of the adoptive
parents. See Comment, Relgion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardianship and Custody,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 376 (1954).
11. Id. at 377.
12. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 113 (McKinney Supp. 1971) reads in pertinent part:
In making orders of adoption the judge or surrogate when practicable must give
custody only to persons of the same religious faith as that of the adoptive child
in accordance with article six of the social service law.
N.Y. Soc. SERVICEs LAW § 373(3) (McKinney Supp. 1971), amending N.Y. Soc.
WELFARE LAW § 373(3) (McKinney 1966), reads:
In appointing guardians of children, and in granting orders of adoption of
children, the court shall, when practicable, appoint as such guardians, and give
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a religious matching requirement, and to the New York judiciary, which
has placed great weight on the natural parents' right to select their child's
religion.'l Reflective of the New York approach is the case of Matter of
Santos.1 4 Two children, ages three and four, were placed with a. Jewish

woman by their Catholic mother, who agreed to their being raised as
Jews. Four years later their natural mother returned, introducing evidence that her religion was Roman Catholic and that the children had
been baptized Roman Catholic. In denying the adoption, the court held
that it was practicable within the meaning of the statute to preserve for
the children their religious faith by placing them in a Catholic institution.
More recently, the New York court of appeals in In re Maxwell's
Adoption' 5 held that section 373 of the state's Social Welfare Law' 6
contained no absolute requirement that the faith of the adoptive parents
be the same as that of the child. The majority interpreted the phrase
"when practicable" as allowing the trial court discretion to approve, as
adoptive parents, persons of a faith different from that of the child in
exceptional circumstances.' 7 Although Maxwell represents a departure
from the mandatory approach of Santos, it is nonetheless difficult to
definitively state that the viability of Santos has been extinguished.' 8
custody through adoption, only to a person or persons of the same religious faith
as that of the child.
13. See Comment, supra note 10, at 378. The importance that is accorded protection of religion oftentimes overshadows even the natural parents' right to select
the religion for their child. See, e.g., Ex parte Agnello, 72 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Monroe
County Sup. Ct. 1947) (custody awarded to a third party as against the natural parent
because of religious differences) ; Adoption of Anonymous, 207 Misc. 240, 137 N.Y.S.2d
720 (Saratoga County Ct. 1955) (adoption decree denied even though natural parents
consented to a change in religion).
14. 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1951). See also In re Glavas, 203
Misc. 590, 121 N.Y.S.2d 12 (N.Y. City Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953).
15. 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958). See also Matter
of Krenkel, 278 App. Div. 573, 102 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1951).
16. It is significant to note that the Maxwell court was not faced with a statutory
provision defining the application of "when practicable" as were the courts in Santos
and Glavas. See note 14 supra. Compare N.Y. Soc. SFRVIcEs LAW § 373(3) (McKinney Supp. 1971), amending N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 373(3) (McKinney 1966),
with N.Y. CITY FAM. CT.AcT § 116(e) (McKinney 1962). The latter provision states:
The words "when practicable" as used in this section shall be interpreted as
being without force or effect if there is a proper or suitable person of the same
religious faith or persuasion as that of the child available . ..to whom orders
of adoption may be granted; or if there is a duly authorized association, agency,
society or institution under the control of persons of the same religious faith or
persuasion as that of the child, at the time available and willing to assume the
responsibility for the custody of or control over any such child.
17. Here the natural mother had stated at the time she had given consent to the
adoption that she embraced no religious faith. The majority reasoned that if the
natural mother was permitted to contest an adoption after practicing such a deception,
the child would always run the risk of having attachments painfully severed. 4 N.Y.2d
at 434, 151 N.E.2d at 850, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
18. See Starr v. DeRocco, 29 App. Div. 2d 662, 286 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1968). Star
cited Maxwell in reversing a lower court that had awarded custody of Catholic
children to their Episcopalian uncle. The court held that where there were blood
relatives available who professed belief in the same faith as the children, and against
whom no cause for rejection existed, it was "practicable" to follow the declared
public policy of religious matching. The court took little note of the fact that the
uncle had testified that he would rear the infants as Roman Catholics.
A more recent case may indicate a liberal trend in the New York law of
adoption. In re C., 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. City Fam. Ct. 1970).
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While the New York courts have retreated somewhat from the mandatory approach of religious matching, the Massachusetts judiciary has
stood fast. In Petitions of Goldman,19 the court affirmed the denial of
an adoption by a Jewish couple of three year old illegitimate twins who
had resided with petitioners continuously from two weeks after their
birth. The children had never been baptized, but it was established that
the natural mother was Roman Catholic. The court imputed the religion
of the natural mother to the children, and interpreted the state's religious
matching statute 20 as being applicable even to children too young to
understand any religion.
The Goldman decision, which has been consistently followed in Massachusetts, 21 represents the most conservative approach taken by any jurisdiction. 22 Massachusetts has emphasized the spiritual welfare of the child
to the point where other factors will be examined only after the religious
issue is settled.

28

The Massachusetts legislature, however, through a 1970 statutory
24
amendment, has removed the foundation from the Goldman decision.
The court held that section 116(e) of the New York City Family Court Act must be
construed to require placement of the child with persons of the same faith only if
such placement would neither preclude nor substantially delay adoption. In so holding,
the court extended Maxwell in two important respects. First, the Maxwell court
was not faced with statutory language of similar import. The legislative intent is
clearly defined in the Family Court Act, but the court construed judicial discretion
into its language to enable it to survive a constitutional test. Second, the court placed
significantly greater emphasis on the temporal welfare of the child than did the court
in Maxwell.
19. 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955). See
Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REV. 333, 379-93 (1955).
20. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5B (1950) provides:
In making orders for adoption, the judge when practicable must give custody
only to persons of the same religious faith as that of the child. In the event that
there is a dispute as to the religion of said child, its religion shall be deemed to
be that of its mother. (Emphasis added.)
To substantiate its finding of practicability, the court in Goldman relied on
oral evidence relating to the availability of Catholic couples willing to adopt twins
similarly situated. Compare Petition of Duarte, 331 Mass. 747, 122 N.E.2d 890 (1954).
There, the same court was unwilling to allow the trial court to take judicial notice of
the many applications pending for the adoption of children of the same faith as the
child before the court. Goldman was distinguished on the ground that the trial court
there had made detailed findings of fact. This distinction, however, is open to criticism
in view of the fact that the Goldman finding of availability differed very little from
the judicial notice taken in Duarte.
21. Cf. Ellis v. McCoy, 332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d 266 (1955). Because of
religious differences, the Ellis court allowed a Catholic mother to withdraw her
consent to the adoption of her child by a Jewish couple. See List, supra note 6,
at 31 n.102.
22. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 911(a), 911(b) (1951), as amended DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 911(d) (Supp. 1970) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-7-13 (1956),
as amended R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-7-13 (Supp. 1970).
23. See Petitions of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 653, 121 N.E.2d 843, 8.46 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955). The court stated that "if neither parent had any
religion we suppose the statute [Section 5B] would have no application."
24. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5B (Supp. 1970) reads in pertinent part:
In making orders for adoption, the judge shall consider the need of the
child for loving and responsible parental care and all factors relevant to the
physical, mental and moral health of the child.
If, at the time of surrender of the child for adoptive custody, the parent or
parents of said child requested a religious designation for the child, the court
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While there are no decisions to date interpreting the amended statute, the
language therein indicates a legislative intent to subordinate the religious
factor and accord the judiciary the opportunity to apply the best interests
of the child doctrine free from a mandate to match religions.
Illinois and Pennsylvania courts represent a middle view, where the
religious affiliation of the parent or child is considered along with the
temporal welfare of the child in determining whether the petition for
adoption should be granted. In Cooper v. Hinrchs,2 5 the court interpreted
the Illinois statute 26 to be advisory and discretionary, indicative of a legislative intent to consider the religious faith of the adoptive parents as
one factor among all the circumstances significant in promoting the general
welfare of the child.27 Pennsylvania, like Illinois, has manifested a desire
to recognize both considerations - the parental right to choose the child's
religion, and the child's right to have safeguarded his temporal welfare.
However, when it is impossible to achieve agreement between them,
28
Pennsylvania courts have chosen the latter.
Pennsylvania, in 1953, enacted a religious matching statute which
provided that "whenever possible, the petitioners shall be of the same
religious faith as the natural parents of the child to be adopted."29, Construing this statute, the court in In re Stone's Adoption 0 held that the
words "whenever possible" indicated a legislative intent to accord the
judiciary discretion to determine whether, under the circumstances of
each individual case, the welfare of the child would best be promoted
by the adoption.
may grant a petition for adoption of the child only to a person or persons of the
religious designation so requested, unless a placement for adoptive custody based
on such request would not have been in the best interests of the child. (Emphasis added.)
25. 10 Ill. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957). See Comment, Religion as a Factor in
Proceedings for Adoption and Custody of Children, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 114, 117.
26. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-15 (Smith-Hurd 1959) provides:
The welfare of the child shall be the prime consideration in all adoption
proceedings. The court in entering a decree of adoption shall, whenever possible,
give custody through adoption to a petitioner or petitioners of the same religious
belief as that of the child.
27. The lower court had held that the statute required the denial of an adoption
whenever a religious difference existed between the child and adopting parents.
Cooper v. Hinrichs, 8 Ill.
App. 2d 144, 130 N.E.2d 678 (1955).
28. Royer Adoption, 34 Del. Co. 402 (Delaware County, Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1947);
accord, In re Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa. 479, 109 A. 682 (1920); Conlon's Adoption,
53 Lack. Jur. 65 (Lackawanna County, Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1952); St. George's Adoption, 45 Pa. D. & C. 387 (Erie County Orphans' Ct. 1942).
29. PA. STAT. tit. 1, § 1(d) (1970).
30. 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 730, 57 Lanc. L. Rev. 51 (Lancaster County Orphans' Ct.
1960), reviewed in Note, The Religious Factor in Adoption Proceedings, 65 DICK. L.
REV. 60 (1960) ; accord, Adoption of Suchocki, 60 Schuyl. Leg. Reg. 172 (Columbia
County, Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1965) ; In re Barnak, 10 Fiduc. Rptr. 464 (Lehigh County,
Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1960). See also In re Adoption of S, 15 Bucks Co. L. Rptr. 365
(Bucks County, Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1966), wherein the court found section l(d) of the
Pennsylvania statute not applicable to adoption by a relative. See text accompanying
note 29 supra.
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The liberal position concerning religion in the law of adoption is
represented by Missouri. 8 ' Despite stringently worded statutes which, on
their face, safeguard the natural parents' choice of religion for their children,
the courts have consistently considered only the temporal welfare of the
child. Even the lack of religious affiliation has been held not to affect the
2
rights of the adoptive parents .
8
construed
Missouri's landmark decision, State ex rel. Baker v. Bird,3
the religious matching clauses of a guardianship statute as advisory only,
indicating that although the state was interested in seeing its children
reared in a good moral atmosphere, it could not constitutionally undertake to
decide what form of religious affiliation would be in the best interest
of the child. Extension of the Baker rationale to adoption proceedings
was made in In re Duren,34 where the Missouri supreme court held that
a Roman Catholic could adopt the Protestant child of her deceased brother
over religious objections raised by the child's Protestant grandmother.
Reaffirming Baker, the court stated5 that the temporal welfare of the
child is the court's primary concern.3
The New Jersey supreme court in In re Adoption of E declined to
adopt the Missouri approach; instead, the court followed the Pennsylvania
and Illinois position in permitting consideration of religion as a factor
relevant to the disposition of the adoption decree.
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court held that the denial
of the adoption based on the sole criterion of lack of religious affiliation
amounted to an abuse of discretion, constituting error as a matter of law.3 6
The failure of the trial court to direct its attention to the myriad considerations encompassed within the best interests of the child doctrine,8 7 and
31. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.221 (1957) which provides:
In placing a child in or committing a child to the custody of an individual
or of a private agency or institution the court shall whenever practicable select
either a person, or an agency or institution governed by persons of the same
religious faith as that of the parents of such child, or in case of a difference in
the religious faith of the parents, then of the religious faith of the child or if
the religious faith of the child is not ascertainable, then of the faith of either
of the parents.
32. Matter of Clements, 12 Mo. App. 592 (1882), aff'd on other grounds, 78 Mo.
352 (1883).
33. 253 Mo. 569, 162 S.W. 119 (1913) ; accord, In re Minnicar's Estate, 141
Cal. App. 2d 703, 297 P.2d 105 (1956) ; In re Walsh's Estate, 100 Cal. App. 2d 194,
223 P.2d 322 (1950).
34. 355 Mo. 1222, 200 S.W.2d 343 (1947). But see Parks v. Cook, 180 S.W.2d
64, 69 (Mo. App. 1944), where the court found the guardianship statute not applicable
to a custody case.
35. 355 Mo. at 1236, 200 S.W.2d at 352.
36. 59 N.J. at 50, 279 A.2d at 793.
37. The child's safety, happiness, and physical and mental welfare are other
relevant factors to be considered by the court. Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536,
122 A.2d 593, 598 (1956). See Comment, Measuring the Child's Best Interests - A
Study of Incomplete Considerations, 44 DENVER L.J. 132 (1967). The Child Welfare
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the lack of a religious matching requirement in the state's statutory
scheme s" were held determinative.
However, in exceptional situations, special recognition of the religious
factor is justified. Instances would include: (1) where the child's prior
religious training could not be pursued due to the nature of the environment ;3 (2) where the child's mature adherence to a religion precludes a
change in faith without accompanying emotional difficulties ;40 or (3)
where the parents' religious beliefs threatened the physical welfare of the
child. 41 The court, however, found none of these considerations relevant
to the present case; rather, circumstances existed which mitigated against
consideration of the religious factor.42 Thus, in light of the statute and
the absence of special circumstances, the court correctly determined that
the trial court abused its discretion by denying the adoption because of
lack of religious affiliation. 43 The New Jersey supreme court pointed to
constitutional impediments as additional grounds for reversal.
Included within the first amendment is the assurance that no law
shall be made that will abridge the freedom to exercise one's religious
League of America, Inc., in its pamphlet, Standards for Adoption Service: Revised,
set forth the following criteria for evaluation of the adoptive parents:
4.4 Age. - The parents selected for a child should generally be within the age
range usual for natural parents of a child of that age ....
4.5 Race. - Racial background in itself should not determine the selection of
the home for a child ....
4.6 National, Cultural, and Social Background . . . should not be considerations ....
4.7 Religion as a Basis for Selection of Family. - The family selected for a
child should be one in which the child will have an opportunity for religious
or spiritual and ethical development; but religious background alone should
not be the basis for the selection of a family for a child.
4.8 Educational Background.
4.9 Physical and Personality Characteristics.
4.10 Geographic Location.
4.11 Children of the Same Family. (Emphasis added.)
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS

FOR ADOPTION

SERVICE:

REVISED

34-35 (1968).
38. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3-23A(4) (b) (Supp. 1970).
39. T. v. H., 102 N.J. Super. 38, 245 A.2d 221 (Ch. 1968), aff'd on other grounds,
110 N.J. Super. 8, 264 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970) (Jewish children raised in rural
Idaho where there were no available religious facilities, and no other persons of
the same faith).
40. Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N.J. Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419 (Ch. 1953).
41. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
890 (1962) (blood transfusion for child of a Jehovah's Witness).
42. The child E was three weeks old when placed in the Burke home. It is
inconceivable that a child this age could have been given religious instruction, and
there was no evidence offered that the mother had requested a religious designation
for the child. 59 N.J. at 41, 279 A.2d at 788.
43. Additionally, the trial court stated that the child had a right to worship as
she saw fit and not to be influenced by parents who did not believe in a Supreme
Being. 112 N.J. Super. at 330, 271 A.2d at 30. No such rule of law exists. The right
to control the spiritual instruction of a child is an incident of lawful custody. Donahue
v. Donahue, 142 N.J. Eq. 701, 61 A.2d 243 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948) ; People ex rel.
Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952) ; People ex rel. Sisson v.
Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936). Exercise of such discretion would
notably reflect only the individual jurist's personal bias for or against a religion or
religiosity in general.
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beliefs. The Supreme Court has interpreted the concept of religion to
include philosophies which do not premise belief in a Supreme Being
in the orthodox sense; Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture and Secular
Humanism have been recognized as religions in this country. 44 The draft
cases of United States v. Seeger45 and Welsh v. United States40 attributed
further dimension to the constitutional concept of religion when the Court
formulated the following test for religious belief under the Selective
Service Act:
[D]oes the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the
objector as an orthodox 47
belief in God holds in the life of one clearly
qualified for exemption?
In view of the Supreme Court's formulation of a broad concept for
religion, the trial court's finding that the Burkes lacked religious belief,
because they did not believe in the existence of a Supreme Being, is not
supported by the Supreme Court's position on the question. In addition,
the trial court distinguished between what it deemed to be the Burkes'
privilege to adopt a child, and the right to do a constitutionally protected
act. The New Jersey supreme court quickly dismissed any such distinction, citing Sherbert v. Verner48 in support.
Although the New Jersey court held that the religious factor cannot
be controlling, it rejected Chief Justice Weintraub's contention, in concurrence, that its holding was as objectionable on constitutional grounds
as was that of the trial court. 49 Measured by the majority's standard, the
44. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961).
45. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
46. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Welsh had stated that he felt his belief was nonreligious, but the majority per Mr. Justice Black rejected what it termed the appeal
board's undue emphasis on petitioner's own interpretation. "[F]ew registrants are
fully aware of the broad scope of the word 'religious' [as used in the Selective

Service Act]." Id. at 341.

47. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). In basing this expansive
concept of religion on the language of the Selective Service Act, it is at least arguable
that the Court intended to limit its application to cases arising thereunder. But see
Valente, Aid to Church Related Education - New Directions Without Dogma, 55
VA. L. REv. 579, 610 (1969). See also Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1381, 1425 (1967).
48. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court held unconstitutional a state statute which
denied a Sabbatarian unemployment compensation. Petitioner had refused to accept
employment which required her to work on Saturday contrary to her religious beliefs.
Justice Brennan, expressing the view of the majority, stated:
[The statute cannot] be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that
unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant's "right" but merely a
"privilege." It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and
expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a
benefit or privilege.
Id. at 404. See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
49. Chief Justice Weintraub stated:
I can think of nothing more unmanageable than an inquiry into a man's
religious, spiritual and ethical creed. There is no catalogue of tolerable beliefs.
Nor would the nature of man permit one, for man is inherently intolerant as to
matters unknowable, and the intensity of his intolerance is twin with the intensity
of his views. I assume the majority would never deny adoption "solely" because
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plaintiffs might have been denied the adoption if the religious factor and
only one additional factor - e.g., age, financial stability, race, or education - had been unfavorable. Application of a religious test 5° or the
placing of a condition 51 on the prospective adoptive parents' opportunity
to adopt the child would appear violative 'of the free exercise clause
under either court's view since both standards penalize the adoptive
parents for adhering to their religious faith. The Supreme Court has
indicated that conditions placed upon the opportunity to serve as a notary
public51 and the privilege of receiving unemployment compensation5 8 and
tax preferences54 cannot be sanctioned if they infringe first amendment
freedoms. Certainly the opportunity to adopt a child is no less important.
While admitting that religion and morality are not equatable, 55 and
that in the Burkes' case there existed no valid secular purpose for requiring religious affiliation,5 6 the court, nevertheless, announced that an
inquiry into prospective adoptive parents' spiritual or ethical beliefs was
valid. The majority's rationale rested on the theory that since morality
is a legitimate secular consideration under the best interests of the child
doctrine, and that morality is reflective of one's conduct and conduct
is a product of one's beliefs, an inquiry into the adoptive parents' beliefs
would serve a valid secular purpose.5 7 The difficulty with this analysis is
that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Conceding arguendo
that conduct is a product of one's beliefs, the nexus between an inquiry
into spiritual beliefs and it serving a valid secular purpose has not been
established, since an investigation of the adoptive parents' conduct alone
could adequately demonstrate their moral character. A succeeding inquiry
of a belief in that area, but if the belief may be considered as the majority say
it may, then how much may be charged against an applicant who is a Jehovah's
Witness and therefore opposed to blood transfusions, or a Christian Scientist,
who, as I understand his faith, would turn to medical aid only as a last resort?
And since a man's religious, spiritual and ethical views may be more evident in
his position on specific subjects than in his abstract statement of his faith, will
it be all right to inquire of his attitude toward the war in Vietnam, or capital
punishment, or divorce, or abortion, or perhaps even public welfare, or income
taxation, or caveat emptor, in all of which some people find evidence of moral
fiber or lack of it?
59 N.J. at 58-59, 279 A.2d at 707 (concurring opinion).
50. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). The Court cited Oliver Ellsworth
who reasoned:
[T]est-laws are utterly ineffectual: they are no security at all; because men of
loose principles will, by an external compliance, evade them. If they exclude any
persons, it will be honest men, men of principle, who will rather suffer an injury,
than act contrary to the dictates of their consciences.
Id. at 494 n.9, citing 0. Ellsworth, Letters of "A Landlord," in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 170 (P. Ford ed. 1892).
51. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958).
52. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
53. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
54. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
55. 59 N.J. at 50, 279 A.2d at 792, see Broeder & Barrett, Impact of Religious
Factors in Nebraska Adoptions, 38 NEB. L. REv. 641, 669-71 (1959).
56. 59 N.J. at 50, 279 A.2d at 792-93.
57. Id. at 50, 279 A.2d at 792.
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into beliefs would be unconstitutional since there exists adequate secular
means of securing the same information.5"
Application of religious qualifications or religious matching requirements also infringe the natural parents' free exercise right where they have
consented to the adoption. A court's right to intervene is derived from the
state's right as parens patriae to protect the general welfare of the child.
This concept, however, is not without limitation. The state does not
have the power to determine matters of spiritual instruction where the
natural parents lawfully hold custody. 59 By its very nature, this right to
religiously guide their child is encompassed within the parents' right to
free exercise of religion. Thus, when the natural parents consent to
a cross-religious adoption, they are in effect determining that the child's
religion should be that of the adoptive parents. Intervention by the
state by imposition of a religious matching requirement would violate
the natural parents' first amendment freedoms. 60 Permissible limitations
on an individual's free exercise right have evolved in the areas of public
health, morality and the physical welfare of children. The Supreme Court
has shown a tendency to deviate from established principle where strong
policy considerations exist. It has upheld a state compulsory vaccination
requirement, 61 a polygamy conviction of a Mormon 62 and a statute prohibiting public sale of religious information by females under age eighteen, 63
even though each activity was performed pursuant to religious principle.
However, in the area of adoption, strong policy considerations operate
which do not support intervention by the state on religious grounds. The
abundance of children and the lack of potential willing parents compel
reduction of the barriers to adoptions.6 4 Additionally, the cost of foster
care and the inability of the state to provide for secure emotional develop58. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (concurring
opinion) ; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). Of further significance is
that an inquiry into an individual's beliefs relies heavily on the expression of those
beliefs in court, and the reliability of such evidence is seriously suspect in view of its
subjective nature.
59. See Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 107 So. 2d 885 (1958) ; People ex rel.
Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936). Professor Giannella has stated:
[Religious orphanages that care for wards of the state] stand in loco parentis
to their charges and, to the extent that they can properly exercise the prerogatives
of parents, they can control the religious formation of the children intrusted
to them.
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II.
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 560 (1968).
60. See List, supra note 6, at 54; Comment, The Religious Factor in New York
Adoption Proceedings, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 825, 833 (1967); Note, Constitutionality
of Mandatory Religious Requirements in Child Care, 64 YALE L.J. 772, 784 (1955).
61. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Public welfare also has been
held to be a legitimate state concern justifying limitations on an individual's free
exercise right. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
62. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
63. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). But see Giannella, supra
note 47, at 1396.
64. Morgenstern, The New Face of Adoption, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1971, at 72.
See also Note, Religious Factors in Adoption, 28 IND. L.J. 401, 402 (1953).
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ment raise serious problems, 5 indicating that consideration of religion
and other limiting factors not related to the temporal welfare of the
child have a counter-productive effect.
Special circumstances pose different problems. For instance, where
the natural parents, incident to lawful custody, have designated a religious
denomination for the child, 66 the court, in considering this designation,
would not be considering religion per se, but would be granting recognition
to the natural parents' free exercise right under the first amendment.
Thus, there would be a permissible limitation on the first amendment
right of the adoptive parents due to the paramount concern for the
natural parents' constitutional right.0 7 Recognition, however, should not
extend beyond a religious designation made incident to lawful custody.
Where the courts recognize parental rights after the natural parents have
abandoned the child,68 the limitation on the adoptive parents' first amendment freedoms cannot be justified.
Another instance is where the child has been reared in a particular
faith and is old enough to maturely adhere to it. Limitation on the
adoptive parents' free exercise right may be justified on either of two
grounds. First, the court could recognize the child's free exercise right
in which case this right would be of paramount concern under the best
interests of the child doctrine. Second, the court may have a valid secular
aim; i.e., preserving the psychological or emotional welfare of the child.
This would not constitute consideration of religion per se, but would be
a protection of the child's temporal welfare. 69
The establishment clause of the first amendment also represents a bar
to a court's involvement with the religious factor in adoption proceedings.
In the instant case the New Jersey supreme court recognized that the
judiciary is incompetent to impose religious qualifications on the adoptive
parents' opportunity to adopt the child.7 0 The United States Supreme
Court has consistently held that the state must maintain a posture of strict
neutrality on the issue of religion.71 However, not only do religious
qualifications contravene the establishment clause, but judicial imputation
65. R. ISAAC, ADOPTING A CHILD TODAY 148-49 (1965).
66. The term "religious designation," as used within the scope of this Note,
means parental stipulation of the child's religion at the time of adoption. It does not
pertain to religious induction rites to which the child may have been exposed, e.g.,
baptism or circumcision.
67. Even this position has been criticized on the basis that the natural parents do
not have the right to control other aspects of the child's development after adoption,
and therefore should not have the right to control the child's religious upbringing.
H. CLARK, supra note 4, at 647.
68. In re Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1951). See text accompanying note 14 infra.
69. Where the child is too young to maturely adhere to a religious faith, no
relation would exist between the religious factor and the emotional factor. In this
situation, some other legitimate secular interest must be found to support consideration of religion. Michigan, for example, no longer permits consideration of religion
where the child is below the age of eight. See Morgenstern, supra note 64, at 72.
70. 59 N.J. at 53, 279 A.2d at 794.
71. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1961) ; McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) ;-Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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of religion to a child is subject to the same constitutional criticism. 72
This is true whether practiced pursuant to either the New York or
Pennsylvania approaches. By granting the force of law to baptismal or
other inductive rites, to the exclusion of other relevant factors, 78 or by
presuming the child's religion to be that of the natural parents, in the
absence of parental designation, the courts do violence to the spirit of
neutrality. 74 Recent decisions may indicate a trend toward relaxing the
requirement of strict neutrality, most noticeably in the areas of tax exemptions to religious institutions 75 and aid to church-related education. 76
There, strong policy considerations have justified the Court's accommodation to the religious institution. However, the underlying policy considerations which help support these holdings do not operate in the area
of adoption. On the contrary, the policy factors that do exist support
77
adherence to the concept of strict neutrality.
Assuming that the Burkes' Humanism does not fall within the
constitutional concept of religion, the denial of the adoption could be
challenged on equal protection grounds. While the trial court decided
that the child had a right to worship as she saw fit 78 - a free exercise
holding - the essential preliminary issue was whether the court was
constitutionally competent to determine that a particular religion or religiosity in general would better serve the general welfare of the child.
To follow the court's reasoning would foreclose the opportunity to adopt
by persons holding unorthodox beliefs. 79 Mr. Justice Jackson, expressing
the equal protection precept, stated:
72. See Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption
Proceedings, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 649, 681 (1959). But see List, supra note 6, at 54.
73. See Note, 65 HARV. L. REV. 694, 695 (1952).
74. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Speaking for the majority, Mr.
Justice Douglas stated:
The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects. It
may not thrust any sect on any person. It may not make a religious observance
compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend church, to observe a religious
holiday, or to take religious instruction.
Id. at 314.
75. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding a property tax
exemption to religious organizations for property used solely for religious purposes).
76. In Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the Court upheld a state
statute which made provision for loans of secular textbooks to parochial school students.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), upheld Title I of the Higher Education
Facilities Act of 1963, which provided for construction grants to sectarian schools for
buildings and facilities used exclusively for secular education. But see Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), noted in 17 VILL. L. REV. 574 (1972), where the
Court struck down a state statute which directly reimbursed nonpublic schools for
actual instructional expenditures. See generally Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The
Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 147; Valente,
supra note 47.
77. See text accompanying notes 64 & 65 supra.
78. 112 N.J. Super. at 330, 271 A.2d at 30.
79. One commentator has indicated that it is customary in New York, when
placing foundlings whose parents' religion is not known, to allocate them among
Catholic, Protestant and Jewish applicants in the proportion which the three groups
appear in the general population. H. CLARK, supra note 4, at 647 n.61.
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[The states] must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate
between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation
fairly related to the object of regulation."0
The best interests of the child doctrine, developed for the purpose of
securing a beneficial adoption for the child, 8' validly includes consideration
of the adoptive parents' moral character. However, since morality "does
not lie within the exclusive province of religion," 2 discrimination based
on religion does not bear a rational relation to the purpose of the doctrine.
Furthermore, classifications based on religion,8 as with those based on
race,8 4 are subject to a higher standard of scrutiny under the equal
protection clause. There must exist a compelling state interest and a
necessary relation between that interest and the classification. Here, that
nexus has not been established, and the fact that religion plays a lesser
role in the eventual disposition of the adoption decree should be of
no moment.
Mandatory religious matching statutes are likewise subject to constitutional criticism on equal protection grounds" if we treat the prospective
adoptive parents and the child as a unit. Where a difference in religious
background exists, the adoptive unit is denied the opportunity to adopt
and to live a normal life, without application of the best interests of the
child doctrine. Where religious backgrounds match, the adoptive unit is
afforded the application of the doctrine to determine the disposition of the
decree. The difference in application of law between the two classes
constitutes a violation of equal protection because it bears no rational
relation to a compelling state interest.
Closely allied to the equal protection consideration is the argument
that a child is denied due process of law when, because of mandatory
religious matching standards, his temporal welfare is not considered.86
80. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (concurring
opinion).
81. See note 37 supra.
It has been suggested that:
[Child placement] laws also fulfill important and well-recognized needs in the
adult population - the need of childless couples for a family and the need of
natural parents (and especially the unwed mother) who cannot care for their
children of a social mechanism to assure them that the welfare of their children
will be protected. With regard to these interests, the object of the adoption law
is to give . . . natural parents some control of the choice of adoptive parents
(generally, consent is required).

List, supra note 6, at 51.

82. 59 N.J. at 50, 279 A.2d at 792-3.
83. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court stated:
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable
state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, "[o]nly
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation .

Id. at 406, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).

84. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U S.

483 (1954).
85. See List, supra note 6, at 51; Comment, supra note 60, at 834.
86. See Comment, supra note 60, at 834; Note, supra note 60, at 783.
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Interpreting the due process clause, the Court in Meyer v. Nebraska"
posited that liberty, as a concept, included "the right of the individual to
• ..marry, establish a home and bring up children .
*..."88
It is submitted that encompassed within this concept is the child's corollary right
to live in a home and enjoy a normal life. The application of mandatory
religious matching standards prevents consideration of other relevant
factors and consequently denies the child his fundamental right to
protection of his general welfare.8 9 Due process requirements strongly
suggest at the very least that the child's temporal welfare be considered
before a disposition of the adoption decree is made. Without this fundamental safeguard, the entire purpose for the adoption proceeding is
frustrated.
Constitutional analysis and consideration of policy leads to the conclusion that the judicial attitude adopted by Missouri, and advocated by
Chief Justice Weintraub represents the most enlightened view on the issue
of religion in adoption. Unfortunately, the law is slow to change and,
at present, a trend toward holding the religious protection laws unconstitutional has not been established. Unmistakably clear, however, is
the fact that increasing social pressures on the courts will undoubtedly
have a profound impact on the weight accorded the religious factor, among
other exclusionary factors, in the future.

Richard McCarthy
87. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
88. Id. at 399.
89. See Note, supra note 60, at 783.
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